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PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OVER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Curtis A. Bradley∗ & Jack L. Goldsmith∗∗ 
Presidents have come to dominate the making, interpretation, and termination of 
international law for the United States.  Often without specific congressional concurrence, 
and sometimes even when it is likely that Congress would disagree, Presidents assert the 
authority to (a) make a vast array of international obligations for the United States, 
through both written agreements and the development of customary international law; (b) 
make increasingly consequential political commitments for the United States on 
practically any topic; (c) interpret these obligations and commitments; and (d) terminate 
or withdraw from these obligations and commitments.  While others have examined pieces 
of this picture, no one has considered the picture as a whole.  For this and other reasons, 
commentators have failed to appreciate the overall extent of presidential unilateralism in 
this area, as well as the extent to which Presidents are able to shift between different 
pathways of authority in order to circumvent potential restraints.  This trend, moreover, 
has become more pronounced in recent years. 
In many ways, the growth of this vast executive control over international law resembles 
the rise of presidential power in other modern contexts ranging from administrative law 
to covert action.  Unlike in those other contexts, however, there is no systematic regulatory 
apparatus to guide or review the exercise of presidential control over international law.  
After presenting a descriptive account of the rise of such control, the Article turns to 
normative issues about the legality and broader legitimacy of this practice.  It concludes 
that much of the modern practice has a plausible legal foundation but that some recent 
presidential actions and arguments relating to international agreements are questionable 
under generally accepted separation of powers principles.  It also explains that the broader 
legitimacy question is difficult to assess because it turns on contested issues about the 
aims of presidential control, its efficacy in practice, and the costs and benefits of possible 
accountability mechanisms.  After mapping out these and related considerations, the 
Article argues for one general accountability reform: significantly heightened transparency 
of executive branch actions and their legal bases.  The Article then assesses the costs and 
benefits of additional accountability reforms that might become appropriate as more 
information about presidential control comes to light. 
INTRODUCTION 
wo of President Barack Obama’s most important foreign policy ac-
complishments were the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, 
which aims to lower greenhouse gas emissions, and the Iran Nuclear 
Agreement, which lifted international and domestic sanctions against 
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Iran in exchange for Iran’s dismantling of its nuclear weapons develop-
ment program.  President Obama made both agreements unilaterally 
without seeking congressional approval.  His successor, President  
Donald Trump, came into office as a critic of the agreements.  He, too, 
acted unilaterally — this time moving to withdraw the United States 
from the Paris Agreement.  He has also claimed the authority to unilat-
erally terminate the Iran deal, but to date he has not done so, in part 
because President Obama’s alteration of the status quo makes it difficult 
to terminate the deal without harming U.S. interests. 
The Paris Agreement and the Iran deal have had significant impacts 
on U.S. foreign relations, on U.S. domestic law, and on the rights and 
duties of U.S. firms and persons.  Whatever one thinks about the merits 
of these two agreements, it is a remarkable development in U.S. consti-
tutional law that the decisions to make, to continue, and to terminate 
them, and to generate these impacts, can be made by the President alone. 
The Paris Agreement and the Iran deal are but two recent instances 
in what has been a long accretion of presidential control over interna-
tional law since the constitutional Founding.  The only provision in the 
Constitution that specifically addresses how the United States can make 
international law is Article II, section 2, which provides that the  
President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur.”1  But the U.S. government has long assumed international ob-
ligations through several mechanisms other than the Article II process.  
In addition, Presidents have long interpreted U.S. treaties and custom-
ary international law, and engaged in related diplomatic communica-
tions, in a manner that seeks to expand or narrow U.S. obligations under 
those laws.  They have also made and interpreted international law in 
international organizations, where the President’s agents represent the 
nation.  And they have long asserted the authority as well to unilaterally 
withdraw the United States from international agreements. 
Through the accumulation of these and other pathways of control, 
Presidents (and the executive branch more generally) have come to dom-
inate the creation, alteration, and termination of international law for 
the United States.2  Many presidential acts of control over international 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 2 For ease of exposition, we generally use the terms “presidential control” and “executive branch 
control” interchangeably in this Article, even though power accrued by executive branch depart-
ments and agencies will not always benefit or be exercisable by the President directly.  Our main 
emphasis in this Article is on the lack of meaningful legislative collaboration in the making, inter-
pretation, and termination of international law, so the distinction between the President and the 
executive branch, while important in other contexts, is not central to our analysis.  In any event, as 
we note below, the White House in recent years has sought to exercise greater control over non-
binding international commitments made by the executive branch.  See infra note 62; see also Jean 
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law are authorized or approved in some fashion by Congress, although 
some of the most important congressional authorizations are quite gen-
eral and were conferred decades ago when the domestic and interna-
tional consequences of the authorizations were different and much less 
significant.  Many other elements of presidential control are not author-
ized by Congress, or congressional authorization is contested.  Scholars 
have focused on presidential control over international law in discrete 
contexts, but no one has considered the President’s collective array of 
powers.  Piecemeal consideration of these presidential powers misses 
both the overall extent of presidential control and the degree to which 
the various options for control have become interchangeable in ways 
that reduce constraints on presidential action.  It also misses how the 
very multiplicity and complexity of the various powers, combined with 
a lack of transparency, make it difficult to evaluate when Presidents 
have exceeded their authority. 
Presidential control over international law matters for the United 
States much more than is commonly appreciated.3  Courts apply inter-
national law directly as domestic law or indirectly when interpreting 
statutes or regulations in accordance with the Charming Betsy canon,4 
and in both contexts often give presidential interpretations of interna-
tional law substantial deference.  More importantly, the international 
law that reaches courts is a tiny fraction of the international law that 
the President controls via lawmaking, interpretation, and termination.  
This vast array of international law can raise the hurdles to domestic 
lawmaking by Congress and have significant effects on the actions of 
U.S. states and private actors.  In addition, this law can have important 
effects on the decisionmaking options of future Presidents.  To be sure, 
future Presidents have discretion under domestic constitutional law to 
alter the international law obligations made by prior Presidents through 
interpretation and termination, as we shall show.  But the political costs 
of doing so are often high, both in the domestic realm and especially in 
international relations, where the United States typically has a strong 
interest in compliance with its international obligations, in part so that 
it can expect compliance or cooperation from other nations. 
The growth of presidential control over international law resembles 
the rise of executive power in other modern contexts ranging from ad-
ministrative law to covert action.  As with these other developments, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Galbraith, From Treaties to International Commitments: The Changing Landscape of Foreign Re-
lations Law, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1675 (2017).  In addition, pursuant to both statutory directive and 
administrative regulation, the conclusion of binding international agreements is supposed to be 
centrally coordinated with the State Department.  See 1 U.S.C. § 112b(c) (2012); 22 C.F.R. § 181.4(a) 
(2017).  
 3 See infra Part III, pp. 1245–57. 
 4 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of  
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
remains . . . .”). 
1201-1297_BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH_CONTRACTPROOFS 02/04/18 – 4:47 PM 
1206 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:1201 
much presidential control over international law is the result of broad 
delegations of authority from Congress and accretions of executive 
branch practice in the face of congressional inaction.  In all of these 
realms, moreover, there are strong functional arguments for executive 
branch leadership and discretion given the scale and complexity of mod-
ern government.  But there is a large difference between the other ele-
ments of presidential power and the President’s control over interna-
tional law: there have been extensive efforts over the decades to oversee 
and regulate executive power in these other contexts, but no such com-
prehensive accountability regime applies to presidential control over  
international law, in part because Congress has never focused on the 
overall picture. 
This Article describes, analyzes, and proposes reforms for presiden-
tial control over international law.  Part I describes presidential control 
over international agreements.  Part II describes presidential control 
over other forms of international law.  Part III shows how the various 
pathways of control can be substituted or combined to further increase 
presidential power, and it explains the many ways that presidential con-
trol over international law matters for domestic actors and institutions.  
The next two Parts turn to normative issues.  Part IV considers the ex-
tent to which there is legal authority for presidential control over inter-
national law and outlines a framework for discerning implicit congres-
sional authorization.  Part V assesses the adequacy of existing 
accountability constraints on presidential control over international law, 
an especially challenging task because the normative framework for as-
sessing presidential control over international law is contested and be-
cause many factual elements of the practice are unknown.  For these 
reasons, our proposals for reform are relatively modest and focus on 
transparency, although we also outline the costs and benefits of more 
ambitious reform options.   
I.  PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OVER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS 
This Part describes the reality of presidential control over the mak-
ing, interpretation, and termination of international agreements for the 
United States.  The basic story is that presidential power over interna-
tional agreements has grown to the point of near-complete control. 
A.  Unilateral Presidential Power to Make Binding  
International Agreements 
The Constitution expressly identifies only one mechanism for mak-
ing international agreements.  Article II provides that the President 
“shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
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to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”5  
A principal reason for requiring legislative involvement in that process 
was that international commitments can have important and long-term 
consequences for the United States and thus should not be determined 
by the President alone.6 
There is no evidence that the Founders discussed the possibility that 
the U.S. government would make international agreements through any 
process other than the treaty process.7  Nonetheless, beginning in the 
1790s, the U.S. government began to make some international agree-
ments through mechanisms other than the one described in Article II, 
although for a long time Article II treaties were still the dominant mode 
of agreement making.8  This section explains the rise and significance of 
these alternate mechanisms, and shows how the President has come to 
use them to make the vast majority of international agreements for the 
United States without meaningful input from Congress or the Senate. 
1.  Forms of International Agreement Making. — Under modern 
practice, there are five recognized mechanisms through which the 
United States can make an international agreement with another nation 
that is binding under international law: (1) a treaty made by the  
President with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate; (2) an 
ex ante congressional-executive agreement in which Congress authorizes 
the President by statute to make and conclude an international agree-
ment; (3) an ex post congressional-executive agreement, in which Con-
gress by statute approves an international agreement previously negoti-
ated by the President; (4) an executive agreement pursuant to treaty, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 5 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 6 Alexander Hamilton emphasized this point in the Federalist Papers, despite otherwise being 
a strong supporter of executive authority.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 448–53 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (explaining that the treaty power belongs “neither to the 
legislative nor to the executive” and that whereas the executive branch is “the most fit agent” for 
negotiation, “the vast importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly 
for the participation of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in the office of making them,” 
id. at 449); see also id. at 450 (explaining that it would be unwise “to commit interests of so delicate 
and momentous a kind, as those which concern [this country’s] intercourse with the rest of the 
world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a President of 
the United States”). 
 7 On the lack of discussion about congressional-executive agreements at the Founding, see 
Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 808–13 
(1995).  The leading originalist accounts of sole executive agreements do not cite evidence of the 
Founders having discussed such a power.  See Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive 
Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573 (2007); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the 
(Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133 (1998). 
 8 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 26, 1 Stat. 232, 239 (authorizing the Postmaster General 
by statute to conclude international agreements concerning the exchange of mail); 5 TREATIES 
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1075, 1078–79 
(Hunter Miller ed., 1937) (describing a 1799 executive agreement concluded unilaterally by  
President John Adams to settle claims by U.S. citizens against the Dutch government for lost cargo 
when Dutch privateers captured the schooner Wilmington Packet).  
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which is made by the President based on an authorization from an ex-
isting treaty; and (5) a “sole” executive agreement made by the President 
on his or her own constitutional authority.9 
The constitutional legitimacy of these mechanisms for international 
lawmaking is settled in practice, and some of these mechanisms have 
specifically been upheld by the Supreme Court.  The generally accepted 
scope of these agreement-making powers is as follows: Presidents may 
conclude treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate on just about 
any subject, and such treaties, if self-executing, can regulate domestic 
matters without any enumerated power limitation.10  Congressional- 
executive agreements (both ex ante and ex post) are interchangeable 
with treaties, at least to the extent that they find support in an Article I 
enumerated power.11  Executive agreements pursuant to treaty are valid 
if they are expressly or implicitly authorized by a treaty.12  A sole exec-
utive agreement must be grounded in Article II, although there is un-
certainty about the scope of the President’s power in this context.13 
Before describing how Presidents have come to deploy these mecha-
nisms as founts for unilateral international lawmaking, we must note a 
major hurdle to analysis of this issue.  In stark contrast to domestic law, 
it is remarkably difficult for anyone outside the State Department to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 303 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. 
 10 See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TREATIES § 112 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2017) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT (FOURTH), Tentative Draft No. 2]; see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 11 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 303(2); Ackerman & Golove, supra note 7; Oona 
A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the 
United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236 (2008). 
 12 See, e.g., Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 528–29 (1957); see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE 
UNITED STATES SENATE 86 (Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter CRS STUDY] (“Numerous agree-
ments pursuant to treaties have been concluded by the Executive, particularly of an administrative 
nature, to implement in detail generally worded treaty obligations.”). 
 13 The Supreme Court has upheld the validity and domestic application of a number of sole 
executive agreements in the context of settling claims, although it more recently described the power 
as “narrow and strictly limited,” Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008).  For decisions uphold-
ing or acknowledging the validity and domestic application of sole executive agreements, see  
American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003), which acknowledged the validity 
of “executive agreements to settle claims of American nationals”; Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 
U.S. 654, 680 (1981), which acknowledged presidential power to settle claims of U.S. nationals and 
concluded “that Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive 
agreement”; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), which upheld a sole executive agreement 
settling claims with the Soviet Union in the context of a recognition decision; and United States v. 
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), which did the same.  We return to the issue of the scope of sole 
executive agreements in section IV.A, pp. 1257–59. 
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figure out the range of and legal bases for many U.S. international agree-
ments.14  Article II treaties are easy to understand because they all go 
to the Senate labeled as such and are approved and ratified in a public 
manner.  But the other four forms of agreement are much less transpar-
ent and thus much harder to analyze in terms of their numbers, how 
they should be categorized, and their legal bases.15  For reasons we ex-
plain in detail in Part V, the executive branch does not publicize the 
international agreements it makes in a comprehensive or organized fash-
ion, and it only very rarely explains to the public (including elements of 
the public who might serve as watchdogs) the legal bases for these agree-
ments.16  As will become apparent, this remarkable uncertainty about 
the legal bases for many international agreements facilitates presidential 
unilateralism in this context. 
2.  Decline of Treaties. — Article II treaties are the paradigm case of 
collaborative (as opposed to unilateral) presidential international law-
making because the President must secure the consent of two-thirds of 
the Senate for the agreement he negotiated before he can make the 
agreement binding on the United States.  As the following chart shows, 
over the course of American history, the U.S. government in making 
binding international obligations has come to rely much more heavily 
on executive agreements — a category that for present purposes includes 
ex ante and ex post congressional-executive agreements, executive  




 14 As noted below, see infra notes 338–46 and accompanying text, sometimes even the State 
Department is unaware of international agreements entered into by various agencies.  
 15 For an excellent overview of the difficulties facing researchers interested in executive agree-
ments, see Ryan Harrington, Understanding the “Other” International Agreements, 108 LAW LIBR. 
J. 343 (2016).  
 16 The State Department has an internal process, known as the Circular 175 procedure, for 
deciding on the domestic pathway to be used in concluding an international agreement, and the 
Department’s lawyers prepare memoranda in this process discussing the legal basis for a proposed 
agreement.  See Circular 175 Procedure, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/c175/ 
[https://perma.cc/B8EL-MMS2].  But this process has been established entirely by the executive 
branch and contains highly discretionary criteria, and, more importantly, the legal memoranda are 
not shared with Congress or the public. 
 17 The first four rows come from CRS STUDY, supra note 12, at 39.  The fifth row derives from 
Hathaway, supra note 11, at 1287 (years 1990–2000); and Jeffrey S. Peake, Obama, Unilateral Di-
plomacy, and Iran: Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Political Commitments, in PRESIDENTIAL 
LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL SECURITY: THE OBAMA LEGACY AND TRUMP TRAJECTORY 
(Richard S. Conley ed., 2018) (years 2000–2012).  
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TABLE 1 
U.S. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS BY TYPE, 1789–2012 




(50 yrs.) 60 27 69.0% 
1839–1889  
(50 yrs.) 215 238 47.0% 
1889–1939  
(50 yrs.) 524 917 36.0% 
1939–1989  
(50 yrs.) 702 11,698 5.6% 
1990–2012  
(22 yrs.) 366 5491 6.2% 
 
Several factors explain the steady and ultimately sharp rise in the 
number and relative frequency of executive agreements and in their 
dominant role in U.S. agreement making.18  On the political level, the 
rise is a response to the growth over time in the number of nations, the 
density of international relations, and the number of topics regulated by 
international law.  These factors led to a spike in new agreements, espe-
cially after World War II.  That spike in turn created a demand for 
processes that would be more efficient than senatorial advice and con-
sent.  Those more efficient processes were supplied primarily by the ex 
ante congressional-executive agreement process, which (as we explain 
below) required only the lightest touch of congressional statutory ap-
proval to authorize the President to make multiple agreements, and 
which is the method used to make the largest percentage of U.S. inter-
national agreements.  As this political demand for more efficient agree-
ment making grew, political actors mostly (but not always) acquiesced 
in the changing allocation of international agreement making.19  Over 
time, the Supreme Court upheld the legality of particular executive 
agreements and thus seemed to place its imprimatur on the shift away 
from treaty making.20 
The relatively low average percentage of treaties during the last 
eighty years (6% or so) masks a historical drop-off in the use of treaties 
during the Obama Administration.  President Obama transmitted to the 
Senate only thirty-eight treaties during his eight years in office (2009–
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 18 This paragraph is drawn primarily from CRS STUDY, supra note 12, at 39; and Hathaway, 
supra note 11.   
 19 See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 7, at 861–96.   
 20 See cases cited supra note 13. 
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2017) and received Senate consent for only fifteen of those treaties.21  
Both the average number of treaties transmitted per presidential year 
during his Administration (4.75) and the percentage of treaties receiving 
Senate consent (39%) are by far the smallest in the modern period meas-
ured since President Truman, and far below the historical averages dur-
ing this period (which are 15.3 treaties per year and 92%, respectively).22  
This recent decline probably resulted from both political and structural 
factors.  The Republicans in the Senate opposed President Obama’s in-
itiatives generally, and President Obama might have anticipated that 
intransigence as a reason to reduce treaty submissions.23  The decline 
might also be explained by a reduction internationally in the number of 
multilateral treaties and the possibility that some forms of bilateral trea-
ties — on topics like tax and extradition — are in less demand because 
the United States has completed such treaties with most nations.24  Such 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 We derive these figures from the Library of Congress database of every treaty document  
submitted to the Senate, which notes whether the Senate has given its consent.  See Treaty  
Documents, CONGRESS.GOV [hereinafter Treaty Documents Database], https://www.congress.gov/ 
search?q=%7B%22source%22:%5B%22treaties%22%5D%7D [https://perma.cc/HFQ7-JD5Y].  
 22 See Peake, supra note 17.  Professor Jeffrey Peake uses the Treaty Documents Database, see 
supra note 21, to calculate these historical averages.  However, he appears not to have accounted 
for a quirk in the process by which the Treaty Documents Database lists treaties.  Presidents trans-
mit a treaty to the Senate for its approval by sending to the Senate a “treaty document” that contains 
a copy of the treaty and a “letter of transmittal” that summarizes the treaty and recommends that 
the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification.  However, Presidents sometimes submit mul-
tiple treaties in a single treaty document, which the Treaty Documents Database then lists (and 
Peake counts) as one treaty.  For example, in 2006, President Bush sent the Senate in a single treaty 
document “[the] Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance between the United States of America and 
the European Union . . . together with twenty-five bilateral instruments which subsequently  
were signed between the United States and each European Union Member State.”  Mutual Legal  
Assistance Agreement, E.U.-U.S., Sept. 28, 2006, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 109-13.  While the treaty 
document makes clear that the treaty with the EU and the bilateral instruments are twenty-six 
distinct treaties, the Treaty Documents Database listed (and Peake counted) these twenty-six trea-
ties as one treaty.  This means that he undercounted the number of treaties submitted by Presidents 
before President Obama and understated the proportion of treaties submitted by pre-Obama  
Presidents to which the Senate has consented.  (This quirk never arose during the Obama presi-
dency.)  For two reasons, however, this undercounting does not affect our basic point about the 
decline in submitted and approved treaties.  First, the submission of several treaties within a single 
treaty document appears to have occurred just a few times, and thus only slightly skews Peake’s 
large and otherwise very useful database.  Second, to the extent that Peake’s data are inaccurate, 
they understate the number of treaties past Presidents submitted to the Senate and the proportion 
of those treaties to which the Senate consented, which means that, if anything, the disparity between 
President Obama and his predecessors is almost certainly greater than Peake’s data might suggest. 
 23 However, the drop-off in the number of treaties submitted during the Obama Administration 
began in President Obama’s first year in office, when his party controlled the Senate.  
 24 Cf. Duncan Hollis, Comparing Obama and Bush’s Treaty Priorities, OPINIO JURIS (June 4, 
2009, 3:08 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2009/06/04/comparing-obama-and-bushs-treaty-priorities/ 
[https://perma.cc/N93B-6HC9] (attributing large drop-off in treaties pending in the Senate to “the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s push last fall to move non-controversial treaties through the 
Article 2 process, resulting in dozens of treaties receiving Senate advice and consent, most notably 
the 40-plus treaties with the EU and its member states on extradition and mutual legal assistance”).  
See generally Cindy Galway Buys, An Empirical Look at U.S. Treaty Practice: Some Preliminary 
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a structural explanation is supported by the fact that, although President 
George W. Bush submitted and received Senate consent for many more 
treaties than did President Obama, his numbers were lower than Presi-
dent Clinton’s and those of his father, President George H.W. Bush.25 
3.  Decline of Congressional Participation in Nontreaty Agree-
ments. — The relative decline of treaties and the relative increase in ex-
ecutive agreements do not by themselves tell us much about the fre-
quency of unilateral executive lawmaking.  To see the extent of 
presidential unilateralism and the decline of collaborative international 
lawmaking, we must break down the approximately 94% of U.S. inter-
national agreements made in the last several decades that are not trea-
ties.  One category of agreement, the ex post congressional-executive 
agreement, is akin to the treaty in terms of interbranch collaboration 
because Congress (as opposed to the Senate) can review the deal made 
by the President and decide whether or not to approve it.  But the 
United States very rarely makes this form of agreement; based on our 
review, it has averaged no more than about one per year of these agree-
ments in recent decades, having almost no effect on the percentages.26  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Conclusions, 108 AJIL UNBOUND 57 (2014) (speculating about decline in multilateral treaty  
ratification). 
 25 See Peake, supra note 17, at 35.   
 26 We have discovered only nineteen such agreements since 1980.  See Act of Dec. 16, 2016, Pub. 
L. No. 114-320, 130 Stat. 1621 (approving nuclear agreement with Norway); Bipartisan Budget Act 
of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-67, § 303, 127 Stat. 1165, 1181 (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1356b note) 
(approving hydrocarbon agreement with Mexico); United States-Panama Trade Promotion Agree-
ment Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-43, 125 Stat. 497 (2011) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3805 
note (2012)); United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-42, 125 Stat. 462 (2011) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3805 note); United States-Korea Free Trade 
Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-41, 125 Stat. 428 (2011) (codified as amended at 
19 U.S.C. § 3805 note); United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation 
Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 110-369, 122 Stat. 4028 (2008) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8001 note 
(2012)); United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 110-138, 
121 Stat. 1455 (2007) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3805 note); United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-283, 120 Stat. 1191 (2006) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3805 note); 
United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-169, 119 Stat. 
3581 (2006) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3805 note); Dominican Republic-Central America-United States 
Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-53, 119 Stat. 462 (2005) (codified in 
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.) (approving free trade agreement between the United States, Costa 
Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua); United States-
Morocco Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-302, 118 Stat. 1103 (2004) 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3805 note); United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement Implementation 
Act, Pub. L. No. 108-286, 118 Stat. 919 (2004) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3805 note); United States-
Singapore Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-78, 117 Stat. 948 (2003) 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3805 note); United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 
Pub. L. No. 108-77, 117 Stat. 909 (2003) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 3805 note); United 
States-Jordan Free Trade Area Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 107-43, 115 Stat. 243 (2001) (cod-
ified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 note); Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 
4809 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); North American Free 
Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified as 
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As a result, close to 94% of binding international agreements made by 
the United States are made without meaningful interbranch deliberation 
and are thus vehicles for unilateral presidential lawmaking. 
The largest category of U.S. international agreements, approximately 
80–85% of the total, consists of ex ante congressional-executive agree-
ments.27  As Professor Oona Hathaway has shown in her foundational 
work in this area, such agreements generally involve little if any  
meaningful congressional input.28  In contrast to treaties and ex post  
congressional-executive agreements, the President does not bring a ne-
gotiated ex ante agreement with specific terms to Congress for its debate 
and approval (or rejection).  Instead, Congress provides the President 
with general advance authorization to make an agreement (or many 
agreements) that the President in his or her broad discretion can nego-
tiate, conclude, and ratify without ever returning to Congress for its re-
view, much less approval.  Moreover, the purported authorization for 
most ex ante congressional-executive agreements is vague and enacted 
many years before the agreement. 
For example, one prominent basis for ex ante congressional- 
executive agreements is the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.29  It 
states that the President shall “conclude agreements . . . to effectuate the 
policies and purposes of this Act,”30 which include providing various 
forms of military assistance to support “individual and collective self-
defense” in order to maintain “peace and security.”31  This statute gives 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
amended in scattered sections of 17, 19, and 22 U.S.C.); United States-Canada Free-Trade  
Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (codified as amended 
at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 note); United States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, Pub. 
L. No. 99-47, 99 Stat. 82 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 note).   
 27 It is impossible to know precisely what percentage of U.S. agreements are ex ante agreements 
because not all agreements are reported, and because the legal basis for many agreements, and thus 
the type of agreement it is, is unclear.  We use the number 80–85% as a rough guess for the following 
reasons: The most comprehensive study of ex ante congressional-executive agreements concludes, 
although without much explanation, that they are “roughly eighty percent of all U.S. international 
legal commitments.”  Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring 
the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 145 (2009).  An earlier study found that between 1946 and 1972, 
88.3% of U.S. international agreements “were based at least partly on statutory authority.”  CRS 
STUDY, supra note 12, at 41 (citing CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95TH CONG., INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF EXECUTIVE REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES 22 (Comm. 
Print 1977)).  For present purposes, the uncertainty in the precise percentage of ex ante congres-
sional-executive agreements is immaterial.  
 28 See Hathaway, supra note 27, at 155–67.  Hathaway’s article is an especially important con-
tribution to the topic of presidential control over international law because of its deep empirical 
analysis of modern executive agreements, especially ex ante congressional-executive agreements, 
and its demonstration of the extraordinary extent to which Presidents make executive agreements 
without genuine congressional collaboration.  While we are indebted to Hathaway’s empirical and 
analytical work, we take issue with some of her prescriptions.  See infra section V.A, pp. 1271–87. 
 29 Ch. 626, 63 Stat. 714. 
 30 Id. § 402, 63 Stat. at 717. 
 31 Id. § 1, 63 Stat. at 714. 
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the President essentially unfettered discretion to make agreements, with 
any nation, in accordance with his or her conception of what the  
national defense requires, without ever returning to Congress.  Similarly, 
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 198832 states without 
further guidance that “[t]he President may enter into an agreement with 
any country that has a positive trade balance with the United States 
under which that country would purchase United States agricultural 
commodities or products for use in agreed-on development activities in  
developing countries.”33  Most statutory authorizations for ex ante  
congressional-executive agreements are similarly open-ended in their 
guidance to the President.  They give the President significant discretion 
to conclude and make agreements that bind the United States under 
international law, usually without further congressional review or even 
notice.  This is why Hathaway concludes, correctly in our view, that  
ex ante congressional-executive agreements “possess the form of  
congressional-executive cooperation without the true collaboration.”34 
We can now see why the sharp decline in the percentage of treaties 
and the rise in executive agreements indicate a sharp drop in meaningful 
interbranch collaboration and a rise in presidential unilateralism in the 
making of international agreements.  Genuine interbranch collaboration 
via Article II treaties or ex post congressional-executive agreements oc-
curs for approximately 6–7% of binding U.S. international agreements.  
Approximately 80–85% of U.S. international agreements are ex ante 
congressional-executive agreements that involve no meaningful inter-
branch collaboration.35  Executive agreements pursuant to treaties, 
which we estimate make up approximately 1–3% of U.S. agreements, 
involve no more meaningful interbranch collaboration than ex ante  
congressional-executive agreements, and basically for the same reason.36  
And about 5–10% of U.S. agreements are sole executive agreements, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107. 
 33 Id. § 4203(b), 102 Stat. at 1392 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 5213 (2012)).  To take another example, 
the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2451–2464 (2012), au-
thorizes the Secretary of State “to enter into agreements with foreign governments and international 
organizations,” id. § 2453, to further the statutory purposes of (among other things) “increas[ing] 
mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries by 
means of educational and cultural exchange” and “promot[ing] international cooperation for educa-
tional and cultural advancement,” id. § 2451. 
 34 Hathaway, supra note 27, at 213. 
 35 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 36 This is a rough estimate based on subtracting from the percentages for other types of agree-
ments.  The number is admittedly speculative.  As discussed further below, see infra text accompa-
nying note 342, the domestic legal bases for nontreaty agreements are often unclear, making it dif-
ficult to categorize them. 
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which Presidents make unilaterally on their own constitutional author-
ity.37  While it is impossible to tell precisely the percentage allocation of 
these three instruments, one can say with confidence that they together 
make up close to 94% of all binding U.S. agreements. 
In her 2009 study of congressional-executive agreements, Hathaway 
concludes that the task of making international agreements “has come 
to be borne almost entirely by the President alone.”38  The President’s 
unilateral powers have only increased since that time with the precipi-
tous decline in the use of treaties under President Obama.  Two other 
developments, to which we now turn, have left the President in an even 
more dominant position when it comes to making international agree-
ments for the United States. 
4.  Rise of “Executive Agreements+”. — Hathaway’s study notes that 
the statutory authorizations for ex ante congressional-executive agree-
ments “are often extremely broad.”39  We believe that this understates 
the extent of presidential unilateralism in this area, even on the evidence 
that Hathaway presents.  Many of the purported statutory authoriza-
tions relied upon by Presidents to make executive agreements have not 
obviously authorized the making of international agreements at all, even 
in broad terms.  For example, some have authorized the President to 
provide assistance to foreign nations without specifying that the form of 
assistance should (or could) come through an international agreement.40  
Others simply have authorized the President to establish a program 
without specifying that he or she should do so via an international agree-
ment.41  In some and perhaps many cases it is unclear whether Congress 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 37 Like ex ante congressional-executive agreements, and for the same reason, the number of sole 
executive agreements is elusive.  We base the 5–10% number on studies that found (during different 
periods) that they constitute 5.9% of all agreements, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE  
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION: 
ANALYSIS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES TO JUNE 
28, 2002, S. DOC. NO. 108-17, at 517 & n.394 (2004) (citing C.H. McLaughlin, The Scope of the 
Treaty Power in the United States II, 43 MINN. L. REV. 651, 721 tbl.3 (1959)); 5.5% of all agree-
ments, id. (citing CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 27, at 22); and 7% of all agreements,  
Harrington, supra note 15, at 348.  Hathaway finds that between 1990 and 2000, approximately 
20% of all executive agreements (as opposed to all agreements) were sole executive agreements, 
though she notes her “rough calculation” and she appears to include some nonbinding political 
commitments in her calculation.  Hathaway, supra note 27, at 155 & n.29.  
 38 Hathaway, supra note 27, at 144. 
 39 Id. at 166. 
 40 See, e.g., id. at 156–57 (noting variety of agreements based on the authority conferred by the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 503, 75 Stat. 424, 435 (codified as amended 
at 22 U.S.C. § 2311 (2012)), which merely states that “[t]he President is authorized to furnish military 
assistance on such terms and conditions as he may determine,” id.). 
 41 See, e.g., id. at 165 (noting that, as authority to conclude agreements, the executive branch 
has relied on the International Anti-Corruption and Good Governance Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2152c, which merely states that “[t]he President is authorized to establish programs that combat 
corruption, improve transparency and accountability, and promote other forms of good governance 
in [eligible] countries,” § 2152c(a)(1)). 
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even intended to delegate international agreement-making power to the 
President. 
In recent years, the purported statutory bases for some executive 
agreements have grown so tenuous as to be nonexistent.  A much- 
discussed example is the Minamata Convention on Mercury, a compre-
hensive international agreement concerning the production, use, and 
disposal of the chemical, which was concluded in 2013.42  The Obama 
Administration never claimed that the Convention fell within the au-
thority of the President to conclude sole executive agreements.  Nor did 
the Administration claim that Congress actually authorized the Conven-
tion.  Instead, it merely observed that the Convention “complements 
domestic measures by addressing the transnational nature of the prob-
lem” and noted that the United States “can implement Convention ob-
ligations under existing legislative and regulatory authority.”43 
Professors Dan Bodansky and Peter Spiro invoke the Minamata 
Convention as one of several examples of a new form of international 
agreement that they call the “Executive Agreement+.”44  An Executive 
Agreement+ is not authorized by Congress, for then it would be a  
congressional-executive agreement.45  Rather, it is an agreement that is 
merely “consistent with” existing federal law.46  Bodansky and Spiro 
identify only two limits on the Executive Agreements+ power: it cannot 
be used to change existing law or extend the executive branch’s domestic 
authority, and it is “appropriate only as a complement to existing  
domestic measures, in order to address the transnational aspects of a  
problem.”47 
The Executive Agreements+ example highlights how opaque the 
process is for making international agreements without congressional 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 Minamata Convention on Mercury, adopted Oct. 10, 2013, T.I.A.S. No. 17-816. 
 43 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, United States Joins Minamata Convention on Mercury 
(Nov. 6, 2013), https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/217295.htm [https://perma.cc/BE9S-
225S]; see also Duncan Hollis, Doesn’t the U.S. Senate Care About Mercury?, OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 
12, 2013, 11:02 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/11/12/doesnt-u-s-senate-care-mercury/ [https:// 
perma.cc/TDT6-DVYE].    
 44 See Daniel Bodansky & Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements+, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
885, 910–11 (2016).  The other recent examples they cite are the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agree-
ment, a series of agreements relating to tax offshoring, and the Paris Climate Change Agreement.  
Id. at 908–19. 
 45 Id. at 897 (noting that Executive Agreements+ are not “congressional-executive agreements, 
since they lack congressional authorization or approval”). 
 46 Id. at 929; see also id. at 887–88, 919 (same). 
 47 Id. at 915.  In identifying a new form of international agreement that need not be authorized 
by Congress, the authors draw on arguments made by Professor Harold Koh while he was the 
Obama Administration’s State Department Legal Adviser.  Id. at 909.  Koh has expanded on these 
ideas since leaving the government.  See Harold Hongju Koh, Triptych’s End: A Better Framework 
to Evaluate 21st Century International Lawmaking, 126 YALE L.J.F. 338 (2017).  We address Koh’s 
arguments below in section IV.B. 
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input.  The Obama Administration concluded the Minamata Conven-
tion without offering any clear public explanation of the precise legal 
basis for the agreement.48  Such uncertainty also was evident in  
connection with the Obama Administration’s conclusion of the Anti- 
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA),49 a multinational treaty de-
signed to bolster intellectual property enforcement that never came into 
force.  The Administration negotiated the agreement in secret, and many 
observers assumed that the Administration was planning to conclude it 
without reference to congressional authorization.50  The Administration 
ultimately grounded the ACTA in the Prioritizing Resources and  
Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008,51 which directed the 
executive branch to develop a “strategic plan” against counterfeiting and 
infringement that included as an objective “to ‘work[] with other coun-
tries to establish international standards and policies for the effective 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights.’”52  This stat-
utory basis for the ACTA was controversial,53 leading some commenta-
tors to conclude that the ACTA was an early example in the direction of 
Executive Agreements+.54  
Given the nontransparency surrounding the making of international 
agreements, and the uncertain and nonpublic legal bases for them, there 
may be many other examples of Executive Agreements+ beyond the 
handful of recent examples that Bodansky and Spiro identify. 
5.  Nonbinding Political Commitments. — The discussion of unilat-
eral presidential international agreement making has thus far focused 
on agreements that are binding under international law.  But there is 
another large category of international agreements called “political com-
mitments” that further underscores presidential dominance in  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 48 See Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 44, at 911 (“The opacity of the State Department announce-
ment left commentators wondering how to classify the Minamata Convention — as a sole executive 
agreement, an ex ante congressional-executive agreement, or something else.”); cf. Hollis, supra note 
43 (“[I]f there’s no statutory authority to join the Minamata Convention, doesn’t that mean it must 
be a sole executive agreement?”). 
 49 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Oct. 1, 2011, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/ 
i_property/pdfs/acta1105_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YGW-EVAE]. 
 50 See, e.g., Letter from Senator Ron Wyden to President Barack Obama (Oct. 12, 2011), 
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=f20e3fd3-f2f1-4fc2-a387-570a575700d6&download=1 
[https://perma.cc/FM24-KWTV].  
 51 Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18, and 42 U.S.C.).  
 52 See Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, State Dep’t Legal Adviser, to Senator Ron Wyden (Mar. 
6, 2012), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/211889.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GY7-ALK4] 
(alteration in original) (quoting Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property 
Act of 2008 § 303 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8113(a)(6) (2012))).   
 53 See Letter from Legal Academics to Members of the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance  
(May 16, 2012), http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Law-Professor-Letter-to-Senate- 
Finance-Committee-May-16-20122.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZE8F-UXRK]. 
 54 See Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 44, at 908–09. 
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international agreement making, and that has become especially im-
portant in recent years. 
A political commitment is an agreement, usually written, between 
the President or one of the President’s subordinates and a foreign nation 
or foreign agency.  Its defining characteristic is that it imposes no obli-
gation under international law and a nation incurs no state responsibil-
ity for its violation.55  As a result, a successor President is not bound by 
a previous President’s political commitment under either domestic or 
international law and can thus legally disregard it at will.  The consti-
tutional basis for a political commitment is unclear, but it appears to be 
closely related to the President’s power to conduct diplomacy, since at 
bottom a political commitment is like diplomatic speech backed by a 
personal pledge of the executive official who made it.56  In practice  
Presidents have asserted the authority to make a political commitment 
on practically any topic without authorization from Congress or the  
Senate and without any obligation to even inform Congress about the 
commitment, as long as the commitment does not violate extant federal 
law. 
Prominent twentieth-century examples of political commitments in-
clude the 1941 Atlantic Charter, in which Roosevelt and Churchill an-
nounced their principles and aims for World War II, and the Helsinki 
Accords of 1975, a Cold War agreement between Western and Soviet 
Bloc nations that included commitments to respect human rights, to 
pursue peaceful dispute resolution, and to avoid interfering in the inter-
nal affairs of other nations.57  Executive branch officials in the last few 
decades have increasingly used political commitments to effectuate 
broader and deeper regulatory cooperation between U.S. government 
agencies and their foreign counterparts on a wide range of regulatory 
topics.  The Federal Reserve Board uses political commitments to coor-
dinate capital requirements and other banking rules in the United States 
with foreign bank regulators.58  The Federal Trade Commission con-
cludes them on issues ranging from bilateral antitrust cooperation to 
multilateral commitments to fight email spam.59  The Food and Drug 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 55 See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 28–53 (3d ed. 2013).  
 56 See Jack Goldsmith, Essay, The Contributions of the Obama Administration to the Practice 
and Theory of International Law, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 455, 465 (2016).  See generally Duncan B. 
Hollis & Joshua J. Newcomer, “Political” Commitments and the Constitution, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 
507, 554–75 (2009) (analyzing other possible constitutional bases for political commitments). 
 57 See Atlantic Charter, Joint Declaration by the President of the United States and the Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom, U.S.-U.K., Aug. 14, 1941, 55 Stat. 1603; Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292, reprinted in 73 DEP’T ST. 
BULL. 323 (1975).  
 58 See David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the New Administrative Law, 91 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 59, 80 (2013). 
 59 See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding on Antitrust Cooperation, India-U.S., Sept.  
27, 2012, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/international-antitrust-and-consumer- 
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Administration makes political commitments on matters ranging from 
the safety of medical products to the opening of new markets to U.S. 
food manufacturers.60  The Federal Aviation Administration uses them 
to promote the development of civil aviation in less-developed nations, 
to cooperate in alternative aviation fuels, and for many other purposes.61  
There are scores of other examples.62  Taken together, political commit-
ments have an enormous impact on the everyday activities of U.S. firms 
and persons.  But not only are they not subject to any of the require-
ments of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),63 they are not even 
published systematically or reported to Congress. 
In a significant constitutional innovation, the Obama Administration 
established a new form of unilateral international lawmaking when it 
married international political commitments with preexisting statutory 
delegations to forge deep international cooperation without the approval 
or even involvement of Congress.  The Administration did this, for ex-
ample, in the nuclear deal with Iran known as the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA).64  In the JCPOA, the United States and five 
other nations agreed to lift international and domestic sanctions against 
Iran in exchange for Iran’s dismantling of its nuclear weapons develop-
ment program.65  Majorities in the Senate and the House appeared to 
oppose the deal.66  But President Obama was able to reach the very 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
protection-cooperation-agreements/1209indiamou.pdf [https://perma.cc/TB3B-J52X]; Memoran-
dum of Understanding on Mutual Enforcement Assistance in Commercial Email Matters,  
Austl.-U.K.-U.S., June 30, 2004, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/international- 
antitrust-and-consumer-protection-cooperation-agreements/040630spammoutext.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/ES5Z-CCEX]. 
 60 See, e.g., Statement of Intent on Co-operation in the Field of Medical Products, India-U.S., 
Feb. 10, 2014, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/InternationalPrograms/Agreements/Memoranda 
ofUnderstanding/UCM385494.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9EX-J5LS]; Memorandum of Understand-
ing Regarding Registration of U.S. Food Manufacturers Exporting to China, China-U.S., June  
15, 2017, https://www.fda.gov/InternationalPrograms/Agreements/MemorandaofUnderstanding/ 
ucm563361.htm [https://perma.cc/2GYE-LAX8]. 
 61 See, e.g., Aviation: Memorandum of Cooperation, Chile-U.S., July 11, 1997, https://www. 
state.gov/documents/organization/101687.pdf [https://perma.cc/79MK-NYWU]; Press Release, 
FAA, FAA and Spain Cooperate in Alternative Aviation Fuels (Feb. 11, 2013), https://www. 
faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=70956 [https://perma.cc/JKH3-4WCU]. 
 62 In 2012, President Obama issued an executive order designed to increase international regu-
latory cooperation by administrative agencies, including through the use of political commitments, 
and to centralize White House coordination of such cooperation.  See Exec. Order No. 13,609, 3 
C.F.R. § 255 (2012). 
 63 Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).  
 64 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015, http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/245317.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7WT-9VQ7]. 
 65 See id. 
 66 Majorities in both houses of Congress voted against its approval.  See Cristina Marcos, House 
Rejects Obama’s Iran Deal, THE HILL (Sept. 11, 2015, 12:34 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-
action/house/253370-house-rejects-iran-deal [https://perma.cc/BY2C-QQT4]; Jennifer Steinhauer, 
Democrats Hand Victory to Obama on Pact with Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2015, at A1. 
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consequential agreement without the consent of the legislative branch 
by treating it as a mere political commitment.  He was then able to 
follow through on his important pledge by exercising domestic authority 
that Congress had separately conferred on him: first, to waive sanctions 
against Iran for up to a year at a time on the domestic stage, and second, 
to vote in the U.N. Security Council, which the Obama Administration 
did to lift the international sanctions.67  This use of political commit-
ments, like Executive Agreements+, vastly expands the President’s 
power to make and implement international agreements (albeit non-
binding ones).   
B.  Interpreting International Agreements 
Like statutes, international agreements contain gaps and ambigui-
ties, and their proper construction in many contexts is uncertain.  The 
power to interpret agreements is crucial in determining an agreement’s 
meaning, and thus in determining the nature and scope of U.S. rights 
and obligations under the agreement.  The President dominates the in-
terpretation of international agreements for the United States just as the 
President dominates the making of such agreements.  
The President’s power to interpret treaties has been apparent since 
at least the famous Neutrality Controversy in 1793.68  In the early stages 
of the war between France and Great Britain growing out of the French 
Revolution, the Washington Administration interpreted two treaties 
with France and one with Great Britain, in light of customary interna-
tional law, to determine and proclaim that the United States would re-
main neutral in the conflict.69  There was significant dispute at the time 
over whether Washington had the authority to issue the Neutrality  
Proclamation of 1793.70  But no one doubted that the President pos-
sessed the authority to interpret treaties for the United States in the 
course of conducting foreign relations and exercising his responsibility 
under Article II of the Constitution to “take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed.”71 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 67 The waiver authorities are collected and analyzed in KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS 19 (2017).  The President’s authority to vote on behalf 
of the United States in the United Nations is found in 22 U.S.C. §§ 287–287a (2012).  See infra 
section II.C, pp. 1241–44. 
 68 The Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: 
FOREIGN RELATIONS 140 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., 1833). 
 69 Id.  See generally CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 12–25 (6th ed. 2017). 
 70 For the famous debate on this question between Hamilton and Madison, see generally  
ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JAMES MADISON, THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 
1793–1794 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007).  
 71 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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It is now settled that the President has substantial interpretive au-
thority over treaties and other international agreements, although the 
precise constitutional source of that authority has never been resolved.72  
The scope of this interpretive authority is extraordinarily broad and, in 
many contexts, nearly exclusive.  The vast majority of U.S. actions re-
lated to or that implicate binding U.S. agreements are conducted by ex-
ecutive branch officials.  In carrying out such actions, the executive 
branch must often interpret the agreement to ensure that U.S. actions 
are consistent with it.  As Professor Eugene Rostow observed, “[t]he 
phenomenon of presidential interpretation and reinterpretation of trea-
ties . . . occurs daily in every nook and cranny of the law.”73 
The executive branch has enormous leeway in these day-to-day in-
terpretations of agreements.  It is of course constrained to some degree 
by its sense of the requirements of law and of U.S. interests, by domestic 
and international politics, and by the aims and interests of its agreement 
partners.  But it has significant discretion, in the face of these con-
straints, to interpret U.S. agreements in ways that it deems appropriate.  
For example, in 2014 the Obama Administration altered the U.S. inter-
pretation of Articles 2 and 16 of the Convention Against Torture to ap-
ply extraterritorially in limited circumstances, although it declined to 
apply them to U.S. military operations, which it insisted remained gov-
erned by the more specific laws of war.74  This interpretation, made 
without congressional input, brought the United States closer (but not 
all the way) to the international consensus on the scope of the Torture 
Convention.75  There are countless other examples of a President  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 72 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 326(1), § 326 cmt. a (contending that the  
President has authority to interpret treaties “since he is the country’s ‘sole organ’ in its international 
relations and is responsible for carrying out agreements with other nations,” id. § 326 cmt. a (citing 
id. § 1 reporters’ note 2)); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret 
International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1766 (2009) (“The President interprets and applies interna-
tional law for purposes of exercising the Article II executive power to conduct the nation’s foreign 
relations and the constitutional powers of the President as the nation’s military Commander in 
Chief.”); John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, 
and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 851, 869–74 (2001) (book review) (grounding interpre-
tive power in “plenary authority over the conduct of international relations,” id. at 874, the Vesting 
Clause, and the Treaty Clause). 
 73 Eugene V. Rostow, The Reinterpretation Debate and Constitutional Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
1451, 1457 (1989). 
 74 See Mary E. McLeod, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Opening Remarks to the 
U.N. Committee Against Torture (Nov. 12, 2014), https://geneva.usmission.gov/2014/11/12/acting-
legal-adviser-mcleod-u-s-affirms-torture-is-prohibited-at-all-times-in-all-places/ [https://perma.cc/ 
CLA4-EZJ7].  
 75 See Sarah Cleveland, The United States and the Torture Convention, Part I: Extraterritori-
ality, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/17435/united-states-torture-
convention-part-i-extraterritoriality/ [https://perma.cc/EUJ4-PCK7].  
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interpreting agreements in ways that depart from other countries’ inter-
pretations of those agreements.76 
With narrow exceptions, the other branches of government rarely 
constrain Presidents in their interpretation of international agreements.  
The vast majority of the President’s interpretations cannot as a practical 
matter be changed by Congress due to the high hurdles posed by bicam-
eralism and the presidential veto.  Only occasionally has Congress over-
come these hurdles to enact a statute that adopts or implies an interpre-
tation of an international agreement that contradicts the President’s 
prior interpretive position.77  And it has been very rare for the Senate 
to bring political pressure to bear on the President to prevent him from 
reinterpreting a treaty in a fashion it did not like.78  This interpretive 
authority gives Presidents substantial ability in practice to affect or alter 
U.S. obligations in ways that deviate from what the legislature would 
likely approve if asked. 
Similarly, most of the President’s interpretations of international 
agreements fall outside of judicial review.79  In part this is because many 
agreements are non-self-executing and thus cannot be applied as a 
source of law by the courts.80  And in part this is because very few trea-
ties contemplate causes of action for suit and courts presume that they 
should not create such causes of action absent express language in the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 76 See, e.g., Olivier Corten, The “Unwilling or Unable” Test: Has It Been, or Could It Be, Ac-
cepted?, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 777, 778–89, 795–97 (2016) (criticizing the U.S. interpretation of 
the Charter to permit uses of force against states “unwilling or unable” to check terrorist attacks); 
William H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 557 (2003) (describing the U.S. interpretation of the U.N. Charter in 2003 to authorize war in 
Iraq); see also Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 529–39 
(1987) (outlining the executive branch departures, deferred to by the Supreme Court, from standard 
international interpretation of the Hague Evidence Convention). 
 77 See, e.g., Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1003(a), 42 U.S.C. 2000dd(a) (2012) (“No individ-
ual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of 
nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or  
punishment.”). 
 78 The most well-known episode is when the Senate resisted President Reagan’s attempt to re-
interpret the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to allow his Strategic Defense Initiative.  See BRADLEY 
& GOLDSMITH, supra note 69, at 364–69; David A. Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch: Ex-
ecutive Reinterpretation of Arms Control Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1353, 1353–80 (1989).  
 79 Just as with agreement making, the President’s control over agreement interpretation was 
much less pronounced at the Founding vis-à-vis the courts.  See David Sloss, Judicial Deference to 
Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
497 (2007). 
 80 For limitations on treaty self-execution, see Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).  The 
Charming Betsy canon, pursuant to which statutes will be interpreted if possible to avoid conflicts 
with international law, allows for some judicial consideration of (and thus interpretation of) non-
self-executing treaties.  See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); 
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: 
TREATIES § 109(1) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016) (“Where fairly possible, courts 
will construe federal statutes to avoid a conflict with a treaty provision.”). 
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treaty.81  Moreover, for the relatively few treaties that are subject to 
judicial review, courts typically give substantial (“great weight”) defer-
ence to the President’s interpretation, somewhat akin to the Chevron 
deference that courts give to certain agency interpretations of regulatory 
statutes.82  Such judicial deference to executive branch treaty interpre-
tations was not practiced at the Founding or in the nineteenth century, 
but rather is a modern phenomenon that has (along with other related 
trends) grown during the last sixty years.83  To be sure, there are high-
profile counterexamples of lack of deference, especially in recent years.84  
But these counterexamples are rare exceptions to the general practice — 
exceptions that are even less significant than they appear because only 
a tiny fraction of treaties are subject to interpretation by courts in the 
first place. 
C.  Terminating International Agreements 
The President cannot unilaterally terminate a statute.  Only Con-
gress, through bicameralism and presentment or a veto override, can do 
that.85  Moreover, although Congress can delegate to the President dis-
cretion over how to apply a statute, it cannot delegate the power to ter-
minate a statute to the President.86 
Under international law, a nation can terminate a treaty either in 
accordance with the terms of a withdrawal clause in the treaty (which 
might require a period of notice), when termination is implicitly allowed 
by the treaty, or as the result of various circumstances such as a material 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 81 See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506 n.3. 
 82 See, e.g., id. at 513 (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 
(1982)).  See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 
649, 701–07 (2000). 
 83 On the Founding, see Sloss, supra note 79, at 505–23.  On the more recent trend toward 
deference, see David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 
953 (1994); and Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive 
Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723, 1725–26 (2007). 
 84 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006) (interpreting Geneva Convention 
Common Article 3 contrary to the Bush Administration’s interpretation). 
 85 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998) (“There is no provision in the 
Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes.”). 
 86 See id. at 445–46 (holding the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional because it bypassed the 
constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment, and noting that “[t]he fact that  
Congress intended such a result is of no moment”); cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–59 (1983) 
(invalidating the legislative veto provision for similar constitutional reasons).  Although Congress 
cannot delegate to the President the power to terminate statutes, it has sometimes authorized or 
directed the President to terminate congressional-executive agreements based on statutes.  See, e.g., 
Tariff of 1909 (Payne-Aldrich Act), ch. 6, § 4, 36 Stat. 11, 83 (instructing the President to terminate 
all agreements that had been entered pursuant to section 3 of the Tariff of 1897 (Dingley Act), ch. 
11, § 3, 30 Stat. 151, 203). 
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breach of the treaty by another party.87  The text of the U.S. Constitution 
does not specifically address which actors in the United States have the 
authority to act on behalf of the United States in terminating a treaty.  
Treaty termination since the Founding has been effectuated by statute, 
by subsequent treaty, by presidential action along with the Senate, or by 
unilateral presidential action.  Since the early twentieth century, how-
ever, Presidents have come to dominate treaty termination just as they 
have the making and interpretation of treaties. 
Unilateral presidential termination of treaties has been common 
since at least the 1930s.88  With a few notable exceptions such as  
President Carter’s termination of a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan 
in 1978, these terminations have not generated domestic controversy.89  
Since the dispute over the Taiwan matter, Presidents have terminated a 
few dozen treaties on their own authority.90  The executive branch has 
repeatedly maintained that Presidents have unilateral termination au-
thority, and this proposition has been endorsed by the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law, and again recently by the  
Restatement (Fourth).91 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 87 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 346 [hereinafter VCLT].  The Vienna Convention addresses issues relating to, 
among other things, the formation, interpretation, and termination of treaties.  Although it has not 
ratified the Convention, the United States (through the executive branch) treats the Convention as 
reflecting generally accepted rules of treaty practice.  See, e.g., Letter of Submittal from William P. 
Rogers, U.S. Sec’y of State, to President Richard M. Nixon (Oct. 18, 1971), in Message from the 
President of the United States Transmitting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 92-12, at 1 (Nov. 22, 1971) (noting that “[t]he Convention sets forth a generally 
agreed body of rules” and that even before it was in force the Convention was “generally recognized 
as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice”).   
 88 See Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773, 788–
801 (2014). 
 89 See id. at 810–15 (describing the controversy surrounding the Taiwan treaty, id. at 810–14, 
and observing a lack of controversy since, id. at 815). 
 90 See id. at 814–15; INT’L LAW INST., DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 2002, at 202–06 (Sally J. Cummins & David P. Stewart eds., 2003) (listing thirty 
treaties “terminated by the President since 1980,” id. at 202); see also, e.g., Letter from Condoleezza 
Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Kofi A. Annan, U.N. Secretary-General (Mar. 7, 2005) [hereinafter 
Letter from Sec’y of State Condoleezza Rice], https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
87288.pdf [https://perma.cc/63Z7-S45B] (withdrawing United States from the Optional Protocol to 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes); 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Text of Diplomatic Notes Sent to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Ukraine (Dec. 14, 2001), https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2001/6859.htm [https://perma. 
cc/8EKE-PTJM] (withdrawing United States from Anti–Ballistic Missile Systems Treaty); Telegram 
from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China (Dec. 23, 1978), https:// 
history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v13/d180 [https://perma.cc/M4DH-M4L4] (con-
taining notification of Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Republic of China of U.S. 
withdrawal from Mutual Defense Treaty). 
 91 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 339; RESTATEMENT (FOURTH), Tentative 
Draft No. 2, supra note 10, § 113.  One of us (Curtis Bradley) served as a Reporter for the  
Restatement (Fourth). 
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Although examples are sparse, the practice of Presidents terminating 
non–Article II agreements is consistent with a dominant presidential 
role.  Presidents clearly have the authority to terminate sole executive 
agreements and political commitments, since those agreements are made 
by Presidents based on their own constitutional authority.92  Presidents 
have also, without controversy, terminated ex ante congressional- 
executive agreements (often but not always with the consent of the 
treaty partner).93  President Trump recently announced that he would 
terminate the Paris Agreement, which President Obama had concluded 
unilaterally and probably in part as an executive agreement pursuant to 
treaty.94  There was significant controversy about the policy wisdom of 
this decision, but no one questioned the President’s legal authority to 
terminate in this context.  Presidential authority to terminate ex post 
congressional-executive agreements is less clear, in part because these 
agreements tend to have extensive domestic implementing legislation 
that Presidents lack the unilateral authority to terminate.95  But the ex-
ecutive branch almost certainly will contend that it has the authority to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 92 See, e.g., CRS STUDY, supra note 12, at 208 (“[T]he President’s authority to terminate execu-
tive agreements, in particular sole executive agreements, has not been seriously questioned in the 
past.”). 
 93 For example, in 1951, the Truman Administration agreed with Costa Rica (without seeking 
congressional approval) to terminate a 1936 ex ante congressional-executive agreement dealing with 
reciprocal trade.  See Reciprocal Trade, Costa Rica-U.S., Apr. 3, 1951, T.I.A.S. No. 2237 (terminat-
ing Reciprocal Trade, Costa Rica-U.S., Nov. 28, 1936, 50 Stat. 1582).  In 1955, the Eisenhower 
Administration terminated a trade agreement with Ecuador, without obtaining either Ecuador’s 
agreement or congressional approval.  See Proclamation No. 3111, 20 Fed. Reg. 6485 (Sept. 2, 1955).  
In 2012, the Obama Administration agreed with Mexico to terminate a 1972 ex ante congressional-
executive agreement concerning the regulation of screwworms.  See Agreement Between the United 
States and Mexico, Mex.-U.S., Sept. 24–25, 2012, T.I.A.S. No. 12-925.1 (terminating Screwworm 
Eradication Program, Mex.-U.S., Aug. 28, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 2465). 
 94 See infra section III.A.3, pp. 1248–52.  The Trump Administration made the announcement 
in early June 2017, and then formally notified the United Nations of the decision in early August 
2017.  See Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 1, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2rvtLhu [https://perma.cc/4LHB-UL7B]; see also Lisa Friedman, 
U.S. to Join Climate Talks Despite Planned Withdrawal from Paris Accord, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 
2017), https://nyti.ms/2hvzG2Y [https://perma.cc/YZY9-Z7R3]. 
 95 President Trump’s threat to terminate or withdraw from the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), which was made as an ex post congressional-executive agreement, has pro-
voked a debate about his authority to do so.  See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, Op-Ed, Trump Might 
Be Stuck with NAFTA, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la- 
oe-yoo-ku-trump-nafta-20161129-story.html [https://perma.cc/VX6H-VL9T] (contending that  
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority bars the President from terminating or even renegotiating 
NAFTA without first receiving congressional approval); Michael Ramsey, Could President Trump 
Unilaterally Withdraw the U.S. from Its International Agreements?, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Sept. 
29, 2016, 6:30 AM), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2016/09/julian-ku-on-
president-trump-withdrawing-from-international-agreementsmichael-ramsey.html [https://perma. 
cc/LBF5-5BPX] (arguing that the President can withdraw from NAFTA but cannot terminate the 
implementing legislation); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Exiting Congressional-Executive Agreements, 
67 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (arguing that there is no persuasive reason to distinguish between 
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terminate even these agreements and, indeed, President Trump has al-
ready suggested this with respect to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), which is an ex post congressional-executive agree-
ment.96  In any event, as discussed above, such ex post agreements are 
a very small fraction of U.S. international agreements. 
II.  PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OVER OTHER FORMS  
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
This Part considers presidential control over other forms of interna-
tional law.  We first consider presidential control over customary inter-
national law (CIL).  We then consider presidential control over the in-
ternational law that can emerge, as a matter of CIL, from the 
negotiation of international agreements before the United States has rat-
ified them (and thus before either the Senate or Congress as a whole has 
approved them), as well as the international law that emanates from 
international institutions.  As with international agreements, the  
President has substantial control over the formation, interpretation, and 
termination of these other forms of international law, and this control 
has grown over time. 
A.  Customary International Law 
In addition to international agreements, the other principal source of 
international law is CIL.  This law forms not by express agreement 
among nations but rather from their practices and understandings over 
time.  According to most accounts, in order for an international norm to 
become binding as a matter of CIL, it must be supported by consistent 
state practice and that practice must be followed out of a sense of legal 
obligation.97  The sense of legal obligation element of CIL is referred to 
as opinio juris.  Once it forms, a CIL rule has the same legal status on 
the international plane as a binding agreement — it is equally obligatory 
and can supersede an earlier-in-time agreement. 
Before the twentieth century, CIL was the principal form of interna-
tional law, regulating matters such as the conduct of war, rights at sea, 
and diplomatic immunity.  Its importance has declined somewhat since 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
presidential authority to terminate congressional-executive agreements and presidential authority 
to terminate Article II treaties). 
 96 See Ana Swanson, Trump’s Tough Talk on NAFTA Raises Prospects of Pact’s Demise, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2z0emXb [https://perma.cc/2KTZ-SUV8]. 
 97 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, at 76, U.N. Doc. 
A/71/10 (2016) (“Conclusion 2 . . . : To determine the existence and content of a rule of customary 
international law, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is a general practice that is accepted as 
law (opinio juris).”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 102(2) (“Customary international law 
results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal  
obligation.”). 
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that time as a result of a substantial increase in the number and types 
of treaties.  But some important areas of international law, such as pre-
scriptive jurisdiction and the immunity of foreign officials, are still pri-
marily regulated by CIL rather than by treaty, and CIL also continues 
to play an important role in filling in gaps in treaty coverage and in 
addressing emerging issues that are not yet addressed by treaty. 
In contrast to Article II treaties, but like other forms of international 
agreements, the Constitution says nothing specific about how the United 
States is to contribute to the development of CIL.98  The executive 
branch, however, has long dominated the formation of, interpretation 
of, and withdrawal from CIL for the United States, although in a dif-
ferent fashion than with agreements.  Moreover, presidential control 
over CIL has grown over time, as the courts have come to play less of a 
role in interpreting and applying it. 
1.  CIL Formation. — CIL differs from international agreements in 
ways that tend to give the President even more control — relative to 
other U.S. actors — over its formation.  CIL is based on the practices 
and perceptions of nations over time, so its content tends to be less cer-
tain than the content of international agreements.  Moreover, unlike for 
international agreements, there are basic and unresolved questions 
about how CIL rules form and change.99 
Because the executive branch controls U.S. diplomacy and practice 
on the international stage, it plays a leading role in developing the state 
practice for the United States relating to CIL.  Moreover, because the 
executive branch dominates communications with foreign nations and 
representations of the U.S. position on the international stage, it pro-
vides most of the input for U.S. expressions of opinio juris.  Every hour 
of every day, through its many diplomatic and other administrative 
channels at home and abroad, the executive branch is acting in accord-
ance with its view of CIL, establishing state practice and often articu-
lating opinio juris for the United States.  This executive-centered U.S. 
contribution to the creation of CIL does not itself create CIL.  As a 
formal matter, a CIL rule’s existence depends on the practice of the 
community of nations, not simply the practice of the United States.  
Nonetheless, because the President almost always decides the U.S. view 
on CIL, and because the United States often has a significant influence 
on the content of CIL, the President is able to affect CIL both through 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 98 CIL was referred to as part of the “law of nations” when the Constitution was drafted.  The 
only reference in the Constitution to the law of nations is in Article I, Section 8, which provides 
that Congress has the power “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high 
Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 99 See Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law Adjudication as Common Law Adjudi-
cation, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 34, 37–38  
(Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016). 
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affirmative actions and statements and through decisions about whether 
to acquiesce in the practices and statements of other nations. 
The executive branch does not have a monopoly over the state prac-
tice of the United States.100  Statutes enacted by Congress and even U.S. 
judicial decisions can potentially constitute relevant state practice.101  
Congress might, for example, enact a statute that purports to define and 
punish an offense against CIL,102 or a court might interpret the scope of 
immunity that foreign officials are entitled to under CIL in domestic 
litigation.103  Nevertheless, the vast majority of relevant practice for CIL 
ends up being executive practice.  In its recent study of CIL, the U.N. 
International Law Commission noted that relevant practice includes: 
[D]iplomatic acts and correspondence; conduct in connection with resolu-
tions adopted by an international organization or at an intergovernmental 
conference; conduct in connection with treaties; executive conduct, includ-
ing operational conduct “on the ground”; legislative and administrative acts; 
and decisions of national courts.104 
All but the last two of these categories involve primarily executive  
conduct.105 
Moreover, in its role as the chief spokesperson for the United States 
in international diplomacy, the executive branch not only interprets in-
ternational law to guide its actions but also advocates particular legal 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 100 Nor does it have a monopoly over expressions of opinio juris by the United States.  Congress 
in a statute can take a position on which particular practices are permissible or obligatory under 
CIL.  See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
(“[S]uch acts [of terrorism] render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise 
its rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad . . . .”).  And 
courts can do the same when deciding whether to recognize particular CIL norms in litigation.  See, 
e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733–38 (2004) (declining to recognize a customary in-
ternational claim under the Alien Tort Statute for short-term arbitrary detention).  Here, as else-
where, congressional and judicial involvement are the exceptions to executive branch dominance. 
 101 See Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 97, at 76 (“Conclusion 5 . . . : State practice consists  
of conduct of the State, whether in the exercise of its executive, legislative, judicial or other  
functions.”). 
 102 An example is the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012), in 
which Congress created a cause of action for instances of torture and “extrajudicial killing” com-
mitted under color of foreign law and defined these offenses. 
 103 See, e.g., Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 776 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[A]s a matter of international 
and domestic law, jus cogens violations [of international law] are, by definition, acts that are not 
officially authorized by the Sovereign.”). 
 104 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 97, at 77 (Conclusion 6). 
 105 See Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 
1205, 1254 (1988) (“Most of the activities of the United States that can amount to state practice are 
under the control of the President, as a matter of American law.”); see also Int’l Law Comm’n, supra 
note 97, at 93 (Commentary on Conclusion 7) (“[T]he practice of the executive branch is often the 
most relevant on the international plane . . . .”). 
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positions.  As the Supreme Court noted in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino106: 
When articulating principles of international law in its relations with other 
states, the Executive Branch speaks not only as an interpreter of generally 
accepted and traditional rules, as would the courts, but also as an advocate 
of standards it believes desirable for the community of nations and protec-
tive of national concerns.107 
As advocate for the United States, the executive branch develops, re-
fines, and alters CIL rules that govern the rights and duties of the United 
States. 
There are many examples of this executive branch role in articulat-
ing U.S. positions relating to CIL.  In 1945, President Truman unilater-
ally proclaimed, by means of an executive order, that under CIL the 
United States had the right to exploit the resources in the continental 
shelf in the sea off its coast.108  This announcement quickly led to the 
formation of a CIL rule consistent with the U.S. position.109  In 1952, 
the executive branch announced that, consistent with the practice of 
certain other nations, the United States would henceforth follow a “re-
strictive” approach to foreign sovereign immunity that would decline to 
accord immunity for private, commercial acts, and courts deferred to 
this position.110  More recently, the executive branch in both the George 
W. Bush and Obama Administrations maintained that there was a CIL 
right, which was also relevant to U.S. treaty obligations, to use force in 
self-defense against terrorist groups operating from within other nations 
if those nations were “unable or unwilling” to address the threats from 
those groups.111  Although this claim is controversial, a number of other 
nations have now endorsed it.112  To take yet another example, the ex-
ecutive branch in recent years has also been developing the U.S. position 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 106 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
 107 Id. at 432–33. 
 108 See Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea 
Bed of the Continental Shelf, Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Oct. 2, 1945). 
 109 See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF FUNDA-
MENTAL CHANGE 113–19 (2013). 
 110 See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman, 
Acting Att’y Gen. (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984 (1952); see also, e.g.,  
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (“It is therefore not for the courts to deny an 
immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds 
which the government has not seen fit to recognize.”). 
 111 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jean Galbraith, Presidential War Powers as an Interactive Dynamic: 
International Law, Domestic Law, and Practice-Based Legal Change, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 689,  
729–31 (2016). 
 112 See Elena Chachko & Ashley Deeks, Who Is on Board with “Unwilling or Unable”?,  
LAWFARE (Oct. 10, 2016, 1:55 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/who-board-unwilling-or-unable 
[https://perma.cc/7YYY-C32A]. 
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concerning the legality, under both treaties and CIL, of cyber operations, 
without any formal participation by Congress or the courts.113 
2.  CIL Interpretation. — The President has at least as much control 
over the interpretation of CIL as over agreements, and probably more, 
since CIL is not typically recorded in an agreed-upon text.  Determining 
whether there is sufficient state practice to support a CIL rule, the ap-
propriate level of generality at which to describe the practice, and 
whether the practice is being followed out of a sense of legal obligation 
all present difficult interpretive challenges that leave substantial room 
for presidential discretion.114  Moreover, in some instances treaty provi-
sions may reflect principles of CIL that apply even to nations that are 
not parties to the treaty, and lack of clarity about when this is the case115 
expands the possibilities for presidential interpretation. 
As with treaties, the constitutional source of this power is not entirely 
clear but probably derives from a combination of the President’s power 
to take care to faithfully execute the law, which presupposes interpretive 
authority, as well as the President’s role as chief spokesperson for the 
United States on the international stage.  These powers, plus control 
over diplomacy, have meant that “the executive branch has emerged as 
the institution most responsible for administering, interpreting, and ap-
plying CIL.”116  In addition, because the content of CIL is often uncer-
tain and debatable, the executive branch’s role in interpreting CIL en-
hances its ability to influence the creation of what are in effect new CIL 
rules. 
Once again, Presidents do not have a monopoly over the interpreta-
tion of CIL.  The other branches interpret CIL in the course of exercis-
ing their constitutional responsibilities.  Congress sometimes makes a 
judgment about CIL in the course of enacting statutes related to CIL — 
for example, a statute creating an exception to sovereign immunity.  Sim-
ilarly, courts interpret CIL when it is relevant to cases within their ju-
risdiction.  There is relatively little case law addressing the extent to 
which courts should defer to executive branch positions concerning CIL, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 113 See, e.g., Michael Schmitt, US Transparency Regarding International Law in Cyberspace, 
JUST SECURITY (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/34465/transparency-international-
law-cyberspace/ [https://perma.cc/KN99-4JSJ].  In June 2017, a bill was introduced in Congress 
that, if enacted, would require the executive branch to report any cyber operations conducted out-
side of war zones.  See Travis J. Tritten, Bill Requires Pentagon to Report Cyber Operations Outside 
of War Zones, WASH. EXAMINER (June 8, 2017, 3:23 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/ 
bill-requires-pentagon-to-report-cyber-operations-outside-of-war-zones/article/2625385 [https:// 
perma.cc/CF94-HQ29]. 
 114 See generally Bradley, supra note 99, at 35 (describing the evidentiary uncertainties associated 
with CIL). 
 115 See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE 
L.J. 202, 213 (2010). 
 116 Julian G. Ku, Structural Conflicts in the Interpretation of Customary International Law, 45 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 857, 862 (2005). 
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but there are reasons to think that courts will typically give such posi-
tions substantial deference.  The content and relevant source materials 
for CIL are less clear and more fluid than those for treaties, providing 
even more potential justifications for deference to executive expertise.117  
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law observed that courts 
give “particular weight” to the views of the executive branch about the 
content of international law, including CIL, “because it is deemed desir-
able that so far as possible the United States speak with one voice on 
such matters.”118 
There is nothing new about executive branch influence on the U.S. 
interpretation of CIL.  What has become more prominent in recent years 
is the use by the executive branch of its authority relating to CIL to 
commit the United States to obligations that Congress would be unlikely 
to agree to, including obligations reflected in treaties that the United 
States has not ratified.119  Executive branch positions concerning the 
Law of the Sea Convention,120 which was finalized in 1982 and came 
into force in 1994, but which the United States has not joined because 
of opposition in the Senate, provide an example. 
In 1983, President Reagan issued a policy statement accepting much 
of the content of the Convention, despite making clear that he would 
not seek its ratification because of its provisions governing mining of the 
deep seabed.121  He also declared by presidential proclamation that “in-
ternational law recognizes” the Exclusive Economic Zone rights set 
forth in the Convention and that the United States would exercise those 
rights.122  In doing so, President Reagan referred generally to “the au-
thority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States of America,” and he said that the United States would 
exercise its rights “in accordance with the rules of international law.”123  
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law subsequently con-
cluded that, “by express or tacit agreement accompanied by consistent 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 117 As noted above, at the time of the constitutional Founding, CIL was referred to as part of the 
“law of nations.”  It was understood even then that the precise content of the unwritten law of 
nations might often be uncertain, which is why Congress was given the authority to “define” as well 
as “punish” offenses against the law of nations.  See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL  
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 615 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (statement of Gouverneur Morris) (“The 
word define is proper when applied to offences in this case; the law of (nations) being often too 
vague and deficient to be a rule.”). 
 118 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 112 cmt. c; see also Bradley, supra note 82, at 707 
(noting that “[t]he conventional view is that deference to the executive branch concerning the mean-
ing of customary international law is covered by essentially the same rule governing treaties”). 
 119 See generally Eric Talbot Jensen, Presidential Pronouncements of Customary International 
Law as an Alternative to the Senate’s Advice and Consent, 2015 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1525. 
 120 Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
 121 See Statement on United States Oceans Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 378–79 (Mar. 10, 1983). 
 122 See Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983). 
 123 Id. 
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practice, the United States, and states generally, have accepted the sub-
stantive provisions of the Convention, other than those addressing deep 
sea-bed mining, as statements of customary law binding upon them 
apart from the Convention.”124 
In 1988, President Reagan issued another proclamation stating that 
the United States was extending the breadth of the territorial sea over 
which it claimed jurisdiction from three miles off its coast to twelve 
miles, something that he contended was now allowed under CIL “as 
reflected in” the unratified Law of the Sea Convention.125  It may be 
that Congress would have agreed with this interpretation of CIL and 
President Reagan’s use of it to extend U.S. jurisdiction, but, importantly, 
President Reagan did not wait to find out.126  In support of the legality 
of this unilateral action, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal  
Counsel (OLC), relying primarily on historical practice, stated that “the 
President may extend the territorial sea by virtue of his constitutional 
role as the representative of the United States in foreign relations.”127   
It cited the initial determination in 1793 by George Washington’s  
Administration of a three-mile territorial sea, as well as the Truman 
Proclamation and another proclamation by President Truman concern-
ing fishery conservation zones in certain areas of the high seas contigu-
ous to the United States.128  OLC acknowledged that the President’s 
ability to acquire new maritime territory for the United States (as op-
posed merely to a claim of authority to regulate in that territory) pre-
sented a harder issue, given that most acquisitions of territory by the 
United States have been accomplished by treaty.  It concluded, however, 
that “[b]ecause of several venerable, and unchallenged, historical exam-
ples of such acquisitions, we believe that he can, even though the prac-
tice may be subject to some constitutional question.”129 
A more recent example concerns Article 75 of the Additional Protocol 
I to the Geneva Conventions, which sets forth certain standards to en-
sure the humane treatment of detainees during an armed conflict.  Al-
though the United States has not joined the Protocol, the Obama  
Administration announced in 2011 that it would “choose out of a sense 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 124 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, pt. V, Introductory Note, at 5.   
 125 Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988). 
 126 See Harry N. Scheiber & Chris Carr, Constitutionalism and the Territorial Sea: An Historical 
Study, 2 TERRITORIAL SEA J. 67, 89 (1992) (“President Reagan’s abrupt and startling announce-
ment of the twelve-mile territorial sea — while Congress had under consideration a bill that would 
have provided for such an extension by statute — must be understood as a trumpet call reasserting 
the powers of the Executive, and not only the resolution of the U.S. posture with regard to territorial 
waters and their status.” (footnote omitted)). 
 127 Legal Issues Raised by Proposed Presidential Proclamation to Extend the Territorial Sea, 12 
Op. O.L.C. 238, 238–39 (1988). 
 128 See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.   
 129 Legal Issues Raised by Proposed Presidential Proclamation to Extend the Territorial Sea,12 
Op. O.L.C. at 248.   
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of legal obligation to treat the principles set forth in Article 75 as appli-
cable to any individual it detains in an international armed conflict, and 
expects all other nations to adhere to these principles as well.”130  Al-
though ambiguous, this announcement seems to treat Article 75 as re-
flecting binding CIL.131  In these and other instances, the executive 
branch is able to adopt contestable positions concerning the CIL rights 
and obligations of the United States, without seeking Senate or congres-
sional approval. 
3.  CIL Avoidance and Violation. — As a matter of formal doctrine, 
nations are not allowed to withdraw unilaterally from rules of CIL.132  
But nations can avoid being bound by CIL if they have “persistently 
objected” to a CIL rule while it is developing,133 and the executive 
branch as the chief diplomatic organ of the nation is the actor most 
likely to be involved in articulating such objection.  The Reagan Ad-
ministration, for example, made the United States a persistent objector 
to any emerging CIL norm requiring a sharing of deep seabed re-
sources.134  In addition, the executive branch has tried to persistently 
object on behalf of the United States to any emerging CIL norm restrict-
ing the death penalty.135 
Claims of persistent objection are rare, however.  Much more com-
monly, the executive branch uses its power to interpret CIL, as discussed 
above, in order to claim that a CIL rule is inapplicable to a particular 
situation or has changed.  Since there is rarely any international adjudi-
cation to review executive branch interpretations of CIL, the executive 
branch has substantial ability through interpretation to avoid CIL rules 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 130 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: New Actions on Guantánamo and 
Detainee Policy (Mar. 7, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/ 
03/07/fact-sheet-new-actions-guant-namo-and-detainee-policy [https://perma.cc/VE6B-6ATY].  Be-
cause the Administration’s acceptance of Article 75 was limited to “international armed conflict,” it 
does not apply to the conflict against al Qaeda and associated groups, which is considered a non-
international armed conflict.  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630–32 (2006). 
 131 In answering questions from Senator Lugar, however, the Obama Administration stopped 
short of claiming that Article 75 was binding as a matter of CIL and instead noted that the United 
States was obligated under “overlapping requirements in U.S. law” to act in accordance with Article 
75.  Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 57 
(2011) (responses of Legal Adviser Harold Koh to questions submitted by Sen. Richard G. Lugar). 
 132 Cf. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 115 (arguing that CIL would be improved if withdrawal 
were allowed under certain circumstances). 
 133 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 97, at 79 (Conclusion 15); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), 
supra note 9, § 102 reporters’ note 2. 
 134 See David A. Colson, How Persistent Must the Persistent Objector Be?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 
957, 967 (1986) (“It is clear that more than a majority of States maintain that deep seabed mining 
may only occur under the structure envisioned by the 1982 Law of the Sea convention (LOS Con-
vention).  The United States and a few other States disagree and assert their right to engage in deep 
seabed mining outside the LOS Convention.” (footnote omitted)).  
 135 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52 DUKE 
L.J. 485, 525–35 (2002) (documenting various U.S. objections to an international law restriction on 
the juvenile death penalty, most of which involve statements by the executive branch). 
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with which it disagrees, without the need for a formal withdrawal.136  
Moreover, it is well settled that, except for a small number of special jus 
cogens norms of international law, CIL may be overridden by agree-
ment.137  As a result, another option for the executive branch is to enter 
into agreements, including agreements that have little or no legislative 
involvement, to override CIL rules as between the parties to the  
agreement. 
When such interpretive avoidance or override by agreement is not 
feasible, the executive branch likely has another option: violating CIL.  
There is substantial debate about the status of CIL in the U.S. legal 
system,138 but the Supreme Court’s Paquete Habana decision has been 
read by many (including the executive branch) to disable U.S. courts 
from applying CIL to override a “controlling executive . . . act.”139  Con-
sistent with that conclusion, lower courts have rejected challenges to 
executive branch action based on alleged violations of CIL — for exam-
ple, challenges relating to immigration detention that is alleged to vio-
late CIL norms.140  Perhaps more significantly, most executive branch 
actions that implicate CIL are never reviewed by the courts at all, in 
which case they are dispositive unless overturned by Congress, which is 
extremely rare. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 136 Relatedly, the executive branch may be able to claim that the CIL rule has disappeared 
through a lack of sufficient state practice or opinio juris.  See generally Michael J. Glennon, How 
International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939 (2005). 
 137 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 102 cmt. j (“Unless the parties evince a contrary 
intention, a rule established by agreement supersedes for them a prior inconsistent rule of customary 
international law.  However, an agreement will not supersede a prior rule of customary law that is 
a peremptory norm of international law . . . .”).  A jus cogens norm, also referred to as a “peremptory 
norm,” is “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as 
a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent 
norm of general international law having the same character.”  VCLT, supra note 87, art. 53, 1155 
U.N.T.S. at 344. 
 138 See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 246 
(2d ed. 1996) (“Unlike treaties which have developed their part in the constitutional life of the United 
States, customary international law remains full of constitutional uncertainties.”). 
 139 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling 
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of 
civilized nations . . . .”).  The executive branch has expressed this view in, for example, Auth. of the 
FBI to Override Int’l Law in Extraterritorial Law Enf’t Activities, 13 Op. O.L.C. 163 (1989).  For 
debate over this issue, see Jonathan I. Charney, Michael J. Glennon & Louis Henkin, Essays, Agora: 
May the President Violate Customary International Law?, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 913 (1986); Frederic 
L. Kirgis, Jr., Anthony D’Amato & Jordan J. Paust, Essays, Agora: May the President Violate  
Customary International Law? (Cont’d), 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 371 (1987).   
 140 See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1451 (9th Cir. 1995); Gisbert v. U.S. Att’y 
Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1448 (5th Cir. 1993); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454–55 (11th Cir. 
1986).  The theory behind CIL envisions that some violations are actually necessary in order for it 
to continue evolving.  See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, The President and International Law: A Missing 
Dimension, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 375, 377 (1987) (“Existing customary law, then, contains the seeds 
of its own violation; otherwise it could never change itself.”). 
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To take one of countless examples, since the September 11, 2001 ter-
rorist attacks, the executive branch has developed the U.S. position con-
cerning the legality of targeted killing outside of traditional battlefields 
under both CIL and treaty law.  It has done so without either specific 
statutory guidance or judicial review, even though the U.S. position is 
highly controversial internationally and is alleged by critics to involve 
violations of international law.141  In September 2017, the Trump  
Administration was reported to be considering adopting a more permis-
sive approach to such targeted killing, again without seeking congres-
sional authorization or approval.142 
B.  Interim Treaty Obligations and Provisional Application 
International obligations can also be created — as a matter of CIL — 
through the negotiation of international agreements before they are rat-
ified, and thus before either the Senate or Congress has approved them.  
This section addresses two situations in which this may occur: first, 
when a nation incurs interim obligations based on its signature of a 
treaty, and, second, when a nation agrees, either through signature or 
otherwise, to have some or all of the treaty apply provisionally prior to 
ratification. 
1.  Interim Obligations. — Nations often sign treaties prior to ratify-
ing them.143  For the United States, the executive branch carries out this 
act of signature.144  Although signing a treaty in these circumstances 
does not bind the nation to the treaty, it may generate certain interim 
obligations.  In particular, Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties provides that a nation that signs a treaty is bound not 
to take actions that “would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty” 
until “it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the 
treaty.”145  Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna  
Convention, the executive branch — in another unilateral practice — 
has indicated on various occasions that it accepts that the object and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 141 See KENNETH ANDERSON & BENJAMIN WITTES, SPEAKING THE LAW: THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION’S ADDRESSES ON NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (2015) (collecting Obama  
Administration legal speeches on these issues); see also bin Ali Jaber v. United States, 861 F.3d 241, 
245–47, 250 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 480 (2017) (holding that suit challenging drone attack 
in Yemen by the U.S. military presented a nonjusticiable political question). 
 142 See Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, Trump Poised to Drop Some Limits on Drone Strikes and 
Commando Raids, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2jRoPSa [https://perma.cc/7D9J-
KAL2]. 
 143 See Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 307 (2007). 
 144 Id. at 308. 
 145 VCLT, supra note 87, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336. 
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purpose obligation set forth in Article 18 is binding on the United States 
as a matter of CIL.146 
The Clinton Administration arguably triggered such interim obliga-
tions when it signed the treaty for the International Criminal Court in 
1999, despite substantial opposition to that treaty in Congress.147  Even 
when the Bush Administration made clear in 2002 that the United States 
did not intend to ratify the treaty, it did not deny the possibility that the 
Clinton Administration had triggered an interim obligation under the 
treaty.  Indeed, one reason it “unsigned” the treaty was to eliminate any 
such obligation.148 
Because the executive branch is responsible for U.S. signature of 
treaties, it has the ability to trigger interim signing obligations under 
CIL without the agreement of the Senate or Congress.149  At times, the 
Senate has pushed back against such authority.  For example, when the 
Law of the Sea Convention was being negotiated during the 1970s, four-
teen senators sent a letter to the Carter Administration’s representative 
to the treaty conference expressing concerns about potential obligations 
that could be triggered by U.S. signature of the Convention.150  The 
senators insisted that such signature “will not bind [the Senate] from 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 146 See, e.g., INT’L LAW INST., DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 2001, at 212–13 (Sally J. Cummins & David P. Stewart eds., 2002) (reprinting answer by  
Secretary of State Colin Powell to question for the record by Senator Jesse Helms reaffirming the 
State Department’s view that Article 18 of the Vienna Convention reflects CIL); MARIAN LLOYD 
NASH, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, DEP’T OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES 
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1979, at 692–93 (1983) (reprinting statement by Ambassador 
Elliott Richardson endorsing the view that the object and purpose test of Article 18 represents CIL); 
Letter of Submittal from William P. Rogers, U.S. Sec’y of State, to President Richard M. Nixon, 
supra note 87, at 2 (acknowledging interim obligation test of Article 18 as CIL). 
 147 See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International 
Law: U.S. Signing of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 397, 397–
400 (2001); Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal Court 
Treaty, ASIL INSIGHTS (May 11, 2002), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/7/issue/7/us- 
announces-intent-not-ratify-international-criminal-court-treaty [https://perma.cc/9JUK-9BSU]. 
 148 See Letter from John R. Bolton, U.S. Under Sec’y of State for Arms Control and Int’l Sec., 
to Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General (May 6, 2002) [hereinafter Letter from John R. Bolton], 
https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm [https://perma.cc/6S69-55SQ] (noting that, 
because of its announcement, “the United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature”).  
 149 For an argument that it is constitutionally problematic for the President to unilaterally trigger 
signing obligations for the United States, see generally David H. Moore, The President’s Unconsti-
tutional Treatymaking, 59 UCLA L. REV. 598 (2012).  The ability of a subsequent President to 
“unsign” an agreement, as happened with the International Criminal Court treaty, is another uni-
lateral presidential power relating to international law.  The extent of presidential discretion over 
this issue is nicely illustrated by the Bush Administration’s decision to pursue a somewhat different 
approach to disavowing the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, which had been signed by the Clinton Administration.  Although the Bush Admin-
istration made clear that it opposed the Kyoto Protocol, it chose not to send an official “unsigning” 
letter to the United Nations, while at the same time insisting that its opposition to the Protocol was 
“clear and unambiguous.”  See Bradley, supra note 143, at 312–13. 
 150 NASH, supra note 146, at 690–93. 
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taking any action which anyone claims would defeat the object or pur-
pose of the treaty.”151  Ultimately, the United States did not sign the 
Convention.152 
Controversy about this issue also arose in connection with the  
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) II Treaty negotiated with the 
Soviet Union, which the Carter Administration signed in 1979.153  The 
next year, after the Carter Administration asked the Senate to delay its 
consideration of the treaty, the State Department stated that “[t]he U.S. 
and the Soviet Union share the view that under international law a state 
should refrain from taking action which would defeat the object and the 
purpose of a treaty it has signed subject to ratification,” and that “[w]e 
therefore expect that the United States and the Soviet Union will refrain 
from acts which would defeat the object and the purpose of the SALT 
II Treaty before it is ratified and enters into force.”154  In 1981, the 
Reagan Administration made clear to the Soviet Union that the United 
States had no intention of ratifying the treaty.155  Two senators subse-
quently sent a letter to President Reagan objecting to what they de-
scribed as President Carter’s position that the Defense Department 
“comply fully and precisely with all the provisions of the unratified 
SALT II treaty,” and to President Reagan’s apparent acceptance that, 
until the United States made clear its intent not to ratify the treaty, it 
was obligated to refrain from actions that would defeat SALT II’s object 
and purpose.156 
One reason that the President’s ability to trigger interim signing ob-
ligations has not generated even more controversy is that the object and 
purpose obligation may not be very significant for most treaties.  In 
describing this obligation, the executive branch has observed that na-
tions are “expected to avoid actions which could render impossible the 
entry into force and implementation of the [agreement], or defeat its 
basic purpose and value to the other party or parties.”157  This narrow 
interpretation of Article 18 is defensible in light of both its text and 
drafting history, despite some academic claims about a broader scope of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 151 Id. at 691. 
 152 Roncevert Ganan Almond, U.S. Ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention, THE  
DIPLOMAT (May 24, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/u-s-ratification-of-the-law-of-the-sea- 
convention/ [https://perma.cc/EPA6-23KF]. 
 153 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II), U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/t/isn/ 
5195.htm [https://perma.cc/ZJ8A-JHKK]. 
 154 MARIAN NASH LEICH, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 1980, at 398 (1986). 
 155 131 CONG. REC. 3449 (1985) (letter from Sens. Steve Symms and John East). 
 156 Id. at 3452. 
 157 Memorandum from Roberts B. Owen, U.S. Dep’t of State Legal Adviser (Feb. 21, 1980), 
reprinted in S. EXEC. REP. NO. 96-33, at 47 (1980) [hereinafter Memorandum from Roberts B. 
Owen]. 
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the obligation.158  While even this narrow conception of the object and 
purpose obligation may have significance for certain treaties that have 
a single core obligation, for other treaties there are not likely to be many 
actions that the United States could take that would “render impossible 
the entry into force and implementation of the [agreement], or defeat its 
basic purpose and value to the other party or parties.”159  But even this 
is simply a matter of executive branch interpretation. 
2.  Provisional Application. — Nations can agree to have a treaty 
apply provisionally even before they have ratified it — for example, 
based on a provision in the treaty that is triggered by signature, or in a 
separate agreement.  As stated in Article 25 of the Vienna Convention, 
“[a] treaty or a part of a treaty is applied provisionally pending its entry 
into force if: (a) The treaty itself so provides; or (b) The negotiating 
States have in some other manner so agreed.”160  This provisional effect 
will normally terminate, according to Article 25, if a signatory state “no-
tifies the other States between which the treaty is being applied provi-
sionally of its intention not to become a party to the treaty.”161  Unlike 
an interim signing obligation, provisional application of a treaty can 
bind a nation to all or part of a treaty, not just to an obligation not to 
defeat its object and purpose.  It is therefore a much more significant 
obligation, and therefore a potentially more significant pathway around 
legislative consent to a treaty.162 
The executive branch has often agreed to the provisional application 
of treaties.163  It has defended the practice based on its power to make 
executive agreements when authorized by a ratified treaty or a statute, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 158 Bradley, supra note 143, at 308; see also Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
2061, 2078 (2003) (“Some commentators regard compliance with article 18 as turning on the ob-
servance of major or indispensable treaty provisions . . . .  But the interim obligation is more com-
monly understood to safeguard against acts that would disable the mere signatory (or others) from 
complying with the treaty once it entered into force — in an attempt to maintain, as relevant, the 
status quo ante.”). 
 159 Memorandum from Roberts B. Owen, supra note 157, at 47.  For the treaty establishing the 
International Criminal Court, it was arguable that the U.S. effort to conclude “Article 98 agree-
ments” with countries — whereby the countries would not extradite U.S. citizens to the Court — 
was incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, which may be part of the reason the 
Bush Administration made clear that the United States had no intention of ratifying the treaty.   
 160 VCLT, supra note 87, art. 25(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 338. 
 161 Id. art. 25(2), 1155 U.N.T.S. 339. 
 162 See René Lefeber, The Provisional Application of Treaties, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF 
TREATIES 81, 82 (Jan Klabbers & René Lefeber eds., 1998) (noting danger that provisional appli-
cation will be used by the executive branch in some countries to evade a requirement of parliamen-
tary approval of treaties). 
 163 See CRS STUDY, supra note 12, at 113–16. 
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or (when the agreement falls within the President’s independent consti-
tutional authority) based on its sole executive agreement power.164  Pres-
idential action triggering interim obligations might also find support in 
a President’s potentially greater authority to enter into sole executive 
agreements for minor or temporary commitments.165 
As with executive agreements, the executive branch frequently in-
vokes legislative bases for provisional application.166  It did so, for ex-
ample, for the provisional application of the General Agreement on  
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which lasted from 1947 to 1995.167  Some-
times, provisional application is specifically limited by its terms to obli-
gations not inconsistent with each country’s domestic law.  That was 
true for GATT: the agreement on provisional application applied “to the 
fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation.”168  Similarly, in 
1998, provisional application of a mutual legal assistance treaty with 
Ukraine was accepted “to the extent possible under [the] respective do-
mestic laws of the United States . . . and Ukraine.”169 
Members of the Senate have recently expressed concern that the ex-
ecutive branch will use provisional application to bypass the need for 
legislative approval of an international agreement.  For example, in 
2013, the Obama Administration signed the Arms Trade Treaty,170 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 164 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 96-49, 19, 26–27 (1980) (Three Treaties Establishing Maritime Bound-
aries Between the United States and Mexico, Venezuela and Cuba) (responses of Mark B. Feldman, 
Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, to questions submitted by Sen. Jacob K. Javits).  The 
executive branch has disclaimed authority, however, to use provisional application of a treaty to 
change existing domestic law.  See id. at 27. 
 165 See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 7, at 198–200; Ingrid Wuerth, Iran Nuclear Agreement as a  
Modus Vivendi, LAWFARE (Nov. 25, 2013, 7:26 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/iran-nuclear-
agreement-modus-vivendi [https://perma.cc/5TF9-XS9W]. 
 166 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LAW OF THE SEA TREATY: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
TO PROVISIONAL APPLICATION 2 (Comm. Print 1974); see also Martin A. Rogoff & Barbara E. 
Gauditz, The Provisional Application of International Agreements, 39 ME. L. REV. 29, 63 (1987) 
(“[T]he President has generally obtained some form of congressional approval of, or at least acqui-
escence in, provisional agreements binding the United States to international obligations.”). 
 167 In 1947, the Truman Administration signed the Protocol of Provisional Application of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Oct. 30, 1947, art. 1, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.  
 168 Id.  
 169 Letter from Madeleine Albright, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Ambassador Anton Buteiko, Ambas-
sador for Ukr. to the U.S. (Sept. 30, 1999), reprinted in Message from the President of the United 
States Transmitting Treaty Between United States of America and Ukraine on Mutual Legal Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-16, at 21 (Nov. 10, 1999).  In subsequently 
explaining this agreement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, executive branch lawyers 
noted that it was “an interim executive agreement” and that it was “limited to what can be done 
under existing legal authority.”  Consideration of Pending Treaties: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. 34–35 (2000) (responses submitted by Samuel M. Witten, Assis-
tant Legal Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence, Department of State, and Bruce C. 
Swartz, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, Department of Justice, to additional ques-
tions submitted by Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.). 
 170 Final U.N. Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty: Draft Decision, art. 1, Mar. 27, 2013, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.217/2013.L.3.  On April 2, 2013, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution 
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which regulates international trade in conventional arms, despite sub-
stantial opposition to it in the Senate.  Senator Corker, then the Ranking 
Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sent a letter to 
President Obama insisting that the President not agree to provisional 
application of the treaty.171  Corker contended in his letter that “[a]ny 
act to implement this treaty, provisionally or otherwise, before the  
Congress provides its advice and consent would be fundamentally in-
consistent with the U.S. Constitution, law, and practice.”172  (Even with-
out provisional application, the signing of the treaty itself may carry 
with it some international legal obligations, as noted above.) 
The executive branch also controls the termination of both interim 
signing obligations and provisional application.  Under the Vienna Con-
vention, both types of obligations are terminated if a nation makes clear 
its intent not to become a party to the treaty.173  With its control over 
diplomacy, it is the executive branch that issues such a notice.  This was 
evident, for example, in connection with the treaty establishing the  
International Criminal Court.  After the Clinton Administration had 
signed that treaty and potentially triggered interim obligations for the 
United States, the subsequent Bush Administration sent a letter to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations making clear that it would not 
become a party to the treaty and that “[a]ccordingly, the United States 
has no legal obligations arising from its signature.”174  Although there 
was significant debate over the policy wisdom of this announcement, 
there was little dispute that the President had the authority to make it.  
As an illustration of the breadth of presidential power in this area, the 
Obama Administration partially reversed course again, both by making 
efforts to reengage with the International Criminal Court and by stating 
that it “is explicitly not the policy of this administration” “to frustrate 
the object and purpose” of the treaty.175 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
adopting the treaty as contained in the annex to the draft decision and recommending that nations 
join the treaty.  G.A. Res. 67/234, Arms Trade Treaty (Apr. 2, 2013). 
 171 Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Corker Warns Obama Administra-
tion Against Any Action to Implement U.N. Arms Trade Treaty Without Senate Advice and Con-
sent (Sept. 24, 2013), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/corker-warns-obama- 
administration-against-any-action-to-implement-un-arms-trade-treaty-without-senate-advice-and-
consent [https://perma.cc/A32T-EMD3].  The treaty provides that “[a]ny State may at the time of 
signature or the deposit of instrument of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare 
that it will apply provisionally Article 6 and Article 7 pending the entry into force of this Treaty for 
that State.”  Final U.N. Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty: Draft Decision, supra note 170,  
art. 23. 
 172 Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 171. 
 173 See VCLT, supra note 87, arts. 18, 25, 1155 U.N.T.S. 336, 338–39. 
 174 See Letter from John R. Bolton, supra note 148. 
 175 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, The Challenges and Future of Interna-
tional Justice (Oct. 27, 2010), https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/150497.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/8MPC-JM53]. 
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C.  The Executive Branch and International Organizations 
Another way that the executive branch can affect the content of in-
ternational law without obtaining specific congressional approval is by 
its actions in international institutions.  The executive branch represents 
the United States in such institutions, and in doing so it engages in a 
wide range of actions, including: making statements about U.S. positions 
relating to international law, voting on resolutions that concern the con-
tent of preexisting international obligations or create new obligations, 
approving modifications to treaty obligations through streamlined con-
sent procedures that do not involve legislative approval, and articulat-
ing the position of the United States in international adjudication or 
arbitration.  In addition to these overt actions, the executive branch can 
work behind the scenes with other nations to encourage them to take 
actions in international institutions that can affect the United States’ 
rights and duties under international law.176 
Consider, for example, executive branch participation in the U.N. 
Security Council.  Congress has expressly authorized the executive 
branch to represent the United States in the United Nations, including 
in the Security Council.  The U.N. Participation Act states that the  
President shall appoint an ambassador to the United Nations and that 
this ambassador “shall represent the United States in the Security  
Council of the United Nations . . . and shall perform such other func-
tions in connection with the participation of the United States in the 
United Nations as the President may, from time to time, direct.”177  It 
also provides that U.S. representatives in the United Nations “shall, at 
all times, act in accordance with the instructions of the President trans-
mitted by the Secretary of State unless other means of transmission is 
directed by the President.”178 
Under the U.N. Charter, the Council has the authority to issue bind-
ing pronouncements concerning international legal obligations, as long 
as they concern the maintenance of peace and security.179  The United 
States is one of five countries that have a permanent seat on the Council 
and the ability to veto its resolutions.  But it has only one of the fifteen 
votes on the Council, which requires at least nine favorable votes — and 
no negative votes from any of the other four veto countries — to pass a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 176 See Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents, and Legit-
imacy, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 681, 688 (1996–1997) (“[E]xecutives may act more or less secretly 
within the international body to shape the rule adopted, and then carry out the international man-
date, either directly or by lobbying its domestic legislature, while disavowing responsibility for the 
rule’s content.”). 
 177 22 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2012). 
 178 Id. § 287a. 
 179 See U.N. Charter arts. 25, 39, 41, 42. 
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resolution.  Nevertheless, there are times when it is easier for the exec-
utive branch to convince the Council to create an international legal 
obligation than to convince Congress to agree to such an obligation. 
Concerns about presidential use of the Security Council to circum-
vent Congress arose in connection with the Iran nuclear deal in 2015.  
As discussed in Part I, the Obama Administration decided to conclude 
that deal as a nonbinding political agreement, which did not require 
congressional approval.  One tradeoff of doing so was that the agree-
ment would not be legally binding on Iran.  As a way of avoiding this 
limitation, there was speculation that the Administration might attempt 
to have the Security Council issue a resolution making the terms of the 
deal binding.180  The Administration had already followed such a route 
two years earlier in having the Security Council convert a nonbinding 
agreement with Syria concerning chemical weapons into binding obli-
gations.181  If applied to the Iran deal, it would make it much stickier, 
not only with respect to Iran, but also with respect to the United States, 
because it could mean that if a subsequent President attempted to reim-
pose U.S. sanctions on Iran he or she would be violating international 
law.  Ultimately, the Council issued a resolution providing for the ter-
mination only of U.N. sanctions on Iran, without mandating that the 
United States end its sanctions.182  Nevertheless, the Security Council 
action in support of the Obama Administration’s Iran agreement is a 
key component of that agreement and something that makes it much 
harder for a subsequent administration to undo.183 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 180 See Jack Goldsmith, How a U.N. Security Council Resolution Transforms a Non-Binding 
Agreement with Iran into a Binding Obligation Under International Law (Without Any New  
Senatorial or Congressional Vote), LAWFARE (Mar. 12, 2015, 8:37 AM), https://www. 
lawfareblog.com/how-un-security-council-resolution-transforms-non-binding-agreement-iran-binding- 
obligation-under [https://perma.cc/MNA6-BBX2]; Colum Lynch & John Hudson, Obama Turns to 
U.N. to Outmaneuver Congress, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 15, 2015, 7:18 PM), http://foreignpolicy. 
com/2015/07/15/obama-turns-to-u-n-to-outmaneuver-congress-iran-nuclear-deal/ [https://perma.cc/ 
78PU-CGNH]. 
 181 See S.C. Res. 2118 (Sept. 27, 2013). 
 182 S.C. Res. 2231 (July 20, 2015); see also John Bellinger, The New UNSCR on Iran: Does It 
Bind the United States (and Future Presidents)?, LAWFARE (July 18, 2015, 4:58 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/new-unscr-iran-does-it-bind-united-states-and-future-presidents 
[https://perma.cc/K2HE-LNNZ]; Somini Sengupta, U.N. Moves to Lift Iran Sanctions After Nu-
clear Deal, Setting Up a Clash in Congress, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2qtA8iy 
[https://perma.cc/TM5U-5JEN]. 
 183 The Security Council resolution includes a “snapback” provision, however, that potentially 
could allow the President to “trigger the re-imposition of . . . sanctions on Iran” without a new ap-
proval by the Council.  Jean Galbraith, If President Trump Ends the Iran Deal, Can He Trigger the 
Security Council Snapback?, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 20, 2017, 8:48 PM), https://opiniojuris. 
org/2017/09/20/if-president-trump-ends-the-iran-deal-can-he-trigger-the-security-council-snapback/ 
[https://perma.cc/5PLJ-F5DG]; see also Somini Sengupta, “Snapback” Is an Easy Way to Reimpose 
Iran Penalties, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2lmsvub [https://perma.cc/745U-P875]. 
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The executive branch can also use its role in the Security Council to 
alter the international legal obligations of other countries.  In December 
2016, for example, the Security Council approved a resolution stating 
that Israel’s construction of housing settlements in occupied Palestinian 
territory “constitutes a flagrant violation under international law.”184  
The Obama Administration decided to abstain on the vote rather than 
exercise its veto authority, thereby letting the resolution take effect, even 
though it is highly unlikely that Congress would have approved such 
action.185  Depending on how it is construed, the resolution may alter 
Israel’s obligations under international law.186  Importantly, when  
Presidents vote in ways that result in new international law obligations 
for other nations, they at the same time establish those obligations for 
the United States.  
There are many other ways the executive branch can use its role in 
international institutions to influence the development of international 
law.  For many multilateral treaty regimes, modifications to the treaties 
can be accomplished through informal “tacit” amendment procedures or 
consensus resolutions of the parties that do not require new acts of rat-
ification by the members.187  When embodied in treaties to which the 
Senate has given its advice and consent, the Senate can be said to have 
“given its consent in advance to the modifications adopted pursuant to 
those processes.”188  In effect, the international organizations or confer-
ences that administer the agreements have been delegated administra-
tive regulatory authority that is somewhat akin to the authority exer-
cised by administrative agencies in the United States.189  In order for 
the tacit amendments to become binding, often the only thing that is 
required is a lack of objection by the parties, and the executive branch 
decides whether the United States objects.190 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 184 S.C. Res. 2334, ¶ 1 (Dec. 23, 2016).   
 185 See Somini Sengupta & Rick Gladstone, Rebuffing Israel, U.S. Allows Censure over Settle-
ments, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2kg07pL [https://perma.cc/CJU8-2EUA]. 
 186 See Recent Resolution, S.C. Res. 2334 (Dec. 23, 2016), 130 HARV. L. REV. 2267, 2269–71 
(2017). 
 187 See, e.g., OONA A. HATHAWAY, HALEY NIX, SAURABH SANGHVI & SARA SOLOW, TACIT 
AMENDMENTS 3 (2011), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/cglc/TacitAmendments.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M3EG-KUGP]; David A. Koplow, When Is an Amendment Not an Amendment?: 
Modification of Arms Control Agreements Without the Senate, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 981,  
1035–44 (1992). 
 188 CRS STUDY, supra note 12, at 183. 
 189 See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1492, 1494–95 (2004) (“The practice of delegating to international institutions — vesting 
them with the authority to develop binding rules — sometimes looks like the next New Deal.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 190 For example, under the Chemical Weapons Convention, which the United States joined in 
1997, the toxic chemicals that are subject to the Convention’s verification measures are set forth in 
schedules contained in an annex to the Convention, and the Convention provides for tacit amend-
ments to these schedules “if proposed changes are related only to matters of an administrative or 
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The executive branch also plays a lead role in deciding whether the 
United States withdraws from international organizations.  These or-
ganizations are typically created through international agreements, and, 
as discussed in Part I, the executive branch as a matter of practice ex-
ercises a unilateral authority to withdraw from agreements.  To take one 
example, in 2005, the Bush Administration unilaterally withdrew the 
United States from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations after the country lost several cases brought pursuant 
to the Protocol in the International Court of Justice.191  More recently, 
the Trump Administration withdrew the United States from UNESCO 
and has threatened to withdraw the United States from the U.N.  
Human Rights Council.192  Not all of these actions are ones that  
Congress would likely object to; the key point is that they are handled 
unilaterally by the executive branch without any significant congres-
sional input.193 
To be sure, in some instances Congress may be able to use its funding 
authority and other powers to influence executive branch action in in-
ternational institutions.194  In general, though, Congress’s authority is at 
best reactive, and exercises of this authority depend on being fully aware 
of the positions that the executive branch has taken, which will often 
not be the case.  Moreover, even if Congress can react to executive 
branch action, it is constrained by the fact that, unlike its ability to over-
turn the decisions and actions of domestic administrative agencies, it 
has no direct ability to overturn the decisions and actions of interna-
tional institutions, which would often require an amendment to the un-
derlying agreement.195 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
technical nature.”  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, art. XV(4), opened for signature Jan. 13, 1992, 
1997 U.N.T.S. 317 (entered into force on Apr. 29, 1997).  A proposed change takes effect if recom-
mended by the Executive Council (which consists of 41 states parties with rotating membership) 
and “no State Party objects to it within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation.”  Id. art. 
XV(5)(d), 1997 U.N.T.S. 352.  The executive branch represents the United States on the Executive 
Council. 
 191 See Letter from Sec’y of State Condoleezza Rice, supra note 90. 
 192 See Gardiner Harris & Steven Erlanger, U.S. Will Withdraw from UNESCO, Citing Its “Anti-
Israel Bias”, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2kIjdd7 [https://perma.cc/YER4-LZ5P]; 
Merrit Kennedy, Trump Administration Warns that U.S. May Pull Out of U.N. Human  
Rights Council, NPR (June 6, 2017, 2:50 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/ 
2017/06/06/531752892/trump-administration-warns-that-u-s-may-pull-out-of-u-n-human-rights-council 
[https://perma.cc/CG9X-H6TW]. 
 193 More generally, the executive branch has substantial ability to influence the agenda of inter-
national institutions, which can in turn affect the international legal issues on which the United 
States, guided by the executive branch, will feel compelled to take a position, as well as, in some 
instances, the development of CIL. 
 194 See, e.g., Kristina Daugirdas, Congress Underestimated: The Case of the World Bank, 107 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 517, 519 (2013) (“Over the past forty years, Congress has undertaken persistent and 
often successful efforts to shape day-to-day U.S. participation in the [World] Bank, a key interna-
tional organization.”). 
 195 See Stephan, supra note 176, at 687. 
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III.  WHY PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL MATTERS 
Parts I and II described ten pathways of presidential control over 
making, interpreting, and terminating international law: 
 Article II treaties 
 Ex ante congressional-executive agreements 
 Ex post congressional-executive agreements 
 Executive agreements made pursuant to a treaty 
 Sole executive agreements 
 Executive Agreements+ 
 Political commitments 
 Customary international law 
 Interim and provisional application of agreements 
 Lawmaking in international institutions 
The pathways of presidential control have expanded in number and 
depth over time, in part because of executive branch assertiveness and 
creativity, but also because of broad statutory delegations of authority 
combined with congressional inattention and passivity. 
This Part explains further why the rise of presidential control over 
international law matters in practice.  Section A recounts several  
high-profile examples of how recent Presidents (both Democratic and  
Republican) have been able to combine or substitute the various path-
ways of control to further enhance their unilateral authority.  Section B 
then explains how presidential control over international law extends 
beyond its impact on U.S. foreign relations and has significant conse-
quences domestically for U.S. institutions and actors. 
A.  Combining and Substituting Unilateral Power 
Parts I and II described the tools of presidential unilateralism piece-
meal for analytical purposes.  This section provides several examples 
showing how recent Presidents have substituted or combined these au-
thorities to extend the reach of presidential unilateralism. 
1.  Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. — Presidential action 
relating to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)196 il-
lustrates how the pathways discussed in Part II can sometimes be used 
when the pathways discussed in Part I are foreclosed or restricted.  This 
treaty, which has not yet entered into force, would ban all explosive 
testing of nuclear weapons.197  The Clinton Administration signed the 
treaty in 1996 and subsequently submitted it to the Senate for advice 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 196 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1439. 
 197 Id. 
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and consent.198  In a major foreign policy defeat for the Administration, 
however, the Senate voted it down in 1999.199 
The Clinton Administration responded by invoking the CIL path-
way associated with “interim” signing obligations.  In particular, the  
Administration maintained that, under CIL, because the executive 
branch had signed the treaty, the United States still had an obligation 
to avoid testing nuclear weapons.200  Years later, in 2013, the Obama 
Administration similarly joined the other permanent members of the 
Security Council in a statement that cited Article 18 of the Vienna Con-
vention and called on all nations “to uphold their national moratoria on 
nuclear weapons–test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and to 
refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the 
[CTBT] pending its entry into force.”201  In both instances, it is highly 
unlikely that either the Senate or the full Congress would have approved 
such a commitment. 
Subsequently, in 2016, the Obama Administration decided to seek a 
U.N. Security Council resolution urging nations not to test nuclear 
weapons and to support the CTBT’s objectives.202  It is unclear whether 
the Administration’s original plan contemplated a resolution that would 
be binding under international law, but Senator Corker, the Chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, perceived that this was the 
Administration’s intention.203  Senator Corker responded by writing a 
letter to President Obama expressing “strong opposition to efforts by 
your administration to circumvent the U.S. Congress and the Senate’s 
constitutional role by promoting ratification of the [CTBT] at the United 
Nations” and insisting that “[t]he U.S. Constitution clearly provides the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 198 Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test-Ban Treaty, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-28, at III (1997). 
 199 Senate Republicans worried that it would be difficult to verify other nations’ compliance with 
the treaty and also that, if the United States were bound by the treaty, it would be too difficult for 
it to maintain the viability of its nuclear weapons.  See Helen Dewar, Senate Rejects Test Ban 
Treaty, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 1999), http://wapo.st/2mlLQul [https://perma.cc/H4X9-NLCN]. 
 200 See Bill Gertz, Albright Says U.S. Bound by Nuke Pact, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1999, at A1 
(quoting letter, from Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to foreign ministers, referring to the 
United States’ “obligations as a signatory under international law”); The President’s News Confer-
ence, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2035, 2039 (Oct. 14, 1999) (remarks of President Clinton) (“I 
signed that treaty.  It still binds us unless I go, in effect, and erase our name.  Unless the President 
does that and takes our name off, we are bound by it.”). 
 201 OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES 
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2013, at 648 (CarrieLyn D. Guymon ed., 2014) (excerpting 
joint statement following fourth conference). 
 202 See Josh Rogin, Obama Will Bypass Congress, Seek U.N. Resolution on Nuclear Testing, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2016), http://wapo.st/2aTwjic [https://perma.cc/DK4B-35ES]. 
 203 Id. (quoting Senator Corker as contending that the Obama plan would “allow countries like 
Russia and China to be able to bind the United States over our nuclear deterrent capability without 
the scrutiny of Congress,” and would keep Congress “from weighing in on an important agreement 
that’s going to limit our ability to ensure our nuclear deterrent is in place”). 
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Senate — not the United Nations — the right to the provision of advice 
and consent for the ratification of any treaty, including the ability to 
identify when a treaty or the application of the provisions contained in 
a treaty is not in the U.S. interest.”204 
Although Senator Corker accurately described the Senate’s role in 
the treaty process, it is also the case, as discussed in Part II, that  
Congress has given the President unqualified authority to vote in  
the U.N. Security Council, an authority that the President has often used 
to support binding international obligations.205  In the end, the  
Administration did not pursue a binding resolution concerning nuclear 
testing, but rather obtained a resolution from the Council that merely 
“calls upon” states to refrain from testing rather than disallowing them 
from doing so.206 
2.  Security Agreement with Iraq. — The war that Congress autho-
rized against Iraq in 2002 became embedded in an international law 
framework when the U.N. Security Council passed Resolutions 1483 
and 1511, which together recognized a Coalition Provisional Authority 
and authorized a “multinational force” to maintain security and stability 
in Iraq.207  These and subsequent elements of the U.N. mandate in Iraq 
were set to expire on December 31, 2008.208  In November 2007,  
President Bush, without consulting Congress, signed a political commit-
ment with Iraq in which the two countries pledged to work toward a 
binding bilateral accord to replace the U.N. mandate and set the terms 
for the U.S. military presence in Iraq going forward.209  Many in  
Congress objected when the Bush Administration made clear that it 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 204 Letter from Senator Bob Corker, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, to President 
Barack Obama (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.corker.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/3224510d-18c7-
467d-aabb-a6ca7d4cdf31/Senator%20Corker%20letter%20on%20CTBT%208-12-16.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/U279-7LAV].  A group of thirty-three congressional Republicans also wrote a letter to 
President Obama threatening to withhold funding for an international monitoring system for nu-
clear tests if the Administration sought to use the Council to obtain binding obligations disallowing 
testing.  See Paul Sonne, Senate GOP Protests Obama’s Planned Nuclear Test Ban Push, WALL ST. 
J. (Sept. 8, 2016, 5:59 PM), http://on.wsj.com/2Exrshb [https://perma.cc/HB9B-MUEY]. 
 205 See supra section II.C, pp. 1241–44. 
 206 S.C. Res. 2310, ¶ 4 (Sept. 23, 2016).  Another option that was apparently considered by the 
executive branch was to have the five permanent members of the Council interpret the “object and 
purpose” of the CTBT as prohibiting nuclear testing.  See The Administration’s Proposal for a U.N. 
Resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on For-
eign Relations, 114th Cong. 3 (2016) (statement of Stephen G. Rademaker). 
 207 S.C. Res. 1511, ¶ 13 (Oct. 16, 2003); see also S.C. Res. 1483, pmbl. (May 22, 2003).  
 208 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council, Acting on Iraq’s Request, Extends ‘For 
Last Time’ Mandate of Multinational Force, U.N. Press Release SC/9207 (Dec. 18, 2007), 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc9207.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/H4NF-H5J9]. 
 209 See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Rela-
tionship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States  
of America (Nov. 26, 2007), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/11/ 
20071126-11.html [https://perma.cc/9BND-GHD6].  
1201-1297_BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH_CONTRACTPROOFS 02/04/18 – 4:47 PM 
1248 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:1201 
would negotiate this binding agreement unilaterally.210  Over the next 
year, the Administration refused to respond to bipartisan congressional 
requests to see the texts of the agreements being negotiated.211 
After the 2008 presidential election but while President Bush was 
still in office, the United States signed two executive agreements with 
Iraq: one a “Strategic Framework” for friendship and cooperation, and 
the other an agreement, akin to a Status of Forces Agreement, concern-
ing the presence and eventual withdrawal from Iraq of U.S. forces.212  
These were important and controversial agreements that would define 
the terms of the American military presence in Iraq for the first three 
years of the Obama Administration.  They were negotiated in secret by 
the Bush Administration without the input or approval of Congress or 
the incoming Obama Administration, were announced as faits accom-
plis during the transition period, and came into force on January 1, 2009.  
The potential legal bases for agreements of this sort can be prior statutes 
or treaties or independent Article II power.213  The Bush Administration 
chose the Commander in Chief Clause to justify what thus became sole 
executive agreements.214 
In sum, at the end of his presidency, President Bush used a political 
commitment and then the sole executive agreement power to cut out 
Congress entirely from the process of establishing an internationally 
binding three-year military and political relationship with Iraq that his 
successor, who came into office pledging to pull the U.S. military out of 
Iraq, inherited. 
3.  Paris Agreement. — The Paris Agreement, mentioned in the in-
troduction to this Article, illustrates how the President can combine 
agreement-making power with political commitments and domestic reg-
ulations to enter into extraordinarily consequential international agree-
ments unilaterally, even if Congress opposes the deal.  The Agreement 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 210 See Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and the 
Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 467–68 (2011). 
 211 Id. at 470. 
 212 Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation Between 
the United States and the Republic of Iraq, Iraq-U.S., Nov. 17, 2008, T.I.A.S. No. 09-101.1; Agree-
ment Between the United States of America and Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United 
States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities During Their Temporary Presence 
in Iraq, Iraq-U.S., Nov. 17, 2008, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122074.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5JME-P68S]. 
 213 See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34362, CONGRES-
SIONAL OVERSIGHT AND RELATED ISSUES CONCERNING THE PROSPECTIVE SECURITY 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ 13 & n.56 (2008), https://fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/mideast/RL34362.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4X3-ZQG4].  
 214 See Negotiating a Long-Term Relationship with Iraq: Hearing on U.S.-Iraq Long-Term Secu-
rity Agreement Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. 4 (2008) (statement of Hon. 
David Satterfield, Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq) (citing Com-
mander in Chief Clause as basis for concluding 2008 Iraq Agreements).  
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requires states parties to prepare, submit, and maintain pledges, called 
“nationally determined contributions,” to limit greenhouse gases.215  
Most elements of the Agreement are legally binding under international 
law.  We know this because most of the Agreement’s terms use the lan-
guage of a binding instrument, the Administration and other nations 
view it as binding, and President Obama deposited an instrument of 
acceptance to the Agreement with the U.N. Secretary General.216  Be-
cause the Administration did not clearly explain its authority under do-
mestic law to make this agreement, and because the answer is not obvi-
ous, scholars and commentators have debated what type of agreement 
it was.  Some maintained that it was a sole executive agreement.217  
Some said it was an executive agreement without specifying the type.218  
Some said it was an Executive Agreement+, at least in part.219  Others 
said it was an executive agreement pursuant to a treaty — the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) — to 
which the Senate gave its consent and the President ratified in 1992.220  
Yet others have said it rested on a number of statutory, treaty, and con-
stitutional bases.221  This uncertainty about the legal basis for such a 
consequential international agreement — much less the validity of that 
basis — is a remarkable testament to the extent of presidential unilater-
alism in this area. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 215 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties, Twenty-First 
Session, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015) 
[hereinafter Paris Agreement].  The Paris Agreement also contains obligations to help developing 
countries facilitate emission reductions, such as climate finance and technology transfer provisions.  
See, e.g., id. arts. 9–10. 
 216 See Tanya Somanader, President Obama: The United States Formally Enters the Paris  
Agreement, WHITE HOUSE: BLOG (Sept. 3, 2016, 10:41 AM), https://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/blog/2016/09/03/president-obama-united-states-formally-enters-paris-agreement [https:// 
perma.cc/4A6S-QP78].  As of February 2018, 174 nations had deposited instruments of ratification 
for the Agreement.  See Paris Agreement — Status of Ratification, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVEN-
TION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php [https://perma.cc/ 
PN9R-FU2Y].   
 217 STEVEN GROVES, HERITAGE FOUND., THE PARIS AGREEMENT IS A TREATY AND 
SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE 11 (2016), http://www.heritage.org/environment/ 
report/the-paris-agreement-treaty-and-should-be-submitted-the-senate [https://perma.cc/XZ7A-7NXB] 
(contending that the Obama Administration treated the Paris Agreement as a sole executive  
agreement).  
 218 Noah Feldman, The Paris Accord and the Reality of Presidential Power, BLOOMBERG 
VIEW (June 2, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://bloom.bg/2vX6eFk [https://perma.cc/HU6C-3Q6X]. 
 219 Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 44, at 916–19. 
 220 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 
[hereinafter UNFCCC]; see Goldsmith, supra note 56, at 466 (arguing that most of the Paris Agree-
ment was an executive agreement pursuant to a treaty).  As we explain in more detail, infra pp. 
1268–69, this appears to be the most persuasive justification. 
 221 David A. Wirth, Cracking the American Climate Negotiators’ Hidden Code: United States 
Law and the Paris Agreement, 6 CLIMATE L. 152, 166–70 (2016). 
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We have obtained a copy of the Obama Administration’s confiden-
tial submission to Congress concerning the Agreement, but it does not 
clarify the legal basis for the Agreement very much.222  The submission 
cites five bases of “legal authority”: First, Article II of the U.S.  
Constitution.  Second, § 2656 of Title 22, which authorizes the Secretary 
of State to perform the foreign affairs duties directed by the President, 
including “negotiations with public ministers from foreign states.”223  
Third, the UNFCCC.  Fourth, the National Environmental Policy Act 
of 1969, in which Congress directed all federal agencies to “recognize 
the worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems 
and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend 
appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to 
maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a de-
cline in the quality of mankind’s world environment.”224  Fifth, the 
Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, which found (among other 
things) that the global nature of climate change required “vigorous ef-
forts to achieve international cooperation” that would be “enhanced by 
United States leadership,” and stated that U.S. policy should seek to 
“work toward multilateral agreements” in this area.225 
This “kitchen sink” statement of legal authorities illustrates why it is 
so hard to categorize or even assess the legality of many nontreaty legally 
binding agreements, even in the rare case in which the bases for the 
agreements are made public.  It also illustrates how elusive the autho-
rizations are for many executive agreements.  Article II is likely cited 
because the President negotiated the treaty, and perhaps some elements 
of it — requirements to submit reports and participate in international 
review — are in fact commitments that the President could make on his 
own authority.226  The three statutory bases seem like very weak reeds 
on which to rest any elements of the binding international obligation as 
a congressional-executive agreement, but perhaps they are thrown in  
to bolster an alternative Executive Agreements+ argument.227  The  
UNFCCC is a more plausible basis for at least some elements of the 
Agreement, since the Agreement was expressly negotiated under and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 222 Letter from Michael Mattler, Assistant Legal Adviser, Office of Treaty Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 
State, to Senator Bob Corker, Chairman of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (Dec. 22, 2016) 
(on file with authors) (Statement Regarding the Paris Agreement, Done at Paris on December 12, 
2015, Signed by the United States on April 22, 2016, Entered into Force November 4, 2016).  The 
submission was made to Congress as part of the executive branch’s reporting obligation under the 
Case Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112b (2012).  See infra notes 336–37. 
 223 22 U.S.C. § 2656 (2012). 
 224 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (2012). 
 225 15 U.S.C. § 2901 note (2012) (Global Climate Protection).  
 226 See Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 44, at 918. 
 227 Bodansky and Spiro rely on some of these statutes to support their claim that the Paris  
Agreement is in part an Executive Agreement+.  See id. at 918–19. 
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pursuant to that prior treaty, furthers that treaty’s objectives, and con-
tains provisions contemplated by that treaty.228 
Whatever the domestic legal basis and justification for making the 
Paris Agreement legally binding without contemporary congressional 
consent, it is clear that the Agreement’s core and most controversial 
mitigation provision — Article 4.4’s requirement that developed coun-
tries undertake economy-wide, absolute emission reduction targets — is 
a nonbinding political commitment.229  This is clear because Article 4.4 
states that this commitment “should” rather than “shall” be carried out, 
and because the Obama Administration stated that the Agreement’s 
mitigation provisions were a nonbinding political commitment, both 
publicly and in confidential documents.230  One reason to make the 
achievement of mitigation targets nonbinding was to attract participa-
tion by those nations, including the United States, that might have 
balked at a binding obligation on this point.231  The Obama Administra-
tion also believed that it could avoid the need for Senate or congressional 
consent by making achievement of any emission target nonbinding.232  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 228 See infra text accompanying notes 317–23. 
 229 See Paris Agreement, supra note 215, art. 4.4.  
 230 See, e.g., Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Sec’y for Legislative Affairs, to Senator Bob 
Corker, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (Mar. 16, 2016) (on file with authors) (noting 
that even after ratification, the U.S. emissions reduction contribution “will not, by the terms of the 
Agreement, be legally binding,” since “[n]either Article 4, which addresses emissions mitigation ef-
forts, nor any other provision of the Agreement obligates a Party to achieve its contribution”); Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Special Briefing by Senior Administration Officials, Background Brief-
ing on the Paris Climate Agreement (Dec. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Senior Administration Briefing], 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/12/250592.htm [https://perma.cc/HH4G-BF7N] (“[T]he 
notion of the targets not being binding was really a fundamental part of our approach from early 
on . . . . The targets are not binding; the elements that are binding are consistent with already ap-
proved previous agreements.”). 
 231 See, e.g., Senior Administration Briefing, supra note 230 (noting that “[t]here are many coun-
tries — the most vocal outside of us probably India — but the reality is there would be many 
developing countries who would balk at having to do legally binding targets for themselves”); Jeff 
McMahon, Paris: How a Voluntary Climate Agreement Can Be Legally Binding, FORBES (Dec. 2, 
2015, 12:09 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2015/12/02/paris-how-a-voluntary- 
climate-agreement-can-be-legally-binding/ [https://perma.cc/PB8B-H6C7] (“Negotiations stalled in 
Copenhagen because of the unwillingness of many nations — notably China, India, Brazil and 
South Africa — to accept an externally imposed limit on carbon emissions that could limit economic 
development.  The U.S., too, had signaled unwillingness to accept an imposed target . . . .”). 
 232 See Senior Administration Briefing, supra note 230 (“[T]his agreement does not require sub-
mission to the Senate because of the way it is structured.”); Joshua Keating, The One Word that 
Almost Scuttled the Climate Deal, SLATE (Dec. 14, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/ 
the_slatest/2015/12/14/climate_deal_came_down_to_the_difference_between_shall_and_should.html 
[https://perma.cc/T83L-T7GE] (“The U.S. had insisted throughout the negotiating process that the 
deal not include any legally binding language that would have required the White House to submit 
it to the Senate for approval.”).  The Administration may have been influenced, politically if not 
legally, by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s report on the resolution of ratification of the 
1992 UNFCCC, which expressed the expectation that future actions on legally binding emission 
reductions would require the Senate’s advice and consent.  See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-55, at 14 
(1992). 
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But the Administration was nevertheless able to give this political com-
mitment legal teeth under domestic law.  In a move parallel to its exer-
cise of domestic waiver authorities for the Iran deal, the Administration 
relied on regulations under the Clean Air Act233 and other domestic stat-
utes to reduce greenhouse emissions and meet the political pledge on the 
international plane.234 
The Paris Agreement illustrates how the President can use the tools 
at his or her disposal to make an extraordinarily consequential interna-
tional agreement without the need for congressional consent, and indeed 
in the face of congressional opposition.235  The Agreement itself was 
based in an uncertain way on an assortment of older sources that were 
not explained to the public, and none of them except perhaps the  
UNFCCC remotely contemplated an agreement of this sort.  Then the 
core emissions-reduction pledge, which likely could not have been made 
binding under any domestic authority, was crafted as a nonbinding po-
litical commitment and subsequently implemented, in effect, via domes-
tic regulations grounded in old statutes not enacted for these interna-
tional ends. 
B.  The Impact of Presidential Control 
One intuition that might seem to support unilateral presidential con-
trol over international law is that, unlike domestic law, it has conse-
quences only (or mostly) outside the United States, beyond U.S. institu-
tions and actors.  To the extent that this is true, some might believe that 
the executive branch should have more authority in this area than in 
domestic law.  This intuition might draw support from the idea —  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 233 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012). 
 234 The highest-profile regulation under the Clean Air Act is the Clean Power Plan, which regu-
lates greenhouse gases from existing power plants.  See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for 
Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,663–64 (Oct. 
23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).  The Supreme Court stayed the implementation of this 
regulation.  See West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (mem.).  And as noted above, see supra 
text accompanying note 94, President Trump has indicated his intention to withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement (although the United States will not be able to formally do so until 2020), and the EPA 
has proposed to repeal the Clean Power Plan, Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for 
Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,036 (pro-
posed Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60), along with several other regulations aimed 
at fulfilling the nationally determined contribution.  Other domestic regulations supporting the 
pledge made in Paris include fuel economy rules under the Energy Independence and Security Act 
of 2007 (EISA), Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
the U.S. Code), and energy efficiency rules under 42 U.S.C. § 6295.  For an overview of the domestic 
regulations that support the political commitment in the Paris Agreement, see generally Cass R. 
Sunstein, Changing Climate Change, 2009–2016, HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 235 Cf. David M. Herszenhorn, Votes in Congress Move to Undercut Climate Pledge, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 1, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2E8aTbz [https://perma.cc/7A4G-BF2M] (“Hours after President 
Obama pledged Tuesday in Paris that the United States would be in the vanguard of nations seeking 
a global response to climate change, Congress approved two measures aimed at undercutting him.”). 
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associated most famously with the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.236 — that separation of powers 
constraints are weaker in the realm of external affairs.237  Many observ-
ers, as well as the Supreme Court itself, have questioned the continuing 
viability of the principle, and the internal/external distinction on which 
it rests.238  And as we show in Part IV, even if separation of powers 
constraints are weaker in some respects, they are still robust in ways 
that matter to presidential control of international law. 
In any event, this underlying intuition about impacts on U.S. actors 
and institutions is not accurate.  Unilateral presidential international 
lawmaking has significant consequences domestically and for U.S. insti-
tutions and actors along at least six dimensions. 
1.  Consequences for the United States. — When the President 
makes, interprets, and terminates international agreements and CIL for 
the United States, he or she prescribes rules that the United States is 
obliged by international law to follow in its interactions with other na-
tions, often on very important matters.  Whether one believes that com-
pliance is determined by the gravitational pull of international law, 
through some instrumental logic relating to national power and inter-
ests, or in accord with some other theory,239 the fact is that the United 
States, as Professor Louis Henkin famously argued, follows “almost all 
principles of international law and almost all of [its] obligations almost 
all of the time.”240  When the President acts alone with respect to inter-
national law, therefore, he or she alone prescribes rules for the United 
States in its interactions with other nations and for how the executive 
branch will act toward other nations over many matters ranging from 
commerce to diplomacy to war.  The same consequences follow as a 
practical matter for political commitments made by the President, at 
least for the duration of his or her administration and often much longer. 
2.  Consequences for Later Presidents. — Presidents’ broad power to 
change international law obligations through interpretation and termi-
nation, and plenary power to alter political commitments, mean that in 
theory a later President can change the international law course set by 
an earlier President.  In practice, however, the actions of an earlier  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 236 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 237 See id. 
 238 See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015) (“The Executive is not 
free from the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue.”); 
see also Hathaway, supra note 27, at 217–19 (arguing that there is “little support” for the view that 
“the separation of powers that applies in the domestic context does not apply to the same extent 
when the President makes or enforces international legal obligations,” id. at 217).  For an analysis 
of cases in the last few decades that support this proposition, see generally Ganesh Sitaraman & 
Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897 (2015). 
 239 For a description of various theories of why nations comply with international law, see Oona 
A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 469, 476–86 (2005). 
 240 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted). 
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President affect and narrow the options of a later President.  For legal 
obligations, in addition to the usual status quo bias and bureaucratic 
inertia, the later President might not want to incur whatever costs result 
from any potential violation of international law entailed in termination 
or reinterpretation.  And for legal obligations and political commitments 
alike, as the Iran deal shows, the state of the world may have changed 
significantly as a result of the first President’s actions in ways that make 
it harder for the later President to change course.  Although President 
Trump came into office as an opponent of the Iran deal, by the time he 
was President, the lifting of domestic and international sanctions against 
Iran for its nuclear weapons program had induced deep global cooper-
ation to reintegrate Iran into the global economy.  Unilateral reimposi-
tion of the U.S. sanctions against Iran would thus primarily hurt U.S. 
firms.  In the face of this reality, President Trump has reluctantly con-
tinued the U.S. waivers of sanctions against Iran,241 while indicating a 
desire to renegotiate the deal.242 
3.  Consequences for Congress. — When the President makes an in-
ternational agreement or political commitment, or when he or she inter-
prets CIL or declares the United States bound by an extant CIL rule, 
Congress can in theory act within its Article I authorities to abrogate 
the effect of the presidential action.243  Congress faces two practical hur-
dles, however.  First are the usual inertia and collective action barriers 
to enacting legislation contrary to the President’s wishes, as well as a 
potential presidential veto.  The second is that Congress may not want 
to violate international law, and in some contexts the prospect of bring-
ing the United States into violation of international law will persuade 
Congress to soften or kill legislation.244  To the extent that this is the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 241 See Peter Baker, Trump Recertifies Iran Nuclear Deal, but Only Reluctantly, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 17, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2utCOBz [https://perma.cc/XYL4-QLES]; Gardiner Harris & David 
E. Sanger, Iran Nuclear Deal Will Remain for Now, White House Signals, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 
2017), https://nyti.ms/2rruaOU [https://perma.cc/EB7C-GTY7]. 
 242 See Peter Baker & Rick Gladstone, Trump Pushes to Revisit Iran Nuclear Deal, and Asks 
Allies to Help, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2jLJab8 [https://perma.cc/NK8R-
JYQT].  In October 2017, President Trump declined to certify that a continued waiver of sanctions 
against Iran was appropriate, but he stopped short of terminating the deal.  See Mark Landler & 
David E. Sanger, Trump Disavows Nuclear Deal, but Doesn’t Scrap It, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2017), 
https://nyti.ms/2z4fOYC [https://perma.cc/RP3P-4YHV]; see also Mark Landler, Trump Is Expected 
to Stop Short of Reimposing Strict Sanctions on Iran, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018), https://nyti.ms/ 
2FulTkQ [https://perma.cc/8Q8D-U9YG]. 
 243 Congress has the clear constitutional authority to enact a statute that violates international 
law.  See, e.g., Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (“[S]o far as a treaty made by the United 
States with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this 
country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal.”). 
 244 See Ashley Deeks, Statutory International Law, 57 VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2018) (argu-
ing that Congress frequently is attentive to international law compliance).  To take a recent context 
in which a desire to comply with international law influenced at least some important members of 
Congress, consider the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), Pub. L. No. 114-222, 
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case, the President’s unilateral alteration of international law for the 
United States can make it yet harder for Congress to overcome the  
action. 
The other elements of presidential control (agreement interpretation 
and termination, interim obligations, provisional application, and ac-
tions in international organizations) are, as a practical matter, even more 
difficult to unwind.  
4.  Consequences in Courts. — Presidential control over international 
law can influence courts in many ways.  First, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that sole executive agreements can have direct domestic ef-
fect.245  The same is presumably true for ex ante congressional-executive 
agreements and executive agreements pursuant to treaty.246  If self- 
executing, international agreements “have the force and effect of a leg-
islative enactment.”247  This means that they can preempt state law to 
the contrary and, at least for agreements based on congressional autho-
rization or with two-thirds senatorial consent, can in theory supersede 
prior inconsistent statutes.248  Second, the international law made or 
recognized by the President can influence the construction of ambiguous 
statutes under the Charming Betsy canon.249  Third, courts give sub-
stantial deference to the President’s interpretations of both agreements 
and CIL.250 
5.  Consequences for States. — As just noted, self-executing agree-
ments made by the President can preempt conflicting state law.  Also, 
executive agreements can create national foreign relations policies that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
130 Stat. 852 (2016) (to be codified in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.), which narrowed 
sovereign immunity from suit in the context of terrorist acts causing injury inside the United States.  
See id.  The Senate version of the bill that was eventually enacted stripped some of the more con-
troversial elements of the earlier-passed House bill.  162 CONG. REC. S2845 (daily ed. May 17, 
2016) (statement of Sen. John Cornyn).  Senator John Cornyn, the Republican coauthor of the re-
vised bill that passed, noted Senators Lindsey Graham’s and Jeff Sessions’s concerns “that earlier 
versions of this legislation might be interpreted to derogate too far from traditional [international 
law] principles of foreign sovereign immunity and put the United States at risk of being sued for 
our operations abroad.”  Id.  Senator Chuck Schumer, the Democratic coauthor, also emphasized at 
multiple points that the new version of the bill is designed “to strike the right balance” between 
victims’ rights and the international law of sovereign immunity.  Id. 
 245 See cases cited supra note 13. 
 246 See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 26–27, 29–30, 30 n.6 (1982) (“Even though [congres-
sional-executive] agreements are not treaties under the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, they may 
in appropriate circumstances have an effect similar to treaties in some areas of domestic law.”  Id. 
at 30 n.6.). 
 247 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); see also Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505–
06 (2008) (quoting Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194).   
 248 See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118–19 (1933) (“The Treaty, being later in date 
than the Act of 1922, superseded, so far as inconsistent with the terms of the Act, the authority 
which had been conferred by § 581 upon officers of the Coast Guard to board, search and seize 
beyond our territorial waters.”). 
 249 See supra note 80. 
 250 See supra text accompanying notes 82–84, 117–18. 
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in some circumstances can be the bases for preemption of state law.251  
Under some accounts, moreover, CIL — including presidentially influ-
enced CIL — can also preempt conflicting state law.252  Presidential 
termination or disavowal of international obligations might also nega-
tively impact states.  For example, the Trump Administration’s effort to 
pull back from commitments made by the Obama Administration to 
address climate change could have long-term economic and other effects 
on U.S. states, especially along the coastlines.253 
6.  Consequences for Individuals and Private Firms. — The  
President’s unilateral international lawmaking power has a deep and 
underappreciated impact on individuals and firms who do business or 
operate in various ways abroad.  The President or the President’s sub-
ordinates often enter into agreements and political commitments that set 
international regulatory standards that U.S. persons and firms must 
abide by in their international transactions.254  Moreover, domestic reg-
ulatory rules that are altered even in part to coordinate with foreign 
nations or international standards agreed to by the President unilaterally 
in an international agreement or political commitment affect the  
U.S. persons and firms subject to those rules.  In addition, ex ante  
congressional-executive agreements are mechanisms for awarding bil-
lions of dollars in grants to American contractors for operations abroad, 
and for opening up markets abroad or providing favored status to  
American contractors in various ways.255  The President’s power over 
interpretation and termination of these obligations only enhances his or 
her potential power to change the legal regimes for individuals and 
firms.  To take just one example, if President Trump unilaterally with-
draws the United States from NAFTA (as he has sometimes threatened 
to do), his action could have substantial effects on U.S. importers and 
exporters, who would likely face higher tariffs and duties.256 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 251 See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 405–06, 435 (2003) (“The express federal 
policy [reflected in a sole executive agreement] and the clear conflict raised by the state statute are 
alone enough to require state law to yield.”  Id. at 425.). 
 252 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, §§ 111(1), 115 cmt. e.  But see Curtis A. Bradley 
& Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the 
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 849–69 (1997) (questioning this proposition). 
 253 Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007) (“EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate green-
house gas emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both ‘actual’ and ‘imminent.’” 
(quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992))). 
 254 See generally Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99  
CORNELL L. REV. 735 (2014). 
 255 See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 27, at 188–205. 
 256 See, e.g., Chad P. Brown, What Is NAFTA, and What Would Happen to U.S. Trade Without 
It?, WASH. POST (May 18, 2017), http://wapo.st/2lNHWZ4 [https://perma.cc/G3PQ-H3JK] (“New 
U.S. tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico could increase to an average of 3.5 percent.  For 
new trade barriers facing U.S. exporters, Canada’s import tariffs would increase to 4.2 percent and 
Mexico’s would increase to 7.5 percent.”). 
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* * * 
Up to this point, we have provided a descriptive account of the  
President’s broad control over international law for the United States.  
In the next two Parts, we move from descriptive to normative analysis. 
IV.  LEGAL AUTHORITY 
This Part considers the extent to which the President’s exercise of 
control over international law, as described in Parts I–III, is lawful.  We 
begin by explaining why, under established separation of powers doc-
trine, such control is valid only if it stems either from the President’s 
independent constitutional authority or has been authorized or ap-
proved by Congress.  Applying this principle, we conclude that most of 
the practices described in Parts I–III are grounded in at least plausible 
legal authority, in large part because Congress has delegated a tremen-
dous amount of discretionary foreign affairs authority to the President.  
We critique, however, the Executive Agreements+ theory and related 
claims, pursuant to which the President would be able to make binding 
international agreements without congressional authorization as long as 
they ostensibly promoted the policies reflected in existing domestic law.  
We also outline several considerations that are relevant to addressing 
the underanalyzed question of whether the President, when exercising 
control over international law, is acting with implicit congressional  
authorization. 
A.  The Frequent Need for Congressional Authorization or Approval 
A foundational tenet of American separation of powers is that all 
presidential action must be authorized by the Constitution or an act of 
Congress.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized this tenet, 
even in the context of foreign affairs.257  It is also central to Justice  
Jackson’s canonical three-tiered framework in Youngstown for evaluat-
ing presidential power,258 and it is a foundational element of adminis-
trative law.259 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 257 See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) (“The President’s authority to act, as with  
the exercise of any governmental power, ‘must stem either from an act of Congress or from the  
Constitution itself.’” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952))); 
see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981) (citing this proposition with approval).   
 258 As Justice Jackson noted, “[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant 
or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers.”  Youngstown, 343 U.S. 
at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 259 See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (noting that “[i]t is axiomatic 
that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the au-
thority delegated by Congress” (emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn 
Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
467, 489 (2002) (“In our system of separation of powers, it has always been assumed that the  
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Of course, Article II of the Constitution confers various foreign af-
fairs powers on the President, such as the Commander in Chief power, 
the power to conclude treaties with the advice and consent of two-thirds 
of the Senate, the power to appoint U.S. ambassadors with the consent 
of a majority of the Senate, and the power to receive foreign ambassa-
dors.  Moreover, these powers have been construed to imply additional 
powers.  The content and scope of these express and implied powers 
have been further developed over time as a result of governmental prac-
tices.  For example, Presidents are understood to be the official organ of 
the United States in diplomacy, a role implied from their specific powers 
over treaty negotiation and the sending and receiving of diplomats, their 
general structural role as the executive arm of the U.S. government, and 
historical practice.260  Based on similar considerations, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that the President has an exclusive power to  
determine which foreign governments the United States formally  
recognizes.261 
The President’s constitutional powers provide plausible legal author-
ity for many exercises of control discussed in Parts I–III.  The courts 
and Congress have long accepted that Presidents have some authority 
to make binding sole executive agreements relating to their Article II 
powers.262  The President almost certainly has some authority to make 
nonbinding political commitments, which relate to the conduct of diplo-
macy.263  Presidents have from the beginning exercised the authority to 
interpret U.S. treaties.  Although somewhat more controversial, it is also 
generally accepted — in large part because of historical practice — that 
Presidents have considerable unilateral authority to terminate or with-
draw the United States from treaties.264  In addition, it has long been 
accepted that, as the official organ of communication between the 
United States and foreign nations, the President can make statements 
and take actions that affect the obligations of the United States under 
CIL.265  This authority likely includes some ability to trigger interim or 
provisional treaty obligations as well.  At least in the absence of con-
gressional restriction, moreover, the President’s diplomatic authority 
presumably includes the authority to take positions on behalf of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
President, members of the executive branch, and federal administrative agencies have no inherent 
power to make law.  By the late nineteenth century, courts had recognized a corollary to this prin-
ciple: administrative agencies cannot make legislative rules absent a delegation of this power from 
Congress.” (footnote omitted)). 
 260 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936). 
 261 See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084–87 (2015). 
 262 See supra note 13. 
 263 See supra section I.A.5, pp. 1218–20. 
 264 See supra text accompanying notes 88–91.  
 265 See supra sections II.A.1–2, pp. 1227–33. 
1201-1297_BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH_CONTRACTPROOFS 02/04/18 – 4:47 PM 
2018] PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OVER INTERNATIONAL LAW 1259 
United States in international institutions, and, in any event, Congress 
has almost always specifically authorized the President to do so.266 
Nevertheless, the President’s constitutional powers cannot support 
all aspects of presidential control over international law, especially with 
respect to the conclusion of international agreements.  Although the 
scope of the President’s sole executive agreement power is somewhat 
uncertain, it is generally considered to be a narrow exception to the usual 
constitutional requirement of joint collaboration in lawmaking.  It ex-
tends least controversially to agreements with foreign nations involving 
claims settlements.267  It also extends to some agreements relating to 
other presidential powers,268 such as the Commander in Chief power 
and the recognition power, and potentially to other minor or temporary 
agreements.269  
Beyond these limited contexts, however, the President must have au-
thorization from Congress or the Senate to conclude the vast majority 
of binding international agreements.  Indeed, the existence of congres-
sional authorization is what is generally thought to legitimate the  
modern rise of congressional-executive agreements as an alternative to  
Article II treaties.270  Authorization is also the basis for concluding 
agreements pursuant to existing Article II treaties (and also some “tacit 
amendments” to such treaties), albeit authorization from the Senate  
rather than from the full Congress.  Although the executive branch has 
not seriously contested the need for congressional or senatorial authori-
zation for the vast majority of international agreements, the Executive 
is often extremely vague, or even silent, about the legal bases for its 
conclusion of international agreements.  If it were more specific and 
public, it would open itself up to more evaluation about whether con-
gressional authorization is needed, and, if so, whether it exists. 
B.  International Agreements Without Congressional Authorization 
Professor Harold Koh has challenged the claim that congressional 
authorization is required for agreements that extend beyond the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 266 See supra text accompanying notes 176–78. 
 267 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531–32 (2008). 
 268 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 303(4) (“[T]he President, on his own authority, 
may make an international agreement dealing with any matter that falls within his independent 
powers under the Constitution.”). 
 269 For the view, expressed by several ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, that the President should not use the sole executive agreement power to conclude an agree-
ment if it is labeled as a “treaty,” while accepting such an action by President Obama for an agree-
ment that did not impose material obligations on the United States, see Duncan Hollis, Can the 
Executive Join the 1976 ASEAN Treaty Without Senate Advice and Consent?, OPINIO JURIS (July 
25, 2009, 4:49 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2009/07/25/can-the-executive-join-the-1976-asean-treaty-
without-senate-advice-and-consent/ [https://perma.cc/V43E-K5JJ]. 
 270 See generally Ackerman & Golove, supra note 7; Hathaway, supra note 11.  
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President’s limited power to make sole executive agreements.  Koh has 
argued that requiring such authorization “fetishize[s]” an old-fashioned 
“triptych” of Article II treaties, congressional-executive agreements, and 
sole executive agreements.271  He has suggested that Presidents can 
make agreements on the basis of mere congressional “receptivity” to the 
agreements as “evidenced by other related congressional actions in the 
subject-matter field.”272  Koh suggests that scholars should embrace this 
development and avoid “unnuanced pigeonholing.”273  This claim is 
similar to the Executive Agreements+ claim made by Bodansky and 
Spiro,274 who describe with approval international agreements that are 
merely “consistent with and can be implemented on the basis of existing 
legal and regulatory authorities,” and that “complement[] existing 
law.”275 
There are a number of problems with the idea that Presidents can 
conclude binding international agreements based merely on the claim 
that existing law seems receptive to or would be complemented by such 
agreements.  One problem is that it is not obvious whether or when 
congressional statutes designed for domestic matters are receptive to, or 
complement, international agreements.276  The very fact that Congress 
has authorized many international agreements, but not ones in the areas 
said to complement or be receptive to international agreements, more 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 271 See Koh, supra note 47, at 341.  Standard accounts of presidential agreement-making author-
ity actually involve four or five categories, not three.  In particular: Article II treaties, ex  
ante congressional-executive agreements, ex post congressional-executive agreements, executive  
agreements made pursuant to a treaty, and sole executive agreements.  See supra section I.A.1, pp.  
1208–09. 
 272 Koh, supra note 47, at 341.  Koh contends that agreement making based on alleged congres-
sional “receptivity” reflects the reality of modern presidential practice, but he does not show empir-
ically whether and to what extent this is actually true and instead relies on just a few examples 
from recent years.  It is possible that his descriptive claim is accurate: as noted above, the executive 
branch rarely explains the legal bases for its agreements and often relies on a multiplicity of sources 
whose relative weights are unclear.  But the very lack of transparency and clarity on the legal bases 
for most agreements makes Koh’s claims difficult to assess.  
 273 Id. at 342.  This argument bears some resemblance to the idea that, in the face of congressional 
gridlock, administrative agencies should use their regulatory authority to update statutes in order 
to address new policy problems.  See Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Prob-
lems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014).  One important difference, however, is that such updating by 
agencies would generally be subject to judicial review, see id. at 81 (“[T]he threat of judicial review 
alone performs a disciplinary function . . . .”), whereas this is often not the case for presidential 
control over international law. 
 274 See Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 44, at 887–88. 
 275 Id. at 919.  While Koh is talking about essentially the same phenomenon as Bodansky and 
Spiro, he does not believe that the “new pigeonhole[]” of Executive Agreements+, Koh, supra note 
47, at 345, adequately captures the phenomenon of agreements that he sees as falling along a spec-
trum.  See id. at 345–47 & n.29.  
 276 Bodansky and Spiro, in their discussion of Executive Agreements+, acknowledge that “the 
adoption of domestic measures by Congress does not imply that Congress supports the conclusion 
of an international agreement.”  Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 44, at 926–27. 
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likely suggests that Congress is not “receptive” to such agreements.  This 
is especially so given that any agreements the President makes on the 
basis of receptivity or complementarity will restrict the options of a fu-
ture Congress. 
More fundamentally, it is difficult to reconcile an approach based on 
purported “receptivity” and “complementarity” with the separation of 
powers principles discussed above in section A, which require actual 
congressional authorization of international agreements, not something 
short of that.  For case law support for their approach, Koh, Bodansky, 
and Spiro rely heavily on Dames & Moore v. Regan.277  But the analysis 
in this decision is much more limited than they suggest.  In Dames & 
Moore, the Supreme Court held that the President had the authority to 
suspend billions of dollars in American claims against Iran as part of an 
executive agreement with Iran resolving the Iranian hostage crisis.278  
Referring to Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown, the Court ob-
served that “it is doubtless the case that executive action in any partic-
ular instance falls, not neatly in one of three pigeonholes, but rather at 
some point along a spectrum running from explicit congressional au-
thorization to explicit congressional prohibition.”279  Applying that idea, 
the Court found that, although Congress had not specifically authorized 
presidential suspension of claims in this situation, it had enacted statutes 
that “in the looser sense [indicate] congressional acceptance of a broad 
scope for executive action in circumstances such as those presented in 
this case.”280  The Court also emphasized that there was a long history 
of executive branch settlement of claims against foreign nations and that 
in legislating in the area, Congress had shown its “continuing acceptance 
of the President’s claim settlement authority.”281  The Court concluded: 
“In light of the fact that Congress may be considered to have consented 
to the President’s action in suspending claims, we cannot say that action 
exceeded the President’s powers.”282 
Koh contends that “Dames & Moore seems to have recognized a 
modern truth: that Congress cannot and does not pass judgment on each 
and every act undertaken by the Executive that has external effects.”283  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 277 453 U.S. 654 (1981).  Koh previously criticized Dames & Moore for having “championed un-
guided executive activism and congressional acquiescence in foreign affairs over the constitutional 
principle of balanced institutional participation,” and argued that it should be limited to its facts.  
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 140 (1990).  In now rely-
ing on the decision in this context, he explains that “after thirty-five years, the Court’s language has 
not been so narrowly construed, and this and other Supreme Court opinions following this reasoning 
remain on the books.”  Koh, supra note 47, at 344.  
 278 453 U.S. at 686. 
 279 Id. at 669. 
 280 Id. at 677. 
 281 Id. at 681. 
 282 Id. at 686. 
 283 Koh, supra note 47, at 345. 
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In defending the Obama Administration’s conclusion of ACTA284 with-
out seeking congressional approval, Koh suggests that Dames & Moore 
supports an executive branch authority to conclude binding agreements 
on any subject matter if the Executive “determine[s] that the negotiated 
agreement fit[s] within the fabric of existing law, [is] fully consistent with 
existing law, and [does] not require any further legislation to imple-
ment.”285  Bodansky and Spiro similarly suggest that Dames & Moore 
supports the idea of Executive Agreements+.286 
The actual reasoning in Dames & Moore, however, does not go this 
far.  The Court’s analysis depended heavily on both the longstanding 
historical practice of executive settlement of claims, which Congress had 
specifically facilitated in the International Claims Settlement Act,287 as 
well as the President’s independent constitutional authority relating to 
diplomacy, and the Court “re-emphasize[d] the narrowness of [its] deci-
sion.”288  The considerations that were important there — historical 
practice and independent presidential authority — do not hold for exec-
utive regulation of many other subjects, such as intellectual property or 
the environment.289  Importantly, when these considerations have been 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 284 See supra p. 1217. 
 285 Koh, supra note 47, at 343. 
 286 See Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 44, at 897, 904–05.  They are, however, more guarded than 
Koh in their conclusions.  See, e.g., id. at 921 (noting that “the constitutional legitimacy of [Execu-
tive Agreements+] remains provisional”).  
 287 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621−1645 (2012). 
 288 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981); see id. at 680–83. 
 289 Koh can be read in places to limit his arguments to the circumstances where, as in Dames & 
Moore, there is both independent presidential authority and longstanding historical practice acqui-
esced in by Congress.  In particular, Koh’s two-dimensional grid for analyzing the constitutionality 
of agreements depends on the degree of congressional approval and the degree of presidential au-
thority.  See Koh, supra note 47, at 347 fig.1.  To the extent that Koh’s proposal for new forms of 
presidential agreement-making power is limited to contexts where there is independent presidential 
authority and longstanding historical practice, it presents fewer normative concerns than we have 
suggested in the text.  But in that circumstance, it also does not have a significant scope, and cer-
tainly it does not extend to two of the examples Koh mentions as lawful agreements — ACTA and 
the Minamata Convention.  Another confounding uncertainty in Koh’s argument is how his two-
dimensional test that seems to be based in part on Dames & Moore fits with what he in other places 
describes as a three-part test for congressional approval for agreements, also derived from Dames 
& Moore, which turns on “general preauthorization, consistent executive practice, and legal land-
scape.”  Id. at 349.  We do not understand the difference between general congressional “preauthor-
ization,” and the more traditional demand for congressional “authorization,” although the former 
term can potentially mean something far less than what is normally thought of as authorization.  
See id. at 343 (citing as an example of a “general preauthorization” that “while Congress did not 
expressly pre-authorize [ACTA], it did pass legislation calling on the Executive to ‘work[] with other 
countries to establish international standards and policies for the effective protection and enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights’” (second alteration in original)).  The bottom line, however, is 
this: Dames & Moore does not support the legality of an executive agreement, beyond the recog-
nized bases for a sole executive agreement, unless the agreement both falls within an area in which 
the President has at least some independent constitutional authority, and Congress has acquiesced 
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absent, the Court has been much more skeptical about executive branch 
lawmaking efforts, including in foreign affairs.  In Medellín v. Texas,290 
for example, the Court rejected an executive branch effort to preempt 
state law relating to criminal procedure that was impeding compliance 
with an international obligation, emphasizing that “the President’s 
power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that 
he is to be a lawmaker,”291 and describing the executive branch’s au-
thority to settle claims by means of a sole executive agreement as “nar-
row and strictly limited.”292  The conception of presidential power to 
make international agreements suggested by Koh, Bodansky, and Spiro 
is difficult to reconcile with Medellín’s approach to presidential 
power.293 
In sum, whether labeled as Executive Agreements+ or something 
else, the notion that Presidents can conclude binding international agree-
ments based merely on the claim that existing domestic law is receptive 
to or would be complemented by the agreements is not consistent  
with the fundamental separation of powers principle that executive 
branch actions must be authorized either by the Constitution or  
Congress.  Purported congressional “receptivity” does not by itself sat-
isfy that principle.  And a vague “spectrum analysis” muddies the legal 
waters in ways that obfuscate the lack of an underlying authorization 
for some agreements. 
C.  The Limits of Implied Authorization 
Congress often has specifically authorized acts of presidential control 
over international law.  It has done so, for example, for many ex  
ante congressional-executive agreements, and for presidential actions  
(including lawmaking votes) in international organizations.  But some  
congressional-executive agreements, and many other types of presiden-
tial control over international law, rest on claims of implied authoriza-
tion from Congress.  There has been little scholarly analysis, however, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
in a longstanding practice.  To the extent that Koh’s argument goes beyond this understanding, it 
cannot find support in Dames & Moore. 
 290 552 U.S. 491 (2008).  
 291 Id. at 526–27 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)). 
 292 Id. at 532. 
 293 In Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221 (1986), the Court ob-
served that, in entering into an executive agreement with Japan to address its whaling activities, 
the executive branch had “furthered [Congress’s] objective” in sanctions legislation, id. at 241, even 
though that legislation did not specifically call for the conclusion of international agreements.  The 
Court there did not purport to discern the scope of the executive branch’s authority to conclude 
agreements; rather, it merely determined whether the executive branch’s decision not to sanction 
Japan involved a reasonable construction of the legislation.  See id. at 240.  Moreover, the agreement 
there was related not merely to legislation but also to U.S. participation in a treaty — the Interna-
tional Convention for the Regulation of Whaling — to which the Senate had given its advice and 
consent.  Id. at 228. 
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of the proper legal framework for assessing such claims of implied  
authorization in the international lawmaking context. 
Three basic principles emerge from the relevant case law, all of 
which are helpful to claims of presidential authority, but only to a point.  
First, decisions beginning with United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp. stand for the proposition that nondelegation concerns are reduced 
in the foreign affairs area because, as Congress has often recognized, the 
President needs particular flexibility when acting in the international 
arena.294  This proposition has little direct relevance today because the 
Court does not actively enforce the constitutional nondelegation doc-
trine.295  It may have indirect relevance, however, in that the Court does 
sometimes take delegation concerns into account in how broadly it con-
strues statutory delegations.296 
A second principle that emerges from the case law is that courts are 
more willing to find implicit statutory authorization in areas in which 
the President has independent constitutional authority.  In Loving v. 
United States,297 for example, the Court found that the President had 
statutory authority to regulate the aggravating factors that can warrant 
the imposition of the death penalty in court-martial proceedings.298  The 
relevant statutes did not provide much guidance about the exercise of 
this authority, and the Court acknowledged that “[h]ad the delegations 
here called for the exercise of judgment or discretion that lies beyond 
the traditional authority of the President,” the “argument that Congress 
failed to provide guiding principles to the President might have more 
weight.”299  But the Court concluded that “it would be contrary to the 
respect owed the President as Commander in Chief to hold that he may 
not be given wide discretion and authority” over courts-martial.300 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 294 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (“It is quite apparent 
that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment — perhaps serious embar-
rassment — is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is 
to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often ac-
cord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not 
be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.”). 
 295 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315 (2000) (noting 
that the Supreme Court has not struck down an act of Congress on nondelegation grounds since 
1935). 
 296 See, e.g., id. at 316 (“Rather than invalidating federal legislation as excessively open-ended, 
courts hold that federal administrative agencies may not engage in certain activities unless and until 
Congress has expressly authorized them to do so.”); cf. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 9 
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (“A holding that the Parties’ post-ratification side agreements were ‘law’ would 
raise serious constitutional questions in light of the nondelegation doctrine, numerous constitutional 
procedural requirements for making law, and the separation of powers.”). 
 297 517 U.S. 748 (1996). 
 298 Id. at 773–74. 
 299 Id. at 772. 
 300 Id. at 768. 
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A third principle supported by the case law is that courts are more 
willing to find implicit statutory authorization for presidential actions 
that are supported by longstanding executive branch practice of which 
Congress was aware when it regulated in the area.  An example is Haig 
v. Agee.301  There, the Court upheld the State Department’s authority to 
revoke a passport on national security or foreign policy grounds, even 
though such authority was not specifically mentioned in the relevant 
statute delegating authority over passports to the executive branch.  The 
Court noted that “[t]he history of passport controls since the earliest days 
of the Republic shows congressional recognition of executive authority 
to withhold passports on the basis of substantial reasons of national se-
curity and foreign policy”302 and that “[t]here is no evidence of any intent 
[by Congress] to repudiate the longstanding administrative construc-
tion.”303  The Court also emphasized that Congress had made amend-
ments to the passport laws, in the face of the consistent executive branch 
practice, without in any way indicating its disapproval of it, and that 
the executive branch interpretation of its statutory authority “was re-
peatedly communicated to Congress.”304 
These general principles have somewhat different implications for 
executive agreements that purport to rest on an act of Congress,  
executive agreements that purport to rest on a prior treaty, and political  
commitments. 
1.  Congressional-Executive Agreements and Executive Agree-
ments+. — These principles suggest that when Congress has expressly 
delegated authority over international law to the President — such as 
the authority to conclude certain types of agreements — this authority 
should be construed expansively.  They thus support the notion that 
Congress can authorize international agreements on very general terms, 
as discussed in section I.A.3.305  This is especially so given that the prac-
tice of generally authorizing the President to make international agree-
ments on certain subjects is supported by longstanding practice. 
The case law also suggests that when Congress has regulated presi-
dential action in an area relating to international law without expressly 
endorsing a particular type of lawmaking, the executive branch has a 
stronger claim of implied authorization if either (a) the subject of the 
statute overlaps with independent presidential authority, or (b) there is 
longstanding executive branch practice of engaging in the action, of 
which Congress was aware when it regulated.  That was the situation 
in Haig, for example, with respect to executive branch authority over 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 301 453 U.S. 280 (1981).  
 302 Id. at 293.   
 303 Id. at 297.   
 304 Id. at 299. 
 305 See supra pp. 1212–15. 
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passports.306  It takes a further step, however, to base a congressional-
executive agreement on a congressional authorization for the President 
to merely furnish “assistance,” or establish a “program,” without an ex-
press mention that he or she can do so through “agreements.”307  These 
authorizations constitute the outer bounds of what might be justified by 
the “authorization” case law.  Many of these agreements do not overlap 
with an independent Article II power, although it may be that in certain 
subject areas there is sufficient historical practice of basing agreements 
on such statutes, coupled with relevant congressional acquiescence in 
such practice, that the statutes can be viewed as sufficient authorization. 
These principles do not, however, support the theory of Executive 
Agreements+ and related claims.  Those claims contend that the Presi-
dent can make international agreements in areas outside of independent 
presidential authority (such as over intellectual property or environmen-
tal regulation) and without congressional authorization or longstanding 
practice as long as the agreements promote the policies reflected in ex-
isting statutes.  Nothing in the case law on implicit statutory authoriza-
tion in foreign affairs supports this idea.  Agreements made under the 
Executive Agreements+ rationale would be fully binding under interna-
tional law.  They would thus have the effect of preventing Congress 
from exercising its legislative power to narrow the scope of the underly-
ing federal statutory law without violating the international law that the 
President adopted for the United States “consistent with” that law but 
without congressional authorization.  Such a presidential authority 
would be a crucial step beyond the outer bounds of ex ante  
congressional-executive agreements.  As Bodansky and Spiro note, 
“[u]nder the [Executive Agreements+] approach, presidents would be 
enabled to enter into agreements in furtherance of any congressionally-
validated policy, at least where the agreements do not require a change 
in U.S. law.”308  It is difficult to overstate the breadth of this purported 
authority, since it might justify any agreement that (to use Bodansky 
and Spiro’s language) “complements” any of the vast array of extant 
federal statutory law.309  Indeed, under this approach the terrain for 
presidential action would be even broader than the executive branch’s 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 306 Haig, 453 U.S. at 301–02. 
 307 See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 308 Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 44, at 915.  But cf. David A. Wirth, Executive Agreements 
Relying on Implied Statutory Authority: A Response to Bodansky and Spiro, 50 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT’L L. 741 (2017) (contending that this is not a new phenomenon). 
 309 Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 44, at 915 (noting that the Executive Agreements+ approach 
“could dramatically expand the subject areas addressed by international agreements adopted with-
out express legislative approval”). 
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authority as part of the modern administrative state, which requires 
some actual domestic statutory authorization.310 
Again, the picture might look different if, within a particular subject 
area, there were a longstanding executive branch practice of making 
agreements, and Congress was aware of that practice when it regulated 
that area.  But this is not currently the case, at least in the areas in which 
the claim of Executive Agreements+ would obviously matter.  The very 
theory of Executive Agreements+ is new, even if one might find past 
instances of executive branch action that might now be characterized as 
supporting it.  Moreover, in part because of a lack of executive branch 
transparency, especially about the legal bases for its agreements,  
Congress often has not been aware that the executive branch has been 
exercising such authority.  To take one recent example, as Bodansky  
and Spiro note, the executive branch’s unilateral ratification of the  
Minamata Convention occurred without an explanation of its legal basis 
“during the government shutdown in fall 2013 [and] received little at-
tention.”311  Other recent examples in which it appeared that the execu-
tive branch might be exercising this authority — such as with ACTA — 
prompted substantial objections in Congress and never took effect.312  
Whatever practice there is that might support this form of presidential 
authority is, as Bodansky and Spiro acknowledge, “not yet constitution-
ally entrenched.”313 
2.  Executive Agreements Pursuant to Treaty. — Executive agree-
ments made pursuant to treaties also depend on authorization — that 
is, authorization from the underlying treaty.  As the Congressional  
Research Service has noted, “[a]greements in this category comprise 
those which are expressly authorized by the text of an existing treaty or 
whose making may be reasonably inferred from the provisions of a prior 
treaty.”314  In the one Supreme Court decision addressing this category 
of executive agreements, the Court looked to see whether the Senate in 
approving the underlying treaty had “authorized” the making of the ex-
ecutive agreement.315  This category of executive agreements has only 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 310 While in theory Congress could try to override an agreement if it disagreed with it, it would 
have to overcome the usual inertia and collective action barriers, and a potential presidential veto, 
as well as the prospect of putting the United States into breach of international obligations.  In 
some of its delegations of agreement authority to the President, Congress has included “legislative 
veto” provisions that would allow a majority of either a house of Congress or the full Congress to 
override presidential agreements.  See Hathaway, supra note 27, at 196–98.  Such legislative veto 
provisions would presumably be deemed unconstitutional today in light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  See Hathaway, supra note 27, at 196–98. 
 311 Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 44, at 921; see also supra section I.A.4, pp. 1215–17. 
 312 Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 44, at 910. 
 313 Id. at 890. 
 314 CRS STUDY, supra note 12, at 86; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 303 
cmt. f (noting that these agreements are valid when they “can fairly be seen as implementing the 
treaty”). 
 315 Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 528 (1957). 
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rarely generated controversy, in part because the executive branch has 
not been very transparent about when it relies on this authority.   
For that reason, among others, it has not been extensively studied by  
scholars. 
While it is hard to know for sure, since executive agreements pursu-
ant to treaties are so obscure, they appear to present fewer authorization 
concerns than arise with ex ante congressional-executive agreements 
and especially Executive Agreements+.  Because executive agreements 
pursuant to treaties are tied to a particular treaty arrangement, they 
tend not to present a problem that bedevils many ex ante congressional-
executive agreements — that is, old authorizations being used much 
later in different contexts.  Furthermore, many executive agreements 
made pursuant to treaties are of a minor, administrative nature that the 
Senate and the full Congress would probably prefer the executive 
branch to handle.  Indeed, such agreements appear to be analogous to 
administrative regulations adopted by an agency charged with imple-
menting a statute.316 
With this understanding of the authorization requirement, the bind-
ing portions of the Paris Agreement appear to qualify as a lawful exec-
utive agreement pursuant to treaty.  The underlying treaty is the 1992 
UNFCCC, which the Senate consented to and President George H.W. 
Bush ratified.317  The UNFCCC created an international framework for 
assessing and responding to climate change.318  It imposed various com-
mitments to develop, promulgate, and update information related to 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction, and it established a framework and 
institutional support for future negotiations and agreements.319  The 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on the UNFCCC expressed 
the expectation that future agreements that would require legally bind-
ing emissions reductions (as opposed to the procedural rules contained 
in the UNFCCC) would require the Senate’s advice and consent.320  The 
Committee thus appeared to contemplate that there might be future 
agreements related to the UNFCCC and insisted on a return to the  
Senate for ones that imposed binding, new substantive emissions limits.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 316 Cf. CRS STUDY, supra note 12, at 86 (“Numerous agreements pursuant to treaties have been 
concluded by the Executive, particularly of an administrative nature, to implement in detail gener-
ally worded treaty obligations.”).   
 317 See supra text accompanying note 220; see also 138 CONG. REC. 33,527 (1992) (Senate reso-
lution of advice and consent to the UNFCCC). 
 318 S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-55, at 1 (1992).   
 319 See UNFCCC, supra note 220, art. 4.  The Convention created a Conference of Parties, which 
includes the United States, and which is charged with reviewing and implementing the Convention 
“and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt.”  Id. art. 7. 
 320 See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-55, supra note 318, at 14.  
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The Paris Agreement aims to “enhanc[e]” the implementation of the 
UNFCCC.321  The vast majority of its provisions appear to have been 
contemplated by the UNFCCC.322  The central new substantive under-
taking in the Paris Agreement related to mitigation that would have 
been a controversial expansion of the UNFCCC was the commitment 
for developed countries to undertake “economy-wide emission reduction 
targets” in Article 4.4.  That commitment was made nonbinding.323  The 
agreement is thus an executive agreement pursuant to a treaty that con-
tains a nonbinding provision that the President pledged on his own au-
thority under Article II.  
3.  Consequential Political Commitments. — Political commitments 
of the novel sort involved in the Iran deal and part of the Paris  
Agreement present a different form of authorization issue.  These agree-
ments may seem to present no authorization problem: If political com-
mitments are merely a form of diplomacy, then the President would 
seem to have constitutional authority to conclude them on essentially 
any subject relating to the conduct of U.S. foreign relations.324  And, 
when the agreements are being given domestic effect, it is pursuant to 
authority previously delegated by Congress.325  
The problem is that the President has been using preexisting domes-
tic delegations in the service of deeply consequential international com-
mitments that Congress did not remotely contemplate when it delegated 
the authority to the President, and that Congress cannot easily unwind.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 321 Paris Agreement, supra note 215, art. 4.4. 
 322 To take a few relevant examples, the Paris Agreement’s obligations in Article 9 (finance), 
Article 10 (technology transfer), and Article 11 (capacity building), correspond to those same obli-
gations in Articles 4(3), 4(4), and 4(5), respectively, of the UNFCCC.  Also of note, the Agreement’s 
apparently binding obligation in Article 4.2 to “pursue domestic mitigation measures” is no different 
in substance from, and indeed corresponds to, the UNFCCC’s obligation found in Articles 4.1 and 
4.2. 
 323 See supra text accompanying notes 229–34; see also David A. Wirth, Is the Paris Agreement 
on Climate Change a Legitimate Exercise of the Executive Agreement Power?, LAWFARE (Aug.  
29, 2016, 12:37 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/paris-agreement-climate-change-legitimate- 
exercise-executive-agreement-power [https://perma.cc/M7R3-DV2C]. 
 324 There is some debate among scholars about this point.  Compare, for example, Hollis &  
Newcomer, supra note 56, at 514, which contends that, although “the executive can invoke custom-
ary and structural rationales to provide a constitutional foundation for the president’s authority to 
conclude these commitments on behalf of the United States[,] . . . neither these rationales nor pru-
dence generally favors a plenary executive power over political commitments,” with Michael D. 
Ramsey, Evading the Treaty Power? The Constitutionality of Nonbinding Agreements, 11 FLA. 
INT’L U. L. REV. 371, 375 (2016), which contends that “the Constitution’s text and practice . . . 
appear to allow Presidents to make nonbinding agreements.”  
 325 This assumes, of course, that the commitments are genuinely nonbinding.  Cf. Michael  
Ramsey, Declaring the Paris Climate Accord Unconstitutional, ORIGINALISM BLOG (June 1, 2017, 
6:49 AM), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2017/06/declaring-the-paris- 
climate-accord-unconstitutionalmichael-ramsey.html [https://perma.cc/RA4L-NUKH] (arguing 
that the Paris Agreement must be submitted to the Senate because “it imposes material binding 
long-term commitments on the United States”). 
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Some commentators have raised concerns about the constitutionality of 
these presidential actions.326 
Although this new use of the political-commitment authority raises 
important policy issues, it is difficult to see why it is unlawful.  Both the 
President’s power over political commitments and the President’s power 
to exercise power delegated from Congress in the domestic realm are 
well established.  Without significantly more argumentation, it is not 
clear why two presidential authorities that separately are not legally 
controversial are unconstitutional when combined.  The real issue here 
is that Congress has delegated extraordinarily broad domestic authority 
to the President that the Obama Administration figured out how to use 
in ways that helped to implement political commitments.  If that is a 
problem, it is one that only Congress can fix, either by taking the un-
likely step of pulling back on extant delegations, or (more likely) clari-
fying going forward that particular domestic delegations cannot be used 
as a basis to implement international commitments. 
V.  INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
This Part shifts the normative analysis from the specific question of 
what counts as proper legal authorization for presidential action related 
to international law to the more general question of whether the rise and 
extraordinary breadth of unilateral presidential control over interna-
tional law is legitimate in the sense of “justified, appropriate, or other-
wise deserving of support.”327  Should we be sanguine about such pres-
idential power as currently practiced in this context?  Or should we 
worry about it and seek to reform it — and if so, to what degree and 
how? 
Intuitions vary widely about the right answer to these questions.328  
A complete answer would depend on a variety of factors, including the 
aims of presidential control over international law, its efficacy and le-
gality in practice, and the costs and benefits of possible accountability 
mechanisms.  Because these factors are hard to assess and often con-
tested, our aims in this Part are relatively modest.  Section A notes some 
reasons to think that the relatively weak accountability constraints on 
the President in this context are probably not adequate, and it then an-
alyzes what one would need to understand to determine whether and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 326 See, e.g., David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Commentary, The Lawless Underpinnings of 
the Iran Nuclear Deal, WALL ST. J. (July 26, 2015, 6:32 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-
lawless-underpinnings-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal-1437949928 [https://perma.cc/ZX4Y-ZCWW] (con-
tending that the Iran deal “features commitments that President Obama could not lawfully make”). 
 327 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1795 (2005).  
Under Professor Fallon’s categorization, we are talking about sociological legitimacy in the strong 
sense.  See id. 
 328 Compare, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 27 (arguing that presidential practice related to interna-
tional agreements raises serious legitimacy concerns and requires major reform), with Galbraith, 
supra note 2 (arguing that current practice presents few concerns and requires little reform). 
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how presidential accountability in this context should be reformed.  
Against that background, section B assesses possible reforms.  It argues 
that, at a minimum, presidential control over international law should 
be subject to a comprehensive regime of ex post transparency.  Beyond 
such transparency, there are too many factual uncertainties and too 
much normative contestation to reach firm conclusions about further 
reforms, especially without more information that only greater transpar-
ency can provide.  We nonetheless consider some additional reforms that 
might be appropriate should Congress wish to go further, and we de-
scribe some of their potential costs and benefits. 
A.  Are Existing Accountability Constraints Adequate? 
Accountability is a standard framework for assessing the legitimacy 
of presidential power and potential constraints on such power.329  By 
accountability, we mean “the ability of one actor to demand an explana-
tion or justification of another actor for its actions and to reward or 
punish that second actor on the basis of its performance or its explana-
tion.”330  Accountability is a broad concept.  In the context of the presi-
dency, it can serve many goals, including helping to ensure that the  
President acts lawfully and in accordance with congressional or popular 
wishes, does not make serious policy mistakes, and takes into account 
the views of relevant stakeholders.  Many different mechanisms, both 
between and within the branches of government, can promote these 
goals, including reporting and consultation requirements, administrative 
process, oversight hearings and censure, funding withdrawals, inspector 
general review, judicial review, elections, and impeachment.331 
In what follows, we explain some reasons to believe that presidential 
control over international law lacks adequate accountability, and we 
then analyze the additional factors relevant to deciding what reforms 
might be appropriate.   
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 329 For very different analyses of presidential power that place accountability at the core of  
the analysis, see JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE  
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, passim (2012); Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing 
Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 310 (2006); Steven G. Calabresi & 
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); and 
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–39 (2001).  See generally 
Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 185, 186 
(2014) (explaining that “‘accountability’ is one of the workhorse concepts of public law”). 
 330 Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. 
L. REV. 2073, 2073 (2005). 
 331 On accountability between branches, see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), in which 
the Court noted that the separation of powers is designed in part to “make Government account-
able,” id. at 742.  See also Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1954–55 (2015) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (similar).  On intraexecutive separation of powers, see GOLDSMITH,  
supra note 329, at 83–160, 205–43; and Neal Kumar Katyal, Essay, Internal Separation of Powers: 
Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006). 
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1.  Reasons to Worry About Presidential Accountability Related to 
International Law. — As Parts I–III showed, the President’s control 
over international lawmaking, law interpretation, and law termination 
arose piecemeal, over a long period of time, against the backdrop of 
many changed conditions.  These changes often occurred outside of pub-
lic view, and without any systematic regulatory focus.  The accountabil-
ity mechanisms for such presidential control are, not coincidentally, just 
as fragmentary. 
Presidential action related to international law is, with rare excep-
tions noted in Parts I–III, not subject to administrative process or judi-
cial review.332  Since its enactment in 1946, the APA has contained an 
exception to its rulemaking and adjudication requirements “to the extent 
that there is involved . . . a military or foreign affairs function of the 
United States.”333  As a result, the only forms of general statutory ac-
countability for presidential action related to international law are trans-
parency and reporting requirements for certain international agree-
ments.  First, the State Department has a duty to publish “United States 
Treaties and Other International Agreements” (UST), a compilation that 
must include treaties “and all international agreements other than trea-
ties to which the United States is a party,” subject to some categorical 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 332 Professor Jean Galbraith suggests that administrative law is an important constraint on pres-
idential control over international law.  See Galbraith, supra note 2, at 1691–97.  She makes much 
of the fact that the Paris Agreement was supported domestically by regulations under the Clean Air 
Act that are subject to APA processes and judicial review.  That support is indeed a genuine check 
on the domestic implementation of the Paris Agreement’s political commitment.  But even if the 
domestic regulations were deemed unlawful, the international side of the deal, in both its binding 
and nonbinding aspects, would persist.  (This is why the Trump Administration, when it wanted to 
kill the Paris Agreement, declared an intention to both reverse the Clean Air Act regulations and 
terminate the international agreement.  The former alone would not affect the latter.)  Moreover, 
the Paris Agreement is unusual among political commitments in having even an indirect domestic 
process check.  The vast majority of political commitments made by agencies are not subject to the 
processes of the APA, and other international agreements and forms of presidential international 
lawmaking are not subject to the APA.  And even when a political commitment is tied to domestic 
delegations of power, it will not always (or even usually) be subject to the APA.  The Iran deal, for 
example, was implemented domestically via exercises of delegated waiver authority to the President 
that do not implicate the APA.  See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.  For these reasons, 
administrative law is only occasionally a constraint on political commitments and is practically no 
constraint on binding international agreements. 
 333 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2012); see also id. § 554(a)(4).  Relatedly, the Freedom of Information Act, 
5 U.S.C. § 552, includes an exemption from its disclosure requirements for “matters that are . . . spe-
cifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest 
of national defense or foreign policy and . . . in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive 
order,” id. § 552(b)(1)(A).   
1201-1297_BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH_CONTRACTPROOFS 02/04/18 – 4:47 PM 
2018] PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OVER INTERNATIONAL LAW 1273 
exceptions.334  Second, under the Case Act335 (also known as the Case-
Zablocki Act), the Department must report to Congress nontreaty agree-
ments within sixty days of their entry into force.336  As noted in the 
legislative history of the Case Act, Congress believed that this basic re-
porting duty was, “from a constitutional standpoint, crucial and indis-
pensable” because “[i]f Congress is to meet its responsibilities in the for-
mulation of foreign policy, no information is more crucial than the fact 
and content of agreements with foreign nations.”337 
Both of these duties are often honored in the breach.  The executive 
branch has not organized itself internally to ensure that all agreements 
are deposited in a central location in the State Department.338  Even 
though the Case Act requires that administrative agencies transmit the 
international agreements that they conclude to the State Department 
within twenty days,339 they often take much longer to do so.340  Even 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 334 1 U.S.C. § 112a (2012).  The Secretary need not publish a nontreaty agreement if he or she 
determines (among other things) that the agreement does not implicate the public interest or does 
not create private rights or duties or standards concerning government treatment of private indi-
viduals, or that the publication would harm the national interest.  See id. § 112a(b).  The categories 
of exclusion from publication are listed at 22 C.F.R. § 181.8 (2017). 
 335 1 U.S.C. § 112b.   
 336 Id. § 112b(a).  Under the Act, if the President concludes that “the immediate public disclosure 
of [an agreement] would . . . be prejudicial to the national security of the United States,” the  
agreement need not be transmitted to Congress “but shall be transmitted to the Committee on  
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of  
Representatives under an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice 
from the President.”  Id.  One scholar recently estimated that “the United States is probably party 
to approximately 1000–1800 secret agreements.”  Ashley S. Deeks, A (Qualified) Defense of Secret 
Agreements, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 713, 724 (2017).  For additional discussion of the phenomenon of 
secret treaties, see Megan Donaldson, The Survival of the Secret Treaty: Publicity, Secrecy, and 
Legality in the International Order, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 575 (2017). 
 337 S. REP. NO. 92-591, at 3 (1972).  The Nixon Administration opposed the bill that became the 
Case Act on the ground that executive branch reporting of non–Article II agreements should be 
made pursuant to nonbinding “practical arrangements” with Congress rather than pursuant to bind-
ing legislation.  See H. REP. NO. 92-1301, at 2 (1972).  Congress concluded, however, that such 
nonbinding arrangements would be insufficient because they “would still leave with the executive 
branch the discretion to disclose or not to disclose as it saw fit.”  Id.  It also rejected the State 
Department’s claim that in some instances Congress would not have a “legitimate interest” in know-
ing about executive agreements, explaining that “[i]f the contention of the Department of State is 
accepted, the Congress, in effect, would agree that the President has the right to bind it, and the 
rest of the Nation, to agreements in perpetuity with foreign nations about which the Congress has 
no right to know.”  Id. at 4. 
 338 One reason for this is that since its enactment in 1935, the Federal Register Act, ch. 417, 49 
Stat. 500 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1511 (2012)), has excluded “treaties . . . and 
other international agreements” from the executive branch’s general duties to collect and publish 
specified executive branch documents in the Federal Register and codify them in the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations.  See id. § 12, 49 Stat. at 503. 
 339 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a). 
 340 For example, the United States Agency for International Development did not forward an 
agreement concluded with Ethiopia in October of 2007 until 2010.  See Reporting International 
Agreements to Congress Under Case Act, 2010, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/ 
caseact/c34684.htm [https://perma.cc/8VB2-KWVH]; see also Agreement Concerning the Program 
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after the agreements arrive, the Department has a backlog of agreements 
to be organized and published.341  Although the State Department pub-
lishes international agreements on its website, it mixes together Article 
II treaties and the various types of non–Article II agreements without 
distinction, making it difficult if not impossible to discern how often it 
is engaging in the different types of agreement making.342  
In addition to these internal organization and publication difficulties, 
and in large part as a result of them, the State Department’s reporting 
of non–Article II agreements to Congress is often late and is perpetually 
incomplete.343  Congress amended the Case Act in 2004 because it was 
“concerned about not being fully informed regarding international 
agreements entered into by the Executive [B]ranch.”344  But noncompli-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
of the Peace Corps in Ethiopia, Eth.-U.S., Oct. 2, 2007, T.I.A.S. No. 07-1002.  To take another 
example, an agreement with Colombia entered into force on September 30, 2007, but “was received 
late from post abroad” in 2010.  Reporting International Agreements to Congress Under Case Act, 
supra; see also Agreement Amending the Agreement of 2000, Colom.-U.S., Sept. 28, 2007, Temp. 
State Dep’t No. 2010-0113, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/147076.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/A35Y-VUKA].  See generally KAVASS’S GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES TREATIES IN 
FORCE 935–45 (2016) (documenting deficiencies in reporting from agencies to State  
Department).  
 341 The Department has acknowledged the problem, which it attributes in part to funding defi-
ciencies.  See Publication of TIAS, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/tias/pubtias/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z38K-VDK5] (noting “that funding to continue producing UST has been prob-
lematic in recent years”). 
 342 See 2017 Treaties and Agreements, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/ 
tias/2017/index.htm [https://perma.cc/7HG5-BF2V]. 
 343 See Harrington, supra note 15, at 352–53 (describing the shortcomings of Case Act reporting); 
MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW 5 n.28 (2015); see also 150 CONG. REC. H11026 
(daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) (noting that in 2004, “the House Committee on International Relations 
learned that, due to numerous management failures within the Department of State, over 600 clas-
sified and unclassified international agreements dating back to 1997, had not been transmitted to 
Congress, as required by the Case-Zablocki Act”). 
 344 See 150 CONG. REC. H11026.  Section 7121 of The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Pre-
vention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) amended the Case Act in three material ways.  See Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 7121, 118 Stat. 3638, 3807–08.  First, 
IRTPA requires the Secretary of State to publish on the Department’s website “each treaty or in-
ternational agreement” that it intends to publish “in the compilation entitled ‘United States Treaties 
and Other International Agreements’ not later than 180 days after the date on which the treaty or 
agreement enters into force.”  1 U.S.C. § 112b(d)(1).  For reasons stated above, these online collec-
tions remain incomplete, and the State Department acknowledges that “much work needs to be 
done.”  See Publication of TIAS, supra note 341.  Second, IRTPA requires the Secretary of State to 
submit an annual report to Congress containing an index of all signed or proclaimed international 
agreements made that year that are not published “in the compilation entitled ‘United States Trea-
ties and Other International Agreements.’”  § 112b(d)(1).  We have found references to these reports 
in the Congressional Record, see, e.g., 162 CONG. REC. H2212 (daily ed. May 10, 2016) (referencing 
a report sent by the State Department “pursuant to 1 U.S.C. 112b(d)(1)”), but they appear to be 
submitted to Congress in classified form, as contemplated by § 112b(d)(2).  Third, IRTPA revived 
a funding restriction from the 1980s that had the effect for three years (2005–2007) of withholding 
funding to implement any agreement that the executive branch did not transmit to Congress within 
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ance persists, and the result in practice is that Congress lacks a full pic-
ture of U.S. agreements, and the public (including those in the public 
who have the incentive and ability to monitor the government) has 
highly selective access to these agreements and little ability to perceive 
the overall agreement practices of the executive branch.345  The confu-
sion about international agreements is so pervasive that in some in-
stances, “different parts of the U.S. government disagree about whether 
agreements exist with a particular nation, whether agreements are still 
in force, and what their terms are.”346 
In sum, the main forms of accountability for presidential control over 
international law are congressional and public scrutiny of international 
agreements made by the executive branch, a task made harder by the 
fact that the executive branch has not entirely complied with its publi-
cation and reporting duties concerning these agreements.  Beyond these 
relatively weak accountability mechanisms for agreements, there is no 
formal review in the domestic legal system at all for presidential  
interpretations or terminations of international law, or for political  
commitments.347 
There are at least two reasons to question the adequacy of this lim-
ited, piecemeal accountability scheme.  First, the absence of a delibera-
tive system of review for presidential control over international law 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
sixty days, as required by § 112b(a).  In 2013, Congress additionally required the Defense Depart-
ment to submit to the Armed Services Committees a report on all Defense Department–related 
agreements reported to the Foreign Relations Committees under the Case Act.  See National  
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 1249, 127 Stat. 672, 925–26 
(2013). 
 345 As the JAG Corps put it, “[d]etermining the existence of an international agreement is more 
challenging than one might think.”  THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., OP-
ERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 122 (2015); see also Harrington, supra note 15 at 353–59 (describing 
the labyrinthine and often futile process of trying to find international agreements); GEN. AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO TRACK AND 
ARCHIVE TRADE AGREEMENTS 4 (1999), http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/228531.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/RKX4-QG4U] (noting in 1999 that “[t]he number of trade agreements to which the United 
States is currently a party is uncertain” and that “key agencies were unable to provide a definitive 
count of all U.S. trade agreements that are currently in force”).  
 346 INT’L SEC. ADVISORY BD., REPORT ON STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS 39 (2015) 
(emphasis added), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236456.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
BT47-VDRY].  The U.S. Department of Defense, for example, operates with “a surprising degree 
of uncertainty about what status [of forces] agreements are in force and their terms.”  Id.  
 347 Galbraith argues that international law, and in particular the need for consensus with other 
nations or international organizations, should be credited as imposing additional constraints on 
presidential power in this context.  See Galbraith, supra note 2, at 1688–91.  Such constraints are 
difficult to generalize about with any confidence.  There are also significant accountability issues 
at the international level.  See generally Stephan, supra note 176; Richard B. Stewart, The Global 
Regulatory Challenge to U.S. Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 695 (2005).  In any 
event, because the international constraints do not concern accountability to Congress or the  
American people, there is no reason to think that they will ensure compliance with domestic law or 
policy or lead to a decision that serves U.S. interests.  If anything, the constraints of international 
law may pull in the opposite direction on average. 
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stands in contrast to other contexts in which there have been accretions 
of presidential power, where Congress has imposed extensive procedural 
rules and constraints to ensure presidential accountability.  Consider ad-
ministrative law.  Beginning in the late nineteenth century and acceler-
ating during the New Deal, Congress delegated substantial domestic 
rulemaking and adjudicative authority to executive branch agencies to 
address complex problems generated by modern capitalism.348  To alle-
viate the constitutional and legitimacy concerns raised by these delega-
tions, and to better ensure that agencies would act in accordance with 
their delegated authority, Congress in 1946 enacted the APA.349  The 
APA imposed procedural requirements (with some exceptions) for 
agency issuance of substantive legislative rules, and it generally pro-
vided that agency action would be subject to judicial review.350  It also 
added to the transparency rules that already existed by virtue of the 
Federal Register Act.351  The two statutes in combination require spec-
ified agency proposals and actions, as well as specified executive actions 
and orders, to be published in the Federal Register and, when appropri-
ate, the Code of Federal Regulations.352 
An analogous transformation occurred beginning in 1991 in the very 
different context of covert action.  A covert action is “an activity . . . to 
influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is 
intended that the role of the U.S. government will not be apparent or 
acknowledged publicly.”353  Covert action became controversial after the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 348 See Richard B. Stewart, Essay, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 437, 440–41 (2003). 
 349 See id. 
 350 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012).  See generally KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD 
J. PIERCE, JR., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 458–596 (2d ed. 
2014).  As noted above, APA rulemaking procedures do not apply “to the extent that there is in-
volved — (1) a military or foreign affairs function of the United States.”  5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1).  
 351 Ch. 417, 49 Stat. 500 (1935) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1511 (2012)). 
 352 Under the APA, notices of proposed rulemaking, substantive rules and interpretations of gen-
eral applicability, statements of general policy, rules of practice and procedure, descriptions of 
agency forms, rules of organization, descriptions of an agency’s central and field organization, and 
amendments or revisions to the foregoing are now also required to be published in the Federal 
Register.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1).  The Federal Register Act requires the executive branch to collect 
specified executive branch documents, file them with the National Archives’ Office of the Federal 
Register, make them available for public inspection, and publish them in the Federal Register.  See 
44 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1505.  The documents that must be published in the Federal Register include 
presidential proclamations and executive orders, notices, and documents that the President or  
Congress requires to be published.  Id. § 1505.  Since its 1935 enactment, the Federal Register Act 
has excluded “treaties and other agreements.”  See § 12, 49 Stat. at 503 (“Nothing in this Act shall 
be construed to apply to treaties, conventions, protocols, and other international agreements, or 
proclamations thereof by the President.”).  Today the exclusion is codified at 44 U.S.C. § 1511. 
 353 50 U.S.C. § 3093(e) (Supp. II 2015).  See generally WILLIAM J. DAUGHERTY, EXECUTIVE 
SECRETS: COVERT ACTION AND THE PRESIDENCY (2004).  Before 1991, covert actions were 
primarily based on Article II of the Constitution and the National Security Act of 1947.  See Na-
tional Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 102(d)(5), 61 Stat. 495, 498 (codified as amended 
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intelligence scandals of the 1970s, which revealed plans for assassina-
tions and other shocking CIA covert actions, and the Iran-Contra scan-
dal of the 1980s, which showed continued indifference by the national 
security bureaucracy to legal constraints on covert actions.354  In 1991, 
Congress — in this most sensitive of contexts — increased presidential 
accountability for covert action to better ensure that it was lawful and 
prudent.355  In particular, Congress ended plausible deniability by re-
quiring the President to make a finding for each covert action that de-
scribes the action, identifies the agencies involved, and determines that 
the action does not violate the Constitution or a statute.356  It also es-
tablished duties to report the finding to congressional intelligence com-
mittees, to keep them “fully and currently informed of all covert ac-
tions,” and to respond to committee queries about such actions.357  These 
committees lack formal veto power but they can influence covert ac-
tions, and sometimes even cause them to be terminated, through leaks, 
spending restrictions, and appeals to the President.358  The reporting 
mechanisms also trigger significant internal executive branch processes 
of review that often result in termination or alteration of planned covert 
actions.359 
Congress (and in some instances courts) concluded that these ac-
countability regimes were necessary to redress the “pathologies of unac-
countable bureaucratic [action],”360 including executive branch law de-
fiance, interest group capture, and imprudent or corrupt presidential 
action.  Presidential control over international law is sprawling and im-
pacts domestic actors, like in administrative law, as well as U.S. foreign 
relations, like in covert action.  There is no particular reason to think 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
at 50 U.S.C. § 3035 (Supp. III 2015)) (providing that it is the “duty of the [Central Intelligence] 
Agency . . . to perform such other functions and duties relating to intelligence affecting the national 
security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct”).  Congress further autho-
rized covert action in the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974 and the Intelligence Oversight Act of 
1980.  See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 69, at 690–91. 
 354 See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 69, at 691. 
 355 See Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-88, 105 Stat. 429 (cod-
ified as amended in scattered sections of 10 and 50 U.S.C.).  
 356 See 50 U.S.C. § 3093(a) (2012). 
 357 See id. § 3093(b). 
 358 For examples, see GOLDSMITH, supra note 329, at 90–91.  The accountability regime for 
covert action is but one piece of a larger accountability regime that Congress imposed on presiden-
tial intelligence operations more generally.  For other elements, see, for example, 50 U.S.C. § 3517 
(Supp. II 2015) (inspector general for CIA); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c); and Intelligence Re-
form and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (codified at 50 
U.S.C. §§ 402–442b) (creating the Director of National Intelligence and other post-9/11 reforms). 
 359 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 329, at 89 (noting that “[m]ost proposed covert actions never 
make it through the [executive branch] process, frequently because they do not pass legal muster”). 
 360 Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, Essay, Agency Design and Political Control, 126 
YALE L.J. 1002, 1010 (2017). 
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that the dangers of illegality, agency costs, and misguided action are less 
prevalent in the context of international law.  The haphazard nature of 
the review that has developed for presidential control over international 
law, and the existence of more considered forms of review for other areas 
of presidential power, are at least suggestive that additional account-
ability is appropriate in this context.361  
The second and more concrete reason to think that current account-
ability constraints on presidential control over international law are 
suboptimal is that there are indications that the executive branch has 
been acting unlawfully in some respects related to international law.  For 
example, the executive branch is clearly not complying fully with its 
duties under the Case Act to report international agreements to  
Congress.  In addition, as we noted in Parts I and IV, it appears that the 
President may in some instances be making binding congressional- 
executive agreements that lack plausible authorization.  Relatedly, the 
executive branch’s possible reliance in recent years on a theory of  
Executive Agreements+ raises serious legal concerns. 
These potentially unlawful executive branch actions are especially 
worrisome because of the extraordinary opacity of the legal bases for 
executive actions related to international law, and especially for interna-
tional agreements.  In the domestic realm, the legal bases for regulations, 
rules, and various other executive actions must be made public in the 
Federal Register.362  By contrast, the public has no access to the legal 
bases for the greater than ninety percent of binding international agree-
ments that are not treaties but that are reported under the Case Act.363  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 361 The fact that other constitutional democracies, faced with a proliferation of international 
agreements and political commitments, appear to be making efforts to rein in executive unilateral-
ism in this area (including countries like the United Kingdom that have a long tradition of executive 
control over foreign relations), see infra notes 407, 409, might also be suggestive.  See also THE 
KNESSET — RESEARCH & INFO. CTR., THE ROLE OF THE PARLIAMENT IN THE RATIFICA-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS 3 (2003), https://www.knesset.gov.il/ 
mmm/data/pdf/me00647.pdf [https://perma.cc/77CY-G5Q2] (“The issue of the role of parliament in 
the approval of international agreements and treaties, is on the agendas of many parliaments around 
the world, especially in this period, in which many public matters are settled by means of interna-
tional law, and the status of international bodies is becoming progressively stronger.”). 
 362 See, e.g., 1 C.F.R. § 19.1(b) (2017) (requiring citation of legal authority for executive orders 
and proclamations); id. § 21.40 (requiring citation of legal authority for documents “subject to cod-
ification,” which include any general document that has general applicability and effect such as 
rules and regulations); id. § 22.2 (requiring citation of legal authority for notices); id. § 22.5(b) (re-
quiring citation of legal authority for proposed rules); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(2) (2012) (requiring 
citation of legal authority for notices of proposed rulemaking).  
 363 Pursuant to a regulatory directive, the transmittals to Congress include a citation of legal 
authority.  See 22 C.F.R. § 181.7 (2017) (requiring Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs to 
transmit to the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House “background information to ac-
company each agreement reported under the Act . . . [including] a precise citation of legal autho-
rity”).  But the public is not currently given access to this citation.  Along with Professor Hathaway, 
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This makes it very hard and often impossible for the public (including 
private groups that monitor the government) to determine the category 
of agreement — that is, whether it is a sole executive agreement, ex ante  
congressional-executive agreement, executive agreement pursuant to 
treaty, Executive Agreement+, or something else.364  But if one cannot 
determine the legal basis for an agreement, one cannot assess whether 
that legal basis is valid and thus whether the agreement is lawful.  Nor 
can one ascertain the scale of potentially illegal executive action — for 
example, how often the executive branch relies on an Executive  
Agreements+ theory, or whether and how often the executive branch 
relies on inappropriate or misplaced authorizations to make agreements.   
The reasons for concern about the legitimacy of presidential control 
over international law — the piecemeal and understudied manner in 
which the control has developed and expanded, the lack of a considered 
accountability scheme compared to other areas of presidential power, 
and specific worries over possibly unlawful action — suggest that ac-
countability in this context may be inadequate.  But these reasons are 
only suggestive.  We now move to discuss what additional information 
one would need to know to determine whether more accountability is 
appropriate, and, if so, how much and in what forms. 
2.  Additional Factors Relevant to Accountability Assessment. — In 
this section, we discuss the main additional factors that one would need 
to consider in order to assess whether the current accountability con-
straints on presidential control over international law are adequate or 
should be reformed.  Many of these factors are difficult to pin down 
with precision and even harder to evaluate in the aggregate, which is 
why normative judgments in this context are so difficult. 
(a)  The Quality of Executive Outputs. — Perhaps the most signifi-
cant uncertainty with respect to broad unilateral presidential control 
over international law is whether it results in good foreign policy out-
comes for the United States.  How well is presidential control working 
in terms of the quality and quantity of the President’s decisions related 
to international law?  Do the agreements that the President makes, the 
President’s interpretations of international law, and the President’s 
agreement terminations, serve the nation well?  How does this output 
compare with what would occur if the President were subject to more 
constraints? 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
we are seeking to obtain, through the Freedom of Information Act, records of the State Depart-
ment’s citations of legal authority in Case Act transmissions to Congress dating back to January 20, 
1989 (the beginning of President George H.W. Bush’s first term as President). 
 364 Harrington, supra note 15, at 352 (noting that “it is nearly impossible for the researcher to 
discover whether the Executive exceeded his statutory authority for any given agreement,” and 
adding that “[i]n fact, it can be a challenge to determine whether the agreement had statutory au-
thority at all”).  Ex post congressional-executive agreements are not collected or identified as such 
but are relatively easy to spot because they are specifically approved by Congress after negotiation. 
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These questions are difficult to answer because there is so much con-
testation about the proper goals of U.S. foreign policy and about how to 
assess policy outcomes.  One can perhaps infer from Congress’s persis-
tent, extensive, and broad delegations in this context that both the  
President and Congress believe that presidential control generally serves 
U.S. foreign policy well compared to the alternatives.  Yet the desirabil-
ity of current levels of presidential control likely still depends on one’s 
views about the contested fruits of presidential control.  For example, 
one who thinks that the Paris Agreement and the Iran deal are historic 
successes for U.S. foreign policy that would not have been possible with 
more robust forms of accountability may be sanguine about presidential 
control.  On the other hand, one who thinks that these agreements harm 
U.S. interests may be more likely to insist on reduced presidential au-
thority, increased congressional involvement and guidance, narrower 
delegations of power to the President, and the like.  There is no easy 
way to sort this issue out in order to assess, from this perspective, 
whether the current levels of presidential power and constraint should 
be altered.365 
(b)  The Quality of Informational Inputs. — Among the reasons why 
Congress delegates authority to the executive branch in the domestic 
context is that the executive branch possesses both relative expertise and 
relatively superior information related to the matter being delegated.366  
These traditional rationales for delegations apply with greater force in 
the context of international law.  The executive branch is thought to 
have much better information than Congress because of its vast intelli-
gence and diplomatic services and the persistent expertise of its large 
bureaucracies.367  And, because it is hierarchical and unitary, it is 
thought to be able to act on this superior information faster and with 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 365 Principal-agent theory, which is often used to analyze the quality of executive branch outputs, 
is not much help here.  The issue about the quality of those outputs can perhaps be stated as whether 
the President is a faithful agent of Congress (the principal) in making (or interpreting or breaking) 
agreements.  Reform of the current set of delegations and accountability constraints might be less 
warranted to the extent that the executive branch is a faithful agent and more warranted to the 
extent that it is not.  But the President’s powers related to international law do not always depend 
on congressional delegation, and rarely depend on delegation from the current Congress.  When the 
source of the President’s power to act is uncertain or mixed, the principal-agent analysis becomes 
so complex as to be unhelpful.  Should the principal be Congress, in which case the test is whether 
the President is carrying out Congress’s wishes?  Or should it be the American people who elected 
the President, in which case the issue may be whether the President is making policy that serves 
the national interest (or preferences of the electorate)?  This uncertainty is a particular stumbling 
block to analysis when Presidents do things (such as the Iran deal) that rest on both constitutional 
and statutory authorities, and that they believe serve the national interest, but that the current 
Congress opposes.  Without a specification of the proper principal, which is contested, we cannot 
sort out how well the President is acting as agent.   
 366 For further explanation, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1607 (2016).   
 367 See id. at 1608–09.  
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greater flexibility, and to better maintain the secrecy that is often vital 
to international negotiations and diplomacy.368  The executive branch’s 
superior information and expertise are the main reasons why Congress 
has delegated so much power so open-endedly to the President in this 
context, and why the President possesses some international lawmaking 
power and related foreign relations powers under Article II that would 
be unthinkable in a purely domestic context. 
In the administrative law context, despite the executive branch’s su-
perior information and expertise in domestic administrative law,  
Congress, courts, and sometimes even the executive branch have wor-
ried about the quality of agency decisionmaking.  The worries, in a nut-
shell, have been that federal agencies had too much discretion and were 
not responsive to democratic wishes, or were captured by special inter-
ests, or did not adequately rest their decisions on inputs from affected 
groups.369  Beginning in the 1960s, agencies responded to these concerns 
by shifting to an “interest representation” model that involved greater 
use of notice-and-comment rulemaking (as opposed to adjudication), 
and judges imposed more robust forms of judicial review and allowed 
an expanded array of plaintiffs to contest agency action.370  In part in 
response to the perceived excesses of the interest representation model, 
the executive branch in 1981 began to require agencies to perform cost-
benefit analyses to constrain agency action.371  In short, over time 
agency decisionmaking was constrained, beyond the original APA and 
bare congressional delegations, by reforms designed to enhance infor-
mational inputs and judicial review, and by imposition of cost-benefit 
analysis supervised by centralized executive branch control. 
Should analogous reforms be applied to presidential control over in-
ternational law?  Hathaway has argued that the making of both sole 
executive agreements and ex ante congressional-executive agreements 
should be brought under a “new administrative process” akin to the 
APA.372  Among other things, she proposes a modified public “notice-
and-comment” procedure for such agreements and judicial review.373  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 368 See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015) (“Between the two 
political branches, only the Executive has the characteristic of unity at all times.  And with unity 
comes the ability to exercise, to a greater degree, ‘[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.’” (quot-
ing THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 6, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton))). 
 369 See Stewart, supra note 348, at 441–42.   
 370 See id. at 441–43.   
 371 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).  This 
order was superseded by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).  For a general analysis, see 
Kagan, supra note 329, at 2277–81.  
 372 Hathaway, supra note 27, at 242.  
 373 Id. at 242–53. 
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Such a process would “allow public input into the process of interna-
tional lawmaking”374 and allow Congress and the public to “provide  
information that might prove helpful in the process of creating the  
agreements.”375 
Setting aside the significant costs of this proposal for presidential 
international lawmaking, to which we return in a moment, Hathaway 
does not make the affirmative case for a need for additional informa-
tional inputs in the context of international agreements, and, indeed, 
provides only one concrete but inconclusive example of where more in-
formation or public input would have improved an agreement.376  Her 
arguments for bringing the APA structure to international agreements 
depend primarily on concerns about restoring the “balance” of congres-
sional and democratic participation in the making of international 
agreements.377  But she does not criticize the overall quality of the agree-
ments made by the President.  Nor does she argue that the agreement-
making process is bedeviled by informational deficits or captured by 
interests that do not serve the public.  We do not deny that such prob-
lems may exist — we just do not know.  While we have suggested that 
there may be reasons to worry by analogy to the types of accountability 
measures that have been brought to bear on other areas of law, those 
analogies alone do not make the case for reform in this different context.  
This is especially so in light of the President’s acknowledged expertise 
in this context, the general confidence Congress appears to have dis-
played in the executive branch with its extensive, broad delegations, and 
longstanding practice in support of many of the executive branch ac-
tions.  The simple point is that before knowing whether or how to re-
form presidential control over international law, one needs to know 
what the actual problems are (if any) with that control. 
(c)  Issues Related to Lawful Action. — One of the most important 
goals for any accountability scheme is to ensure that the President or his 
subordinates act lawfully.  A traditional aim of administrative law, and 
especially of public judicial review of certain forms of agency action, is 
to ensure that administrative agencies act within their delegated author-
ity.378  In other contexts, especially where there is an imperative for se-
crecy, or where executive branch action rests in part on inherent author-
ity, or where the action involves national security, mechanisms short of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 374 Id. at 245. 
 375 Id. at 244.  
 376 See id. at 215–39.  Hathaway contends that a more open process “will lead to agreements that 
are more legitimate, more consistent with American constitutional ideals, and better tailored to the 
needs and interests of the American public.”  Id. at 252. 
 377 Id. at 215–30. 
 378 See Stewart, supra note 348, at 439–40; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American 
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1671–76 (1975). 
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public judicial review are sometimes deemed sufficient to ensure lawful 
action by the President.379 
In contrast to the absence of affirmative evidence of problems con-
cerning the informational bases on which the executive branch makes 
its international law decisions, there are concrete reasons, explained 
above, to think that Presidents are sometimes exceeding their authority 
in connection with their control over international law.  But that fact 
alone does not tell us much about whether or what types of accounta-
bility reforms are appropriate.  One would also need to know the scale 
of the illegality problem under the current accountability scheme.  This 
question matters because the optimal rate of illegal action by the  
President is not zero.  Accountability schemes are rarely if ever designed 
to ensure perfect legality, because the costs to presidential practice of 
ensuring perfect legality are too high.380  Judicial review almost certainly 
improves the overall legality of presidential action.  But judges some-
times make mistakes about the law.381  And judicial review imposes 
many costs on presidential action that are sometimes in the aggregate 
prohibitive.382  These costs in the context of presidential control over 
international law include dampening presidential initiative, slowing ne-
gotiations, foreign relations problems resulting from changes to or ter-
mination of agreements already made, reduced presidential credibility 
during negotiations or amidst assertions of U.S. positions relating to cus-
tomary international law, and the like.383  Costs such as these are one 
reason why Congress excluded “a military or foreign affairs function” 
from the procedural and judicial review requirements for agency  
rulemaking.384  They also explain, more generally, why robust public 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 379 For example, for covert action, a presidential certification combined with strict reporting to 
the congressional intelligence committees is deemed to suffice.  See 50 U.S.C. § 3093(a)–(c) (2012).  
Another example is section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments 
Act of 2008, which authorizes the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to review and approve, 
in secret, programmatic executive branch “targeting” and “minimization” procedures for certain 
forms of foreign intelligence electronic surveillance to ensure compliance with statutory commands 
and the Fourth Amendment.  See Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438–48 (2008) (codi-
fied as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a).  
 380 See Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 673 (2015). 
 381 Cf. id. at 677 (“[E]liminating abuses requires setting up enforcement machinery that is itself 
a source of possible abuses.”).   
 382 See id. (“[T]he costs necessary to produce full enforcement of constitutional rules might simply 
not be worth paying, in light of other possible uses for those resources.”).  
 383 Some of these costs are discussed in Hathaway, supra note 27, at 251.  
 384 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2012).  The Senate Report to the original APA explained that the 
“foreign affairs functions” exclusion included “those ‘affairs’ which so affect relations with other 
governments that, for example, public rule making provisions would clearly provoke definitely un-
desirable international consequences.”  S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 13 (1945) (emphasis added).  Unde-
sirable international consequences are the primary criteria for exclusion of executive branch action 
under this exception to the APA, see, e.g., Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356, 1360 & n.4 (9th Cir. 
1980), though some courts go further and exempt rules whose “‘subject matter is clearly and directly 
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judicial review of presidential action related to foreign affairs and na-
tional security remains relatively rare.385   
To assess whether the costs of judicial review or other robust forms 
of review of presidential action related to international law are justified, 
therefore, one must have a sense of the rate of unlawful presidential 
action in this context.  If Presidents are not exceeding their legal author-
ity very much under the current scheme of minimal review, the costs of 
full-blown public judicial review may be hard to justify.  These costs are 
more warranted and easier to justify if the President frequently exceeds 
his or her authority related to international law and if other, less costly 
forms of accountability review do not suffice to rein in the President. 
(d)  Congressional Oversight. — An important factor in any assess-
ment of the need for more accountability in this context is the quality 
and quantity of the main accountability constraint on the President — 
congressional oversight.  
Congress does not engage in a great deal of “police patrol” oversight 
of the President related to control over international law.386  The foreign 
relations committees in Congress do not conduct active, persistent over-
sight in the form of hearings and other studies to examine the President’s 
actions related to international law.387  That does not mean that  
Congress’s oversight is inadequate, however, because Congress might 
sufficiently rely on “fire alarms” set off by the press, organized groups, 
and citizens who monitor the executive branch and bring its untoward  
actions to the attention of Congress.388  Consistent with this view,  
Congress has shown an awareness of and an ability to engage with  
Presidents when it thinks they are acting improperly or otherwise in 
ways that demand more scrutiny and constraint.  It has shown itself 
capable of imposing ex post consultation or consent requirements in cer-
tain contexts.389  It has amended the Case Act to require more robust 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
involved’ in a ‘foreign affairs function,’” Mast Indus., Inc. v. Regan, 596 F. Supp. 1567, 1582 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 1984) (quoting H.R. REP. 79-1980, at 23 (1946)).  For a recent effort to integrate these 
tests, see City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to U.N., 618 F.3d 172, 202 (2d Cir. 2010).    
 385 See generally BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 69, at 45–133 (reviewing doctrines lim-
iting judicial review in these contexts). 
 386 Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Pa-
trols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166–67 (1984). 
 387 Recently, however, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing related to some of 
the issues discussed in this Article, and one of us (Curtis Bradley) testified at that hearing.  See The 
President, Congress, and Shared Authority over International Accords: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/the- 
president-congress-and-shared-authority-over-the-international-accords-120517 [https://perma.cc/ 
U2XL-8S7K].  
 388 McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 386, at 166.  
 389 See supra note 26 (listing ex post congressional-executive agreements in recent decades); Iran 
Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114–17, 129 Stat. 201 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2160e (Supp. IV 2016)) (requiring the President to disclose to Congress the text and details about 
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reporting of agreements, although not with complete success.390  And, 
at least in high-profile examples, it often learns about and responds to 
threatened exercises of presidential unilateralism related to international 
law, sometimes leading the President to back down.391 
Despite these signals of congressional engagement, there are many 
hurdles to assessing their adequacy and some reasons to think they are 
inadequate.  The fire alarm theory cannot work unless the public and 
journalists and interested groups can examine presidential behavior and 
thus trigger the fire alarms.  To the extent that presidential practice or 
the legal basis for that practice is concealed from the public, confidence 
in fire alarm mechanisms is reduced.  Moreover, even if there were per-
fect transparency and occasional reactions to fire alarms, it is difficult 
to tell whether such oversight would be optimal.  Perhaps Congress 
should react more to fire alarms but it lacks the electoral incentives or 
institutional interest or resources to do so.  One indicator beyond general 
concerns of transparency that congressional oversight is inadequate is 
that the President appears to be engaged in at least marginally unlawful 
action related to international agreements, in response to which Con-
gress has done very little.  Another indicator is that the executive branch 
has not been fully complying with the Case Act and Congress has done 
nothing since its 2004 amendments to redress the problem.  Does con-
gressional nonaction in these contexts reflect ignorance, indifference, or 
resource constraints?  Or does Congress think the legality concerns are 
marginal and thus not worth worrying about?  One needs more infor-
mation about these questions to make an assessment of presidential ac-
countability in this context. 
(e)  The Costs, Benefits, and Tradeoffs of Accountability Mecha-
nisms. — The discussion above underscores that there are significant 
tradeoffs associated with imposing more accountability constraints on 
the President.  Additional congressional checks on presidential agree-
ment making might adversely affect the quantity or quality of the agree-
ments the President makes.  Judicial review might improve legal com-
pliance, but at the possible cost of significantly slowing the agreement-
making process, reducing the number of agreements, alienating negoti-
ation partners, creating uncertainty about the United States’ interna-
tional obligations, introducing harmful interest group competition, and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
the political commitment with Iran after signature but before ratification, giving Congress sixty 
days to stop the deal). 
 390 See supra note 344. 
 391 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 150–52 (Law of the Sea Convention obligations); text ac-
companying notes 170–72 (provisional application of Arms Trade Treaty); text accompanying notes 
202–06 (United Nations vote on nuclear testing ban). 
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undermining presidential flexibility and credibility.392  Reporting and 
publicity requirements, depending on their timing, could have similar 
effects.393 
These examples show that we need more than additional information 
to figure out which accountability mechanisms might be appropriate.  
We also need to understand the costs of those mechanisms, and assess 
whether their benefits (in terms of better, more lawful, more informed, 
more responsive, or higher-quality decisionmaking) are worth the costs 
that the accountability constraints impose.394  Another way to under-
stand this issue is in terms of the balance of decision costs and error 
costs.  Additional accountability constraints increase the decision costs 
of presidential action.  The aim of these constraints is to lower the rate 
of “erroneous” decisions, which can include any of the problematic pres-
idential actions we have described.  One way of looking at the tradeoff 
is that accountability constraints should minimize the sum of decision 
and error costs.  By itself, that abstract formulation tells us little, because 
decision and error costs are hard to assign with precision.  But it does 
provide a framework for assessing reforms.  For example, if the error 
cost of illegality under the current system is relatively small, then the 
known high decision costs of judicial review would probably not be war-
ranted, and a lower-decision-cost reform, such as public transparency, 
might suffice.  
(f)  Concluding Observations. — We conclude this section with five 
general observations relating to any assessment of proper reforms in this 
area.  First, it is especially challenging to theorize accountability strate-
gies across the entire range of international law pathways, and even 
across the entire range of international agreements.  One can do better 
in assessing the informational and cost-benefit factors the narrower 
one’s focus gets.  Second, the more dimensions along which one alters 
current accountability constraints, the greater the likelihood of systemic 
effects in various directions, including second- and third-order conse-
quences that are hard to fathom and might be self-defeating.395  Put 
slightly differently, the more ambitious the proposal, the more difficult 
it is to assess how the costs and benefits tally up.  Third, even with 
perfect knowledge of the facts and much more consensus than we now 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 392 Hathaway acknowledges these costs, see Hathaway, supra note 27, at 251–52, and she pro-
poses a variety of possible benefits that she contends will outweigh or ameliorate these costs, see id. 
at 252. 
 393 On the potential downsides of excessive transparency, see Gersen & Stephenson, supra  
note 329, at 212–13, 219–20; and David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift (unpublished  
manuscript). 
 394 For further elaboration of this point, see Vermeule, supra note 380; and Gersen & Stephenson, 
supra note 329. 
 395 See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term — Foreword: System Effects 
and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2009). 
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have on normative issues, there would still likely be many different plau-
sible approaches to reform. 
Fourth, despite these reasons for caution, it does not make sense to 
require perfect information or complete normative consensus before en-
gaging in reform.  Such conditions would almost never be realized and 
thus would lead to regulatory paralysis.  Important prior reform efforts 
relating to executive branch action, including efforts in the areas of ad-
ministrative law and covert action, were not preceded by either perfect 
information or complete normative consensus.  Fifth, and finally, pre-
cisely because no one has perfect information and there are disputes 
about normative principles, real-world answers to accountability for 
presidential control over international law will be filtered through  
politics and compromise and ultimately will come through reform  
experimentation.396 
B.  Reform Proposals 
This final section considers reform.  Our main prescriptive sugges-
tion is that presidential control of international law should be subject to 
a comprehensive regime of ex post transparency.  After making the case 
for why such a transparency reform is appropriate in light of the prin-
ciples articulated in section A, we consider other plausible accountabil-
ity reforms. 
1.  Transparency. — As noted above, federal law requires the publi-
cation of regulations and related executive instruments, and their legal 
bases.  By contrast, Congress and the public, both under the law and in 
practice, are given much less information about the international laws 
and commitments that govern the United States, about the legal bases 
for these instruments, and about when such instruments are terminated, 
than they are given about domestic law and regulations.  However, 
transparency on these basic matters is foundational to presidential ac-
countability.397  If Congress and the people do not know about presi-
dential action or its legal basis, they cannot review it and thus checks 
and balances cannot operate.  More broadly, the publicity of law is 
widely viewed as a minimal presumptive requirement of the rule of law, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 396 The accountability mechanisms associated with both the APA and covert action evolved over 
time in response to changes in the world and learning about how these mechanisms operated.  On 
the former, see Martin Shapiro, A Golden Anniversary?, REGULATION, no. 3, 1996, at 40, 42.  On 
the latter, see GOLDSMITH, supra note 329, at 86–90. 
 397 Cf. Kagan, supra note 329, at 2332 (noting that a “fundamental precondition of accountability 
in administration” is the “degree to which the public can understand the sources and levers of bu-
reaucratic action” and that, because bureaucratic action is “impervious to full public understand-
ing . . . the need for transparency, as an aid to holding governmental decisionmakers to account, 
here reaches its apex”).  See generally AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISAGREEMENT 95–97 (1996) (describing theoretical links between transparency and ac-
countability); David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 285–86 (2010) (similar). 
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so that institutions and citizens can know their legal duties and conform 
their behavior accordingly.398  Finally, greater transparency will not only 
serve accountability and rule of law values, but will also provide infor-
mation that will enable more informed judgments about whether addi-
tional accountability constraints are needed. 
Our main transparency proposal in this section is simply that the 
executive branch make public the international agreements that it con-
cludes, and the legal bases for them, as well as the agreements that it 
terminates, after such action has been taken.  Such ex post transparency 
would serve the aims of accountability by publicizing the law and al-
lowing scrutiny and redress of presidential action, without interfering in 
the President’s prerogatives — some constitutional, some delegated by 
Congress — to negotiate and decide these matters. 
(a)  Agreement Making. — The asymmetry between the publication 
regime for U.S. domestic law and regulations and that for U.S. commit-
ments relating to international law reflects the assumptions of a different 
era of international agreements.  The modern Federal Register docu-
ment collection and publication system that was created for the admin-
istrative state in 1935 excluded international agreements at a time when 
they were much less frequent and much less consequential.  The exclu-
sion of agreements from the otherwise extensive executive branch duty 
to publish the legal basis for executive branch action is also traceable to 
the 1946 “foreign and military affairs” exception to the APA that, at least 
with respect to ex post transparency, is also difficult to justify today.  
There is now dramatically more international law than in the 1930s and 
1940s, and much of it can be just as consequential for U.S. firms and 
citizens as domestic law.  Absent special circumstances, these agree-
ments and their legal bases should be as readily accessible to the public 
as domestic law. 
International agreements should thus move toward a system of col-
lection and publication, after the agreements are made, similar to the 
system for domestic statutes and regulations.  First, there needs to be a 
better system for ensuring (as is already required by the Case Act) that 
the State Department is promptly made aware of international agree-
ments concluded by the various executive branch agencies.399 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 398 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (1964); JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law 
and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 210, 214–18 (1979).  
 399 Senator Corker recently introduced a bill that would amend the Case Act to require any 
executive department or agency that enters into an international agreement to designate a “Chief 
International Agreements Officer” with a statutory duty to transmit international agreements to the 
State Department within twenty days after signature.  See S. 1631, 115th Cong. § 802 (as reported 
by S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Sept. 6, 2017). 
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Second, the State Department needs to establish a better and more 
efficient system for organizing and publishing these agreements pursu-
ant to its statutory duties.  The current system of congressionally au-
thorized regulatory exclusions to publication seems to be a reasonable 
way of drawing the line on what agreements get published.400  But the 
Department needs to do a better job of publishing and organizing U.S. 
agreements.  Indeed, Congress should insist on a system — analogous to 
the Code of Federal Regulations — that constitutes an organized and 
easily searchable database for international agreements.401  
Third, the executive branch should make available to the public the 
legal bases for its agreements, just as it does for domestic regulations.  
Especially in a context in which judicial review plays a very small role, 
public scrutiny of the legal bases for agreements is vital to ensure that 
the President is acting lawfully.  As we explained above, the fire alarm 
theory of congressional oversight of executive branch legality can only 
work if scholars, journalists, and other citizens can examine those legal 
bases and elevate problematic legal rationales into the public realm 
where Congress can, should it wish, act.402  Such scrutiny would require 
the executive branch to think more carefully before relying on contro-
versial legal authorities.  This form of transparency is especially im-
portant since the executive branch in recent years has appeared to assert 
ever broader and more controversial authorities to make agreements.403  
Such transparency will not always clarify the legal bases for all interna-
tional agreements since the State Department will likely continue to rely 
on underexplained, overlapping authorities (although Congress could 
consider requiring more explanation from the Department about its le-
gal claims).  But even minimal public transparency on the legal bases 
for agreements would materially enhance accountability.404 
Such ex post transparency for international agreements and their le-
gal bases is unlikely to impose unwarranted costs on the President.  It 
might adversely affect presidential discretion to the extent that it ex-
poses bad agreements, or agreements based on inappropriate or poor 
information, or agreements that are unlawful or close to being so.  But 
these are features of transparency in this context, not bugs.  The trans-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 400 See 22 C.F.R. § 181.8 (2017).  
 401 If the State Department needs additional funding, as it suggests, Congress should provide it. 
 402 See supra pp. 1284–85; see also Hathaway, supra note 27, at 245 (“[T]here should be much 
more specific information made available about the legal authority for the executive agreements — 
and it should be made available to both Congress and the public at large.”).  
 403 See supra section I.A, pp. 1206–20. 
 404 We are not proposing disclosure of the State Department’s internal legal memoranda prepared 
as part of that Department’s Circular 175 procedure, which is used to decide on the domestic path-
way for concluding an international agreement.  See supra note 16.  Among other things, such 
disclosure might run into issues relating to attorney-client privilege and executive privilege. 
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parency regime will demand additional resources, but the system of pub-
lication for domestic rules shows that there is no fundamental resource 
hurdle to publication of agreements and their legal bases.  Moreover, the 
demand for ex post transparency gives Presidents leeway (should they 
want it) to avoid public scrutiny during the negotiation and completion 
of agreements.  This is consistent with the special need for confidential-
ity in negotiation that is part of the reason why the Founders made the 
President the chief negotiator for treaties, why Congress has delegated 
so much open-ended international lawmaking power to the President, 
and why the Supreme Court has suggested that the negotiation power 
is exclusively the President’s.405 
The Constitution does not, of course, rule out earlier presidential 
transparency about the content of a legal agreement under negotiation, 
or its legal basis.  Congress could require the agreements and their legal 
bases to be disclosed after negotiation but before ratification, or possibly 
even during negotiation.  Both versions of an ex ante publication re-
quirement would allow the public and Congress to know about and 
weigh in on agreements informally even if they could not stop them 
absent extraordinary action by Congress.  If the publicity requirement 
were imposed during negotiation and before signature, however, it 
would make it significantly more difficult for the executive branch to 
negotiate, since it would be engaged simultaneously in two different pro-
cesses, one international and one domestic. 
A publicity requirement after negotiation but before ratification 
would avoid this concern, while still bringing significantly more scrutiny 
to the content of executive agreements.406  But it might also impose sig-
nificant costs that, unlike a less invasive ex post approach, might ad-
versely affect the quality of U.S. agreements.  In the abstract it is prac-
tically impossible to say whether that extra scrutiny would be useful or 
harmful on balance.  It might slow or stop untoward presidential action, 
but it might also interfere with useful negotiations and allow powerful 
interest groups to slow or stop an agreement that should be made.  Con-
gress sometimes requires a short period of notice after a congressional-
executive agreement is signed, during which it can enact a joint resolu-
tion to stop the deal.407  It almost certainly possesses the authority to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 405 See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015) (“The President has 
the sole power to negotiate treaties . . . .”).  
 406 For a proposal along these lines, see Hathaway, supra note 27, at 244.  
 407 See, e.g., Arms Export Control Act § 63, 22 U.S.C. § 2796b (2012) (prohibiting the President 
from entering into lease or loan agreement made under the Act if Congress, within a specified 
fifteen-day or thirty-day period, enacts a joint resolution barring the lease or loan).  In Great Britain 
and certain other Commonwealth countries, although parliamentary approval is not required in 
order for the executive to conclude a treaty, there is a constitutional custom whereby the executive 
will lay a treaty before the Parliament for a certain period of time (such as twenty-one days) before 
ratifying it.  In Great Britain, this convention, which is referred to as the “Ponsonby Rule,” was 
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impose an ex ante notice requirement in connection with any particular 
presidential negotiation.408  Congress has imposed such an ex ante notice 
requirement relatively rarely, just as it has rarely required the President 
to return to Congress for ex post approval of a negotiated agreement.  
These patterns suggest that, for the vast majority of congressionally  
approved agreements, Congress has generally been satisfied with the  
President’s performance and with notice of the agreement after the fact.  
They also show that Congress can impose earlier transparency rules 
when it sees fit to do so.  We have proposed making the ex post trans-
parency duty more regularized and robust for all agreements, but ex-
tending that duty to ex ante transparency across the board would impose 
substantial new burdens and delays on the President that, at least based 
on the current evidence, seem difficult to justify. 
Finally, there is the question of what the transparency rules should 
be for political commitments.  Such commitments are not systematically 
collected and reported anywhere.409  Prominent ones like the Paris 
Agreement are of course publicly known, and different agencies some-
times publish their important political commitments.410  But the bulk of 
political commitments are neither collected centrally nor published in a 
systematic way.  We believe that it would be imprudent to apply the 
Case Act wholesale to political commitments, as one commentator411 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
converted into a statutory requirement in 2010.  See ARABELLA LANG, HOUSE OF COMMONS 
LIBRARY, BRIEFING PAPER: PARLIAMENT’S ROLE IN RATIFYING TREATIES 10 (2017), 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN05855 [https://perma.cc/8PKT-
96NR].  For the custom in Australia, see Treaty Making Process, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T,  
DEP’T FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/treaties/treaty-making- 
process/pages/treaty-making-process.aspx [https://perma.cc/AHM6-23JZ] (“Although the Constitu-
tion does not confer on the Parliament any formal role in treaty making, all treaties (except those 
the Government decided are urgent or sensitive) are tabled in both Houses of Parliament for at least 
15 sitting days prior to binding treaty action being taken.”). 
 408 This is what Congress did in the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (INARA), Pub. 
L. No. 114-17, 129 Stat. 201, which concerned a political commitment rather than a congressional-
executive agreement.  That Act required the President to disclose to Congress the text and details 
about political commitments with Iran after signature but before ratification, giving Congress sixty 
days to stop the deal.  Id. § 135(b)(2); see also infra notes 423–26 and accompanying text. 
 409 Political commitments are excluded from Case Act reporting.  See 22 C.F.R. § 181.2(a) (2017) 
(exempting from Case Act reporting “[d]ocuments intended to have political or moral weight, but 
not intended to be legally binding,” id. § 182.2(a)(1)).  The United States is not the only country 
confronted with this issue.  For discussion of recent legislation in Spain that is designed in part  
to increase the transparency of political commitments, see Carlos Esposito, Three Points on the  
Spanish Treaties and Other International Agreements Act, ACQUIESCENCIA (Aug. 4, 2015), https:// 
aquiescencia.net/tag/spanish-treaties-and-other-international-agreements-act/ [https://perma.cc/ 
Z8BT-AUKJ]. 
 410 See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation, Cooperation and the Ex-
change of Information Related to the Supervision of Cross-Border Regulated Entities, H.K.-U.S., 
Jan. 18, 2017, https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/hongkong-011817.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/NT32-EAE9]. 
 411 Ryan Harrington, A Remedy for Congressional Exclusion from Contemporary International 
Agreement Making, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 1211, 1236–41 (2016). 
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has suggested.  There are too many types of political commitments, and 
the distinctions between political commitments and ordinary diplomatic 
speech and cooperation are too uncertain, to demand that the executive 
branch report all political commitments to Congress.412  At the same 
time, reporting to Congress alone is not enough.  Political commitments, 
especially in the regulatory context, can have large impacts on domestic 
actors just as domestic regulations do.  The public should thus have 
access to political commitments in an organized and searchable fashion 
as well.  A presidential duty to make public such commitments would 
not hinder the negotiation of the commitments in any material way. 
Taking these factors into account, we think the proper solution is for 
Congress to impose Federal Register–like duties of centralized organiza-
tion and publication for political commitments, but only for the most 
important ones.  We are agnostic about how the category of important 
political commitments should be defined.  One possibility is to describe 
a list of types of commitments — such as ones that foster regulatory 
cooperation — that must be centrally collected and published.  Another 
possibility is to create a statutory duty to collect and publish all political 
commitments meeting a general standard, such as “significant” or “im-
portant.”  Such an open-ended standard might sound too vague to be 
manageable, but such a standard works reasonably well in other report-
ing contexts by putting the burden on the agencies to figure out what 
counts as important, subject to informal sanctions by Congress and the 
public should they get the calculation wrong.413 
(b)  Interpretation. — The executive branch’s everyday interpreta-
tions of U.S international agreements and pertinent CIL can modify U.S. 
international obligations in ways that are sometimes hard for Congress 
and the public to discern.  The State Department’s Office of the Legal 
Adviser publishes an annual Digest of United States Practice in Inter-
national Law “to provide the public with a historical record of the views 
and practice of the Government of the United States in public and pri-
vate international law.”414  The Digest is a good compendium of major 
U.S. actions under international law and of the U.S. government’s in-
terpretations of international law related to those actions.  It has at least 
two limitations, however.  First, the executive branch has no affirmative 
duty to publish the Digest, and at times it has stopped doing so (for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 412 This is especially so because, as discussed, the State Department cannot even, at the moment, 
manage to satisfy its Case Act duties as applied to agreements.  See supra notes 338−46 and accom-
panying text. 
 413 See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 3092 (2012) (requiring the executive branch to keep “intelligence com-
mittees fully and currently informed” of other U.S. intelligence activities, including “significant an-
ticipated intelligence activity” (emphasis added)). 
 414 Digest of United States Practice in International Law, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/ 
s/l/c8183.htm [https://perma.cc/7LFS-YYD8]. 
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example, from 1989–1999).415  Second, the public in general has no way 
of knowing whether the Digest is reasonably complete. 
Considered alone, these problems might argue for imposing a statu-
tory duty on the executive branch to publish all “major” or “significant” 
interpretations of international law for the United States in the Digest, 
and a related duty to notify Congress whenever the executive branch 
adopts a substantial new interpretation of international law.416  How-
ever, the executive branch does not publish the vast majority of its in-
ternal legal interpretations of domestic law that support executive 
branch enforcement or executive action pursuant to law, and access to 
such interpretations under the Freedom of Information Act is limited.  
And, in the context of international law, and especially CIL, additional 
transparency can impose appreciable costs.  CIL is more fluid than 
agreements, and the United States (like every nation) will often find it-
self making arguments about the contours of CIL in very different fac-
tual and political situations for which it might want to maintain flexi-
bility.  A rule requiring publication of “major” legal opinions might 
jeopardize this flexibility by ruling out or weakening certain arguments 
in new contexts.  For these reasons, additional transparency beyond the 
Digest in this context is probably unwarranted.417  
(c)  Termination. — Under U.S. domestic law, there is currently no 
mandated reporting process for presidential decisions to suspend, termi-
nate, or withdraw from treaties, and no readily accessible catalogue of 
terminated agreements.418  We can see no affirmative justification for 
this state of affairs, which makes it difficult and sometimes impossible 
for the public, Congress, and even members of the executive branch to 
know what the law is at any particular moment.  Since knowledge of 
the law is necessary to conform to it, the President should be required 
to publish all treaty terminations once they become effective in a manner 
consonant with the Federal Register process described above.419   
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 415 The State Department took a hiatus from publishing the Digest from 1989–1999, and then 
later published a two-volume set covering 1991–1999 and a volume for 1989–1990.  See id. 
 416 The executive branch has a similar obligation in discrete domestic law contexts.  For example, 
under 28 U.S.C. § 530D (2012), the Justice Department has an obligation to report to Congress any 
new policy to refrain from enforcing federal law, or a determination to contest or not enforce federal 
law on the ground that it is unconstitutional. 
 417 Congress might, however, have an institutional interest in imposing a reporting duty on the 
executive branch for situations in which the executive branch accepts (or decides not to oppose) 
international resolutions, tacit treaty amendments, and similar developments if they materially af-
fect U.S. obligations under international law.  If public transparency proves too costly, such reports 
could be classified.   
 418 For trade agreements, however, Congress has addressed other issues relating to termination.  
See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2135 (2012) (mandating that trade agreements entered into by the United 
States be subject to termination after a certain period, regulating the continuing effect of duties and 
other import restrictions in the event of a termination, and mandating notice and a public hearing 
before presidential withdrawal of proclamations implementing such agreements). 
 419 At the moment, there is no comprehensive compendium of terminated U.S. agreements, and 
finding such terminations is haphazard and involves guesswork. 
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Congress might further require the executive branch to explain the rea-
sons for its action and why it is permitted under international law to 
take the action.  Congress could go further and require that it and the 
public learn of the potential termination earlier, when the executive 
branch notifies other parties to an agreement (either directly or through 
the central depository for the agreement) that the United States is sus-
pending, terminating, or withdrawing from a treaty.  At least for situa-
tions in which the executive branch is invoking a withdrawal clause in 
a treaty that requires advance notice, such a report would give Congress 
a chance to express its views before the termination takes effect.  Such 
earlier notice might make it politically more difficult for the executive 
branch to terminate agreements within its authority.  Whether and when 
those extra political hurdles are appropriate is a decision for Congress 
that is difficult to speculate about in general terms. 
* * * 
In sum, we propose four reforms to enhance ex post transparency of 
presidential control over international law: (1) the State Department 
should create a centralized and comprehensive publication of all legally 
binding agreements, akin to the Code of Federal Regulations; (2) the 
executive branch should be required to state the domestic legal authority 
that it is relying on in order to make an agreement binding; (3) it should 
be required to collect and publish important nonbinding political agree-
ments; and (4) it should be required to publish all treaty terminations 
once they become effective (or perhaps earlier when invoking with-
drawal clauses). 
2.  Other Reform Possibilities. — As noted above, one virtue of our 
transparency proposals is that they will, with few creditable costs to the 
executive branch, generate much more information about the quality of 
executive branch control over international law.  Such information 
might well reveal the need for additional reforms.  Given the current 
state of knowledge, we think the following reforms beyond greater trans-
parency are worth considering. 
If Congress has additional residual concerns about the legality of 
presidential agreements, it could impose a duty on the Secretary of State 
to make a finding that every agreement submitted under the Case Act 
is lawful.  In theory, this would require no more work than the internal 
reporting procedures that currently support most if not all agreements.  
But if the Secretary of State, or another senior official in the Depart-
ment, were required to certify legality, the lawyers would have to take 
their jobs more seriously, and cases of marginal illegality might be re-
duced.  Congress has used such certification requirements to enhance 
accountability related to legality in numerous international relations 
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contexts ranging from covert action, to programmatic Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act applications, to actions related to chemical and 
biological weapon activities.420 
Congress also has several options should it wish to more closely mon-
itor the content and quality (as opposed to legality) of presidential con-
trol over international law, although we reiterate that it is unclear 
whether members of Congress have incentives or interests to do so.  
First, as it did in 2005–2007, it could prohibit all expenditures in con-
nection with any international agreement until the executive branch dis-
closes the agreement to Congress.421  If foreign affairs committee re-
sources are a hurdle, Congress could establish a subcommittee structure 
with specialized staffs that closely monitor and push back against pres-
idential initiatives in both formal and informal ways.422  In the extreme, 
Congress could in select instances insist on ex post approval for partic-
ular agreements or classes of agreements. 
Congress could also, for important classes of agreements, institute 
deliberation-forcing mechanisms short of ex post approval.  The Iran 
Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (INARA)423 provides a model.  
President Obama had the relevant legal authority (based on his political 
commitment power plus his delegated discretion over sanctions) to make 
the Iran deal, but Congress intervened with INARA to slow the process.  
In relevant part the law required the President to send the text of the 
signed Iran agreement and related documents and assessments to Con-
gress, and established a sixty-day review period during which presiden-
tial authority to complete the deal was frozen while Congress considered 
how to narrow or eliminate that authority.424  Republicans tried to use 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 420 See 50 U.S.C. § 3093(a) (2012) (prohibiting the President from engaging in covert action with-
out a finding by the President that contains many factors, including that “[a] finding may not au-
thorize any action that would violate the Constitution or any statute of the United States,” id. 
§ 3093(a)(5)); 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g) (requiring Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence 
to certify to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under oath various facts designed to ensure 
that search and minimization procedures comply with Fourth Amendment and other privacy con-
cerns); 50 U.S.C. § 1513(2) (prohibiting expenditure of funds if Secretary of State “determines that 
such testing, development, transportation, storage, or disposal [of chemical or biological weapons 
agents] will violate international law”).  
 421 See supra note 344. 
 422 Such a subcommittee could be modeled on the United States Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that were created in the 
1970s to devote focused attention to the largely secretive and esoteric presidential intelligence prac-
tices (including covert action).  See GOLDSMITH, supra note 329, at 86–92.  While the success of 
the intelligence committees has been uneven over the years, the intensive reporting to and review 
and hearings by the committees (especially staffers) have had a significant disciplining impact over-
all on presidential behavior.  See id. at 92.  
 423 Pub. L. No. 114-17, 129 Stat. 201. 
 424 Id. § 135(b).  INARA also established various reporting requirements about Iranian compli-
ance with the deal, id. § 135(d), and created a mechanism for quick congressional action to reimpose 
sanctions should Iran violate the deal, id. § 135(e). 
1201-1297_BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH_CONTRACTPROOFS 02/04/18 – 4:47 PM 
1296 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:1201 
INARA to stop President Obama from making the deal, but could not 
do so because they lacked the votes to override his threatened veto of 
such an effort.425  INARA was nonetheless successful at bringing to light 
the relevant Iran deal documents and sparking an extensive national 
debate on the deal that forced the Obama Administration to explain and 
justify it like it had not before, and that required members of Congress 
in a vote to take a position on the deal for which they can be held  
accountable.426 
In addition, Congress might want to conduct a comprehensive re-
view of its many statutory delegations of authority to make agreements 
that have accumulated over the years, many of which are quite dated, 
and see how the executive branch has been using those statutes.  Such 
a study might suggest the need for narrowing, updating, or repealing 
some of the statutes.  Relatedly, Congress may wish to start including 
sunset provisions in some of these delegations of authority.427 
Finally, Congress could consider reforming the process whereby 
Presidents make consequential political commitments, which have been 
so controversial in recent years.428  One concern Congress might have is 
that these commitments take advantage of delegations to the President 
that did not contemplate international agreements as a basis for foster-
ing deep international cooperation that Congress might oppose.  Another 
concern may be that, as the Iran deal illustrates, consequential political 
commitments of this form, which lack meaningful interbranch collabo-
ration, may be less stable and thus disruptive to U.S. foreign relations 
because they can be made without the broad domestic support needed 
for long-term compliance.  As noted above, some observers believe that 
the instability inherent in this form of presidential unilateralism is an 
acceptable cost for important agreements like the Iran deal that could 
not have otherwise been reached.  We do not take a position on this 
dispute.  But should Congress think there is a problem here, it has many 
options to rein in the President, ranging from discrete deliberation- 
forcing mechanisms like INARA, to spending restrictions for agreements 
it does not approve of, to a global statute that makes clear that domestic 
regulatory authority that does not itself authorize a political commit-
ment cannot be the basis for one by the President. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 425 Jack Goldsmith, The Iran Deal Is on the President (and Those Who Supported It in Con-
gress), LAWFARE (Nov. 6, 2015, 1:45 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/iran-deal-president-and-
those-who-supported-it-congress [https://perma.cc/6F5D-SKCD].  
 426 See id. 
 427 See Hathaway, supra note 27, at 255–56. 
 428 As explained in Part IV, we believe that the Iran deal and Paris Agreement are lawful.  Here 
we discuss reforms concerning their wisdom and execution in practice. 
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CONCLUSION 
Aspects of presidential control over international law have been 
studied before, but there has not previously been any comprehensive 
effort — by scholars, the public, or Congress — to examine the overall 
picture and consider its normative attractiveness.  As we have shown, 
the pathways of presidential control over international law have evolved 
and expanded over time and increasingly overlap in ways that tend to 
reduce constraints on presidential action.  This growth in presidential 
power has not been accompanied by the development of mechanisms of 
accountability comparable to those that apply to exercises of domestic 
authority.  In sketching some suggestions for reform, this Article seeks 
to initiate a long-overdue consideration of this important development 
in American public law. 
